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ABSTRACT
In the present study we wish to address four related questions. Firstly we 
ask what effect sectoral imbalance has had on aggregate unemployment. We 
examine this question in Chapter 2 using the framework of regional wage 
determination and evidence from Great Britain over the period 1975-1989. 
Secondly we ask why such an imbalance should persist over time and why 
labour does not move to equilibriate its compensating differentials across 
regions. We attempt to answer this question in Chapters 3 and 4 using a 
model of migration flows based on the theory of the 'hiring function' and 
use evidence on bilateral migration flows across the standard regions of 
Great Britain over 1975-1989. Thirdly we wish to examine whether long-term 
unemployment distorts the working of the labour market by examining its 
effects on regional wage determination in Chapter 2 and on migration 
Chapters 3 and 4. Finally we examine whether certain developed economies 
have been more successful than others in curbing both excessive 
unemployment growth and unemployment persistence. In Chapter 5 we attempt 
to explain such contrasting performance by comparing differences in 
institutional features and the more pragmatic active labour market 
intervention in the form of training and other employment related measures 
initiated by different countries following each of the two oil price 
shocks. In comparing national labour market performance we use comparable 
data of the 14 main OECD member countries covering the period from the mid 
1970s to the late 1980s.
For my grandparents and parents
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
High and persistent unemployment was the experience of most developed 
economies following the two oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979, with the 
effects being especially protracted and pronounced during the 1980s. 
Further, the economic recovery of the late 1980s led to inflationary 
pressures at rates of unemployment far higher than those experienced in the 
1960s and 1970s. This latter point would suggest that there had been an 
increase in the natural rate of unemployment, defined as that rate of 
unemployment which is consistent with no wage and price inflation spiral. 
Another alarming feature was that as unemployment increased, long-term 
unemployment increased proportionately more. In France by 1988, as in 
Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom, 
more than 40 per cent of the unemployed have been out of work for more than 
a year with these figures extending to over 60 per cent in certain cases. 
The effects of long spell unemployment range from their social effects, 
resulting from disillusionment and despair at one extreme, through the 
financial costs in the form of dependence of welfare payments to the 
inherent economic effects whereby long-term unemployment may of itself 
hinder the efficient working of the labour market. It is well known that 
the experience of long-term unemployment leads to a loss of morale and 
motivation and that people who have been unemployed for a long time become 
increasingly unattractive to employers seeking to fill vacant jobs. It is 
these latter effects of long-term unemployment which we will examine in 
this study with particular reference to the effects on wage behaviour and 
migration.
Furthermore, throughout the 1980's many industrialised economies 
experienced quite pronounced differentials in regional unemployment rates. 
For example, evidence for Great Britain reveals that the correlation 
coefficient of regional unemployment rates between the mid 1970s and the 
mid 1980s was 0.92, with comparable figures of 0.91 for Japan, 0.84 for 
Italy, 0.83 for Germany and 0.69 for Sweden. The persistence of relative 
unemployment rate differentials lead to increases in absolute differences 
in unemployment across regions with the associated social problems that 
such a dichotomy in economic experiences within countries produced. In 
fact the issues related to the "North-South" divide were as relevant to 
Britain as they were to Italy, with similar geographical divisions existing 
in many other developed economies.
In the present study we wish to address four related questions. 
Firstly we ask what effect sectoral imbalance has had on aggregate 
unemployment. We examine this question in Chapter 2 using the framework of 
regional wage determination and evidence from Great Britain over the period 
1975-1989. Secondly we ask why such an imbalance should persist over time 
and why labour does not move to equilibrate its compensating differentials 
across regions. We attempt to answer this question in Chapters 3 and 4 
using a model of migration flows based on the theory of the "hiring 
function" and use evidence on bilateral migration flows across the standard 
regions of Great Britain over 1975-1989. Thirdly we wish to examine 
whether long-term unemployment distorts the working of the labour market by 
examining its effects on regional wage determination in Chapter 2 and on 
migration Chapters 3 and 4. Finally we examine whether certain developed 
economies have been more successful than others in curbing both excessive 
unemployment growth and unemployment persistence. In Chapter 5 we attempt 
to explain such contrasting performance by comparing ’differences in
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institutional features and the more pragmatic active labour market 
intervention in the form of training and other employment related measures 
initiated by different countries following each of the two oil price 
shocks. In comparing national labour market performance we use comparable 
data of the 14 main OECD member countries covering the period from the mid 
1970s to the late 1980s.
1.2 Regional wage determination
One idea which we pursue in this study is that the distribution in 
unemployment either through the geographical concentration in economically 
depressed regions or into low skill occupation groups has of itself added 
to wage pressure at given aggregate unemployment. This would explain the 
emergence of wage pressure at lower aggregate unemployment rates if the 
mechanism of wage determination was local in character. According to this 
idea if a reduction in the dispersion of unemployment rates across regions 
can reduce inflationary pressure for given aggregate unemployment, then a 
reduction in unemployment dispersion can allow a reduction in aggregate 
unemployment consistent with a given inflationary pressure. This issue is 
pursued in Chapter 2 where we ask how the inter-sectoral dispersion of 
unemployment is related to the overall aggregate unemployment rate. We 
conclude that average unemployment increases with the variance of relative 
unemployment rates across regions. We examine the determinants of regional 
wage behaviour using time series data for the standard regions of Great 
Britain over the period 1974 to 1989 drawn from the Department of 
Employment New Earnings Survey. We carry out a detailed analysis 
disaggregating earnings firstly by sex, secondly by sex and occupation and 
thirdly by sex, occupation and industry. We examine which regional 
variables determine earnings for each of our separate groups and we propose 
possible explanations for our findings.
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1.3 Regional Migration
Many researchers have attempted to explain the labour market 
developments of the 1980s by arguing that those economies which have 
suffered most through unemployment growth and its subsequent persistence 
have been those which have been least flexible in matching their unemployed 
with available employment opportunities. Such mismatch may have occurred 
either through inadequate education and training of job seekers, notably 
the recently unemployed and the young, or insufficient geographical labour 
mobility amongst those groups. The failure of migration to help eliminate 
unemployment dispersion, has lead economists into an examination of 
possible barriers to movement. This has largely concentrated on an 
analysis of the housing market, with particular reference to the local 
authority housing sector within Britain. While justifiably important in 
understanding migration, housing alone fails to explain why migration flows 
follow a cyclical pattern. Moreover, since unemployment dispersion 
generally grows in downturns, migration is least effective when it is most 
needed. This study rigorously examines, in Chapters 3 and 4, the issue of 
geographical mobility using evidence for Great Britain from the National 
Health Service Central Register which records the transfer of patients 
between GPs across regions. We find that migration can be viewed as one 
component of job hiring and as such will fall when overall engagements 
fall. We examine migration using the mechanism of the "hiring function", 
which assumes that the job filling is based on the interaction of 
unemployment and vacancies.
1.4 International comparison of hiring functions
We continue with the idea of the "hiring function" in Chapter 5 where 
we examine national hiring functions across the economies of the OECD 
through their observed reduced forms; the U-V curves. We examine whether
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active intervention in the labour market through training and other forms 
of labour market spending improved the matching efficiency of national 
labour markets and whether institutional features help aid hiring, either 
through the mechanism of wage bargaining or through differences in 
unemployment benefit entitlement.
1.5 Data
While each chapter attempts to be self-contained in its specification 
of data sources we will give a brief summary of the data with the 
respective sources below.
The data we will use in this study derives almost completely from 
published sources. The time span covers the period from the mid 1970s 
through to the late 1980s.
In Chapter 2 where we examine evidence on wage determination within 
Great Britain we use figures published by the Department of Employment and 
published in Regional Trends and the Employment Gazette. In Chapters 3 and 
4 where we examine the determinants of migration flows across the regions 
of Great Britain we again use data drawn from Regional Trends and the 
Gazette supplemented by migration data kindly supplied by the Office of 
Population Censuses and Surveys (OPCS).
In Chapter 5 where we make an international comparison of U-V curves 
across developed labour markets we use published figures taken from the two 
OECD publications Economic Trends and Employment Trends.
CHAPTER 2
REGIONAL WAGE DETERMINATION IN GREAT BRITAIN
2.1 Introduction
The labour market in Britain continues to be characterised by 
substantial differences in unemployment rates across regions. In 1990, 
average unemployment rates over the year ranged from 3.7 per cent in East 
Anglia and 4.0 per cent in the South East up to 8.2 per cent in Scotland 
and 8.7 per cent in the North of England. These differences are commonly 
attributed to a shift in the composition of employment from traditional 
manufacturing industries to services - the former concentrated in the 
North, the latter in the South - so that jobs have been migrating from 
North to South but workers, or at least some types of workers, have been 
slow to follow them.
Regional policy takes as its basis the idea that, given the barriers to 
migration, it is economically wasteful and socially unproductive to allow 
high unemployment to persist in areas where the demand for labour is 
falling. The immediate, and superficially attractive, answer is policy 
intervention to revive the demand for labour in the depressed regions, for 
example, by means of incentives to encourage firms to relocate or take on 
more workers in areas of high unemployment (see, for example, the 1983 
White Paper Regional Industrial Development. Cmnd 9111).
A question often asked about such policies is whether, if they are 
effective in raising employment in the depressed region, they do so simply 
by shifting jobs from one region to another, or whether a reduction in 
regional inequalities can lead to less unemployment in total in the economy 
as a whole. This chapter attempts to address this issue. We should stress 
that an economic case for regional policy can be made on the grounds of
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reducing external social costs resulting from migration. But if aggregate 
unemployment can be reduced there are also gains in the form of additional 
output, and additional revenue to the exchequer (from higher taxes and 
lower unemployment benefit outlays) which can be set against any public 
expenditure costs of regional policy.
The key issue is the relationship between unemployment and inflation. 
It is often argued that shifting jobs from low unemployment regions to high 
unemployment regions will reduce inflationary pressure in the economy as a 
whole. Recognising, however, that the rate of inflation is ultimately 
determined by macroeconomic commitments, such as membership of the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS), a reduction in 
inflationary pressure at any given level of economic activity can be seen 
as permitting a higher overall level of economic activity consistent with 
achieving a given inflation objective. Hence, if a reduction in the 
dispersion of unemployment rates across regions can reduce inflationary 
pressure for given aggregate unemployment, this is equivalent to arguing 
that a reduction in dispersion can allow a reduction in overall 
unemployment consistent with a given inflationary pressure.
There are two arguments as to why a reduction in the dispersion of 
unemployment rates may lead to less wage pressure. The first, originally 
due to Lipsey (1960), rests on the curvature of the wage-unemployment 
relationship. Suppose wages in each region depend on the unemployment rate 
in that region but the wage-unemployment relationship is convex to the 
origin, such that a given small change in unemployment has a bigger impact 
on wages in regions where unemployment is low than in regions where it is 
high. Then reducing the dispersion of unemployment rates while maintaining 
the average unemployment rate unchanged will reduce aggregate wage pressure 
in the economy.
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A second idea is that there is a "leading sector", say the South-East, 
and that wage increases in the South-East depend on the pressure of demand 
in the labour market in the South-East, and wage increases in other regions 
simply follow the levels set in the South-East. Again a reduction in the 
dispersion of unemployment rates, so long as it was associated with an 
increase in unemployment in the leading sector, would lead to lower wage
pressure in the economy as a whole.
One of the major counter-arguments to the case for regional policy is 
the view that Britain is essentially a national labour market, and wages 
are determined with regard to national rather than local conditions 
(including the unemployment rate in the country as a whole rather than in 
any particular region). In this case, of course, a reduction in the 
dispersion of unemployment rates with the average unemployment rate 
unchanged would have no effect on wage pressure. The first question to 
investigate in our empirical work is therefore whether wages in a 
particular region influenced more by the unemployment rate in that region,
the unemployment rate in the leading sector region (the South-East), or the
unemployment rate in the nation as a whole. While this question might 
appear relatively straightforward, it is in fact not easy to distinguish 
these hypotheses because there is a strong tendency for the unemployment 
rates in the different regions to move in tandem. Nonetheless we do 
believe that the evidence lends strong support to the idea that wages of 
some groups of workers, and in particular of manual men, within a region 
are most strongly influenced by the unemployment rate in that region.
If this is accepted, the impact of regional inequalities on aggregate 
unemployment depends on the curvature of the wage-unemployment 
relationship. To establish the degree of curvature of an economic 
relationship requires careful modelling and we have insufficient data to do
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this unless we make the assumption that the form of the relationship is the 
same across regions. We investigate this issue and we are satisfied that 
it is reasonable to assume a common form. Our results suggest that the 
data are best fitted by a double logarithmic form of the wage - 
unemployment relationship, embodying a significant degree of curvature.
In less technical terras, we believe that there are social and 
institutional forces within Britain pushing towards a greater degree of 
wage equality across regions than is justified on the basis of (full 
employment) productivity levels. In the low productivity regions wages are 
as a result too high and in consequence unemployment emerges. This serves 
to push wages down, thus creating the observed wage differentials. The 
forces pushing towards equality may be pay comparability, the wage policies 
of big firms which operate in many parts of the country (or of the public 
sector), and social security policies in particular uniform, flat rate 
unemployment benefits.
The argument is illustrated in Figure 2.1. In the Figure, there are 
two regions, a high productivity region 1 and a low productivity region 2 . 
The total labour force in each region (L) is set equal to unity. The 
demand for labour in the two regions is given by the curves and D 2D 2
respectively. If wages in each region were very flexible, the employment 
rate in each region would settle down at, say, L*, with 1-L* the 
equilibrium unemployment rate (due to frictional and voluntary 
unemployment) . Wages in region 1 would be W^*, and in region 2, W 2*.
By contrast, if wages are set nationally at a common level, say W, then 
the wage in two regions would obviously be the same, but the unemployment 
rate in region 1, (1-L^) , would be lower than that in region 2, (I-L2).
Our approach lies between these two extremes. We assume a wage-setting 
relationship common to the two regions, marked WW on the Figure, but that
the level of wages actually set depends on the unemployment rate within the 
region. Thus region 1 ends up with higher wages and lower unemployment, 
and region 2 with lower wages and higher unemployment.
The question then is whether the overall level of unemployment in the 
economy as a whole, for given average wages, is affected by the dispersion 
of unemployment between the two regions. This depends on the curvature of 
the wage function WW. If the wage function is a straight line, the average 
wage in the economy depends only on the average level of unemployment but 
if the wage function is curved, as shown in the Figure, the more dispersed 
the regional unemployment rates the higher the average wage for any given 
overall level of unemployment. For any given feasible level of wages in 
the economy, total unemployment will be lower the smaller are regional 
inequalities, as shown in Figure 2.2. (For a fuller discussion of these 
issues, see Jackman et al . 1991.)
The unemployment differentials that are created are, thus, asymmetric 
in their effects. Higher unemployment rates in the depressed regions do 
relatively little to reduce wage pressure in such areas, but lower 
unemployment rates in more prosperous areas add significantly to wage 
pressures in those regions.
Clearly the coexistence of depressed regions with lower than average 
wages and higher than average unemployment, and prosperous regions with 
higher wages and lower unemployment suggests at a minimum that there are 
significant barriers to migration from one region to another. For the 
purposes of this study we take such constraints on migration as given, and 
we do not consider whether it would be desirable or practicable to 
alleviate regional inequalities by breaking down the barriers to migration.
Our main conclusion is that there is clear evidence of a regional 
problem, but it is confined to the labour market for manual men. This is
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cons is tent with the view that barriers to migration are important primarily 
for manual men for reasons which may have as much to do with tradition and 
culture as with current housing policies. Unemployment rates of manual 
workers vary more across regions than is the case with non-manuals (Minford 
and Stoney, 1991) which suggests that when local economic conditions are 
depressed the tendency is for manual workers to stay put and to become 
unemployed, whereas non-manual workers are more likely to get up and go 
elsewhere, where job prospects are better.
Unemployment rates of manual men are high and, we think, could be 
reduced by a reduction in regional disparities. To get an idea of the 
magnitudes involved, if the wage equation takes a double logarithmic form, 
the equilibrium unemployment rate for a group of workers increases with the 
variance of the relative unemployment rates across regions such that, at a 
given wage level, a 10 per cent reduction in this variance would be 
associated with a 5 per cent reduction in the overall unemployment rate of 
the group (ie for example from 10 per cent to 9.5 per cent).
The remaining sections of this chapter are as follows:
Section 2 : outlines the basic theoretical approach, which differs from
the traditional mainly in its focus on unemployment as influencing the 
level of real wages rather than the rate of wage inflation.
Section 3 : provides an empirical overview of the behaviour of regional
wages and unemployment over the past 16 years.
Section 4: is on empirical methodology and is concerned primarily with
the question whether one should require a common structural form for the 
wage equations in the different regions.
Section 5 : presents tests concerning the assumption of a common form
for the wage equations, and assesses the relative importance of regional, 
leading sector and nationwide unemployment rates in wage equations.
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Section 6 : makes use of estimates of relative wage equations to obtain
as precise estimates as possible of the impact of labour market variables.
Section 7 : discusses the issue of curvature in relation to our
estimated wage equations.
Section 8 : summarises the findings of the study.
2.2. Theoretical Approach: Real Wage Equations
While in inflation prone economies, such as Britain, the most 
publicised aspect of wage determination is the annual increase in the money 
wage received by each group of workers, it is clear that in general money 
wages and prices tend to move quite closely together. In the short-term it 
may be important for workers to attempt to anticipate changes in the 
inflation rate, or in the wage increases of other groups of workers, but 
over the longer haul any such errors can be corrected. What is important 
in wage determination is not the accuracy with which a given group of 
workers' money wage tracks the price level in the short run, but rather the 
level of real wages underlying any claim. Any money wage settlement can be 
regarded as the product of a desired real wage and of the average price 
level expected to prevail over the period of the settlement. Similarly any 
increase in money wages can be regarded as the sum of any increase in the 
desired real wage and of the expected rate of price inflation. Since 
inflation expectation errors are unlikely to persist, the driving force 
behind wage settlements is the desired level of real wages which they are 
intended to secure.
Most^- recent empirical work on wage determination therefore focusses on 
the determinants of the real wage, and these typically include the level of 
unemployment or some other indicator of labour market conditions. The idea 
that there is a relationship between the level of unemployment and the 
level of the real wage is consistent with models of wage determination
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based on bargaining theory and with "efficiency wage" models. In the first 
case, unemployment weakens the union's bargaining power, because workers 
are more worried about the risk of job loss and thus less willing to 
bargain for a high wage. In the second case, unemployment itself assists 
firms in recruitment and in retaining and motivating their workforces thus 
reducing the incentive for firms to offer high wages for these reasons.
These theoretical considerations parallel econometric arguments to the 
effect that looking only at the rate of change of wages can lead to a 
neglect of factors fundamental in determining the level of wages in the 
long run but whose effects may be difficult to quantify on a year-to-year 
basis. This line of argument, first put forward by Sargan (1964), has been 
immensely influential in improving the econometric modelling of wages and 
many other economic time series.
While we adopt the real wage specification, in our empirical work we 
generally include the lagged value of the real wage as one of the 
explanatory variables. This, in a sense, allows the data to determine the 
correct specification. If the estimated coefficient on the lagged real 
wage is unity, the equation is identical to the Phillips Curve 
specification with unit coefficient on price inflation^. If the estimated 
coefficient is zero, we have a pure real wage equation with no dynamics. 
In general we find an estimated coefficient on lagged real wages lying 
between zero and one-half.
While the various theories of wage behaviour examine the determinants 
of the desired real wage, the real wage that can actually be paid is 
determined by labour productivity. In general unemployment serves the role 
of constraining real wage demands to be consistent with what can feasibly 
be paid (Layard and Nickell, 1986). For example, if unions become more 
powerful and demand higher real wages, the initial outcome may be a rise in
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inflation which may temporarily lead to the belief that real wages are 
rising when in fact they are not, but the ultimate effect will be to raise 
unemployment sufficiently to restrain real wage demands so that they are 
again in line with what can feasibly be paid.
2.3. Wage Dispersion in Britain 1974-89
We start with some basic facts. Despite frequent claims that wages in 
Britain are determined nationally and therefore uniform across regions 
there are in fact quite significant variations. In particular, there has 
been a sharply increasing wage dispersion across regions in the average 
hourly money earnings of manual men since the early 1980s.
Figure 2.3 sets out the dispersion^ of hourly earnings of men and, for 
comparison, the dispersion of male unemployment rates, house prices and the 
cost-of-living across regions over the period 1974-89. All these measures 
show a sharp increase over the past ten years, although in the case of 
wages there is an extraordinary disparity of experience, with the South 
East growing further apart and all the other regions converging closer 
together.
Our particular concern is with the relationship between earnings and 
local labour market conditions, and in Figure 2.4 we set out for each of 
the ten regions of Britain the time series of earnings and unemployment 
relative to the national average. These graphs show a systematic tendency 
for earnings and unemployment to be inversely related. In the South East, 
East Anglia and the South West, relative unemployment has been falling 
since the late 1970s and relative wages have been rising. In the West 
Midlands the relative unemployment rate has been much higher in the 1980s, 
than in the 1970s, and relative wages have been much lower. In the East 
Midlands, the relative unemployment rate rose to a peak in the mid 1980s, 
and has since fallen back a little, whereas relative wages fell to the mid
-15-
1980s, and have since risen quite sharply. In the North West, relative 
unemployment fell and wages increased up until the early 1980s, but since 
then unemployment has risen but wages have remained relatively high. In 
the North, and in Wales, there is a marked inverse relationship in the 
1970s but no clear pattern in the 1980s. Finally, Scotland shows a very 
clear inverse relationship, with low levels of relative unemployment in the 
mid 1970s and early 1980s, corresponding to relative wage peaks, and the 
worsening in the Scottish relative unemployment position since 1982 being 
associated with a steady fall in relative wages.
To examine the statistical signficance of this relationship we examine 
a simple equation of the form
(log W£—log w)t - c*oi + c*i(log Wj-log w ) ^
+ a2 (log ui-log u)t + et (2 .1)
where w^ is average hourly earnings of employees in full-time employment in 
region i, u^ is the unemployment rate in region i and the subscript t 
refers to time. The equation is estimated on 15 annual observations
(1975-89) and the data sources are described in the Data Appendix.
For manual men the estimate of is 0.57 (t-statistic 9.3) and of c*2
-0.054 (t-statistic 3.4). The implied long-run elasticity of unemployment 
on wages is therefore about -0.13. This implies that an increase in a 
region's unemployment rate of 10 per cent of the national unemployment rate 
(that is, in present circumstances, by about 0.7 percentage points) would 
be associated with a fall in its wage relative to the national average of
1.3 per cent. We have tested whether in the context of equation (2.1) the 
unemployment coefficient (a^) is the same for all regions, and the 
Gallant-Jorgensen test statistic indicates that this restriction is
satisfied. (The test statistic takes the value 8.4 as against a critical
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value at the 10 per cent level of significance of 14.7 ( ^ 9).)
This exercise demonstrates that, at least as far as manual men are 
concerned, average wages paid in a region are systematically related to 
labour market conditions as measured by the regional unemployment rate. 
There are of course other categories of workers, and following the basic 
classification of the New Earnings Survey we distinguish workers by sex, 
occupation (manual or non-manual) and industry (manufacturing or 
non-manufacturing). In fact, in the empirical work that follows we make 
use of 14 categories of workers involving a breakdown of the NES sample 
first by sex, second by sex and occupation and third by sex, occupation and 
industry. These categories are set out schematically in Table 2.1, and the 
data is described in the Data Appendix.
Rather than plot out the time series for each region for each of these 
14 groups, we focus on the statistical summary provided by the regression 
equation. Starting with men, in Table 2.2 we set out the estimates of 
equation (1) for each of the seven groups of male workers. For each of the 
four occupation-specific subgroups, the unemployment effect is significant 
(t>1.6), and the estimated long-run elasticity is close to -0.1. The 
equation for all manuals is also well-defined, but in the other two 
aggregate equations the unemployment term is not statistically significant. 
A possible reason has to do with the composition of employment: if a rise 
in unemployment affects relative employment rates in different proportions, 
the average wage would change even if individual earnings were unaffected. 
For example, if in a downturn firms lay off unskilled and low paid workers, 
average wages may rise even though no individual wage rises. Testing for 
the equality of unemployment elasticities across regions using the 
Gallant-Jorgensen test statistic we observe that we can accept the 
hypotheses of common coefficients for all our occupational groups.
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Table 2.3 presents the equivalent results for women workers. The
effect of unemployment on the wages of women workers is not significant for 
any group and in most cases is wrongly signed. This conclusion holds 
whether unemployment is measured (as in the table) by the female 
unemployment rate or by the male unemployment rate or by the overall 
unemployment rate^. Our explanation for this finding is that it is caused 
by differences in participation, or activity, rates of women across regions 
(see section 6 below).
The broad overview of the data in this section suggests the existence 
of a significant impact of regional labour market conditions on wages in
the region. Further, the estimated unemployment effect on wages, an
elasticity of 0 .1 , is of the same order of magnitude as the results found 
for national wage equations, e.g. by Nickell (1987). However, these graphs 
and regressions can be no more than suggestive since other possible 
explanatory variables have not been taken into account and the particular 
relationship discussed - that between relative wages and relative
unemployment rates - has not been justified. We proceed to this issue in 
the next section.
2.4.______Empirical Methodology
The wage level in a particular region is a purely statistical concept: 
it is the weighted average of the level of wages paid in each firm or
enterprise located within the region. In exactly the same way, the
aggregate national wage level is no more than the weighted average of wages
paid in each firm or enterprise in the country.
We start from the assumption that wage determination can be represented 
by a linear relationship common to all firms. This assumption does not
preclude variables entering in an interactive way or in more complex 
functional forms, i.e. we do not rule out a relationship of the form
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w — aQ + a^x +C2y + a3xy + a4y^ + e. The objective is to model differences 
between firms by differences in explanatory variables, or in interactions 
between them, rather than in having different models (i.e. different 
regression coefficients). There might, in principle, be three types of 
variable:
(i) firm specific variables, denoted Xfj (e.g. firm profits) where 
subscript f indicates the firm and j the variable
(ii) region specific variables, denoted y^j (e.g. local economic 
conditions), where subscript i indicates region
(iii) national variables, denoted zj (e.g. interest rates, tax rates). 
Interaction between variables are represented by composite variables at the 
level of the most disaggregate of the variables interacted.
It then follows:
at the firm level Wf - oq + J ajxfj + ^ ^j^ij + ^ ^ j zj + e (2 .2 )
j j j
at the regional level w^= o q + ^ o:jxij + ^ /Sj^ij + ^ T j zj + u (2.3)
j j j
where x-y = E Xf j ^ where the summation here and subsequently is understood 
f
to be appropriately weighted, but the weights are not represented in the 
equations.
at the national level w = otQ + ^ ajxj + I + l r p j  + v (2.4)
j j j
where xj = and yj = ^Yij
i i
and the relative (w^-w) = ^  aj (x -j j -xj ) +  ^  ( y ij —yj  ^  + (u _ v ) (2.5)
regional wage
While we are interested in equation (2.3), we will also estimate equations 
of the type (2.5) since we believe these enable better estimates of the aj
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and /3j terms to be obtained. Indeed it is our view that estimating
equations of the form of (2.3) directly can lead to inefficient estimates
due to collinearity between unobserved zj variables and x -jj and y^j 
variables. The possibility that the extent of this collinearity may differ 
between regions may explain why some studies have found that wage behaviour 
in the different regions appears to be determined by different factors.
However, relative wage equations such as (2.5) can only be derived if 
one can assume that the absolute regional wage equations (such as (2.3)) 
have coefficients that are common across regions. We address this issue in 
two ways. First, we examine some recent empirical studies on wage
determination at the level of the firm. The evidence here, which is
briefly discussed in Note 1, is that firms in different regions set wages 
in much the same way. It follows that regional wage equations, being 
simply aggregates of firm level wage decisions should also look much the 
same. Second, we make use of statistical procedures (the Gallant Jorgensen 
test) to establish whether differences in estimated coefficients across
regions are or are not statistically significant. On balance, our 
conclusion is that is is valid to assume a common specification, and hence 
legitimate to estimate relative wage equations.
There are two types of advantage of estimating relative equations, such
as (2.5) rather than absolute equations, such as (2.3). First, with
respect to variables that affect wages at a national level (zj). these 
variables appear in (2.3) but not in (2.5). Since they have proved hard to
identify, and may be correlated with region specific (yij) variables, their
omission will bias the estimates of (2.3) while (2.5) is free of such
problems.
A case in point is productivity. The reason is that it is difficult to 
measure variations in the underlying rate of productivity growth, which
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tend to be small in the short run, given that changes in economic activity 
are associated with sharp short-run changes in measured labour 
productivity. To the extent that national rather than region-specific 
productivity affects wages, and unfortunately we do not have data to 
investigate this issue, the relative wage formulation allows us to omit the 
productivity variable altogether.
Second, with respect to the region specific variables (yij), these 
appear both in (2.3) and in (2.5) but insofar as the variation in them is 
primarily a variation over time with a similar pattern across regions 
rather than a differential movement across regions there will be bias in 
equation (2.3) but not in (2.5). For example, the proportion of workers 
unionised has varied substantially over the last fifteen years, but the 
proportion unionised in one region relative to the nation as a whole has 
not varied to anything like the same extent (see Minford and Stoney, 1991, 
p.134, for evidence covering the period 1963-79). A similar argument would 
apply to productivity, if it is regional specific rather than national 
productivity which affects regional wages.
A further problem is that the omission of key variables may generate 
spurious effects of aggregate unemployment on region-specific wage 
equations.5 Imagine, for example, a highly simplified form of equation 
(2.3) in which regional wages depend only on unemployment in the region and 
some aggregate, but unobserved, national variable z. Then the true 
equation is
w it = ao ~ aluit + 71Zt (2 .6 )
Aggregation of (6 ) across regions gives
w - aQ - oqut + T 1zt (2.7)
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If we were to estimate
w it “ “o ~ °au it “ 72ut + €t <2 -8)
the value of 72 would tend towards -cx^  depending on the correlation between 
w t and ut in the aggregate data. To see this we need only note that, from 
(2.6) and (2.7), the true model can be written
w it ~ -0!1 u it + °aut + wt (2.9)
and hence estimating (2.9) would yield a coefficient on ut equal and 
opposite to that on u^t , and a coefficient on w t of unity. Equation (2.8) 
is the same as (2.9) but with w t omitted: the omission of w t will bias the 
estimates on the other explanatory variables to the extent that it is 
correlated with them.
It follows further that it may be very difficult to detect any effect 
of aggregate (nationwide) unemployment on regional wages. If, now, the 
true model is
w it " «o “ aluit ~ 01 ut + 71zt (2.6')
then aggregation across regions gives
wt = cx0 -(oq+0l)ut + 7izt (2.7')
The relative wage equation (2.9) is the same as before, and hence if we 
estimate (2 .8 )
w it = «o “ «luit " 72ut + et (2 •8)
we will again find the estimate of the coefficient 72 tending to -ot\.
2.5. Regional Wage Equations
Our first task is to establish to what extent wages at the regional 
level are sensitive to regional as against national labour market
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conditions. For this purpose, we need to investigate absolute wage 
equations (such as (2.3) above), since national labour market conditions do 
not appear in a relative wage equation. We therefore investigate equations 
of the following form:
log w it - aoi + au  log u it + a2i log uLt
+ a3 i log ut + a^£t+ a5^ log + ag^Z£t (2 .1 0)
where w^t is the real wage, measured as the average hourly earnings of 
full-time adult workers, deflated by the GDP deflator, of a category of 
workers in region i at time t, Uj_t the unemployment rate in the region ULt 
the leading-sector (South East) unemployment rate^, u t the average 
nationwide unemployment rate (excluding region i and the South East) , w^t_^ 
the real wage in the previous period and Z£t all other factors affecting 
the real wage.
Two comments are required about estimation of equation (2.10). First, 
after some experimentation with various combinations of price indices it 
became clear that the best measure to use for the purpose of deflating the 
money wage was the GDP deflator. Thus, real wages henceforth are defined 
as average hourly earnings deflated by the GDP deflator. Cost-of-living 
effects on wages thus have to be introduced by means of additional 
explanatory variables on the right hand side of the equation, rather than 
into the definition of the real wage.
Second, rather than attempt to estimate some underlying productivity 
growth, which can raise problems of interpretation, we have simply included 
a time trend in the equation to capture the trend increase in real wages 
over time. This then also captures the effects on average hourly earnings 
of other gradual changes, such as in working hours or in the proportion of 
part-time workers, to the extent that changes in the composition of labour
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time between part-time and full-time work affect the hourly productivity of 
full-time workers.
Third, here and throughout we estimate 14 separate wage equations for 
each of the groups of workers set out in Table 1. In the most aggregate of 
the equations (ie those for all male workers and for all female workers) we 
allow for compositional effects by including share of manual workers (ie 
male manual workers, as a proportion of all manual workers, and likewise 
for females) for each region in each year. Similarly in looking at the 
equations for male manual, male non-manual, female manual and female 
non-manual workers, we allow for the proportion employed in manufacturing 
within each category for each region and each year. These proportions are 
incorporated as additional explanatory variables in the equations but not 
reported. The most disaggregated of our equations are not adjusted for 
compositional effects. The wage variable in these equations also suffers 
from being inclusive of overtime payments. We examine the effects of 
overtime payments below.
We might in principle estimate equation (2.10) for each of our 
categories of workers for each region independently. However, it turns out 
that equations estimated in this way are poorly defined. The reason is 
that the number of observations for each equation is only 15, and this 
gives insufficient degrees of freedom for any reliable estimates to be 
obtained. We therefore need to cut back the number of explanatory 
variables by removing all the independent variables other than the 
unemployment variables and the national average wage.
The results of this exercise for the various groups of male workers are 
set out in Table 2.4. The striking feature of Table 2.4 is that the 
national unemployment rate, (ut), takes a coefficient approximately equal 
and opposite to that on the region specific unemployment rate, as suggested
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by our analysis of the previous section concerning the consequences of 
omitted variables, while the unemployment rate in the leading sector 
region, the South East, (usE,t)» also positive. To check the nature of 
the mis-specification we experimented with adding the national average wage 
w t in place of the time trend. The results, set out in Table 2.5a, confirm 
those of Table 2.4, and suggest the positive coefficient in nationwide 
unemployment is simply the result of omitted variable bias.
In Table 2.5a the leading sector unemployment rate is always 
insignificant, and we therefore examined the consequences of aggregating 
these two variables into a single nationwide unemployment rate (Table 
2.5b). In Table 2.5b it is remarkable that the coefficients on u^ and u 
are almost exactly equal in magnitude and opposite in sign in nearly all 
the equations.
In Tables 2.4 and 2.5 we have also recorded the Sargan statistic which 
tests for mis-specification. This indicates that the national average wage 
successfully represents the effects of common omitted exogenous variables, 
as suggested by the analysis of the previous section.
In addition to the equal and opposite coefficients on region specific 
and national unemployment rates, the coefficient on the national wage rate 
is approximately equal to one. This is consistent with the idea of a 
common regional specification such that the data can be fitted by a 
relative wage equation of the form (log w^t-log = aQ-a^(log u ^ - l o g  ut) 
+ . . . . To investigate this issue further we examine the wage equation
allowing the impact of unemployment in the ten regions to be estimated 
separately. That is, we test an equation of the form
log w it = aQ - aXi log u it + a2 log ut+ a3 log wt + et (2 .1 0 ')
Table 2.6 presents the estimates of a^i for manuals and for manuals in 
manufacturing. Clearly the independently estimated coefficients lie very
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close to one another^. In Table 2.7 we summarise the range of estimates 
for each of the groups of workers. The South East shows generally the 
smallest effect, and Wales the biggest. The range is about the same for 
all the groups of workers. Table 2.7 also sets out the Sargan statistic, 
which shows that these equations suffer from mis-specification. Our 
explanation is that the relative form of the wage equation eliminates the 
bias from omitted variables, but the freely estimated form does not®. 
Again this is consistent with the discussion of the previous section.
The key conclusion is that, for the reasons suggested in the previous 
section, an analysis based on absolute wage equations does not lead to
satisfactory results. Essentially there are too many variables relative to 
the number of observations and some of the variables are difficult to
measure and their effects may change over time. The results suggest we 
should adopt a relative wage form, which overcomes many of these problems.
We have repeated all the empirical work in this section for each of the 
groups of women workers. However, as might be expected from the 
preliminary results of Table 2.3, all the equations are very poorly 
defined. (These results are available on request.) When, in the next
section, we turn to the estimation of relative wage equations, we are able 
to introduce more variables and thus offer some hypotheses about the 
influences on women's wages. At this stage we have only the negative
finding that there is no relationship between wages of women workers and 
unemployment at the regional level.
2.6. Relative Regional Wage Equations
The results in Table 2.7 provide a basis for accepting a common 
coefficient specification for the wage equations in the different regions 
but they do not provide very precise estimates of the impact of regional 
unemployment on regional wages. This is because, in order to carry out the
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common coefficient test, given the small number of observations, it was 
necessary to omit a number of relevant variables. In this section we take 
advantage of the assumption of common coefficients to estimate the 
determinants of relative regional wages.
Starting from equation (2.10) or (2.10') and imposing common 
coefficients allows us to rewrite each equation relative to the national 
average:
log w it - log w t - (aoi - aQ) + a ^ l o g  uit-log ut)
+ a5 (log w it_ 1-log_1)+ a6 (zit-zt) (2 .11)
Because this equation has many degrees 'of freedom, this formulation 
permits us to investigate the impact on wages of other possible explanatory 
variables.
The new variables we introduce are:
(i) the proportion of male long-term unemployment (R^)
(ii) relative regional cost-of-living excluding housing costs (Pni/^H)
(iii) relative regional house prices (Pni/^H)
(iv) relative regional house prices multiplied by the owner occupancy
rate (rTiH PHi/PH )
(v) the proportion of householders in the local authority rental 
sector (n^) .
While we were keen to include other variables, such as value added per 
head, unionisation rates or skill composition, we were unable to track down 
any for which consistent annual data were available on a regional basis. 
Insofar as these variables evolve slowly over time, their effects will be 
captured by the term in the lagged dependent variable.
The estimated relative wage equations for each of the groups of workers
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are set out in Table 2.8. For men (Table 2.8a), the new equations are in 
line with the results of Table 2.5, but the effects are now more clearly 
specified and the Sargan test confirms that there is no misspecification. 
The results quoted do not allow for region specific time trends. Equations 
including such trends exhibit very similar effects of unemployment on 
wages, but the effects of the other economic variables are much less 
well-defined.
The main results are now clear. Unemployment matters but primarily 
because it matters for manual men in manufacturing. (We examine in more 
detail the results for non-manufacturing manual men below.) As far as 
non-manual men are concerned, regional cost-of-living and house price 
effects are much more important. The only consistently significant 
variable influencing women's wages is house prices (Table 2.8b). The long 
run house price coefficient for non-manual men not in manufacturing is 
found to be 0.19 while for all employed women it is 0.22. This is in line 
with the elasticity of approximately 0.2 found by Carruth and Oswald (1989) 
and Bover et al (1989).
Before drawing any general conclusions from this result we investigate 
its resilience in the face of changes in specification. First, we 
introduce economic activity rates as an additional labour market variable. 
The reason for doing this is that the difference between being classified 
as unemployed and out of the labour force is in some cases rather arbitrary 
(particularly with regard to married women). People can become discouraged 
from entering the labour force if there is little hope of getting a job. 
A high level of economic activity, on the other hand, will encourage people 
to enter the labour market and look for work. It is also sometimes said 
that people in areas such as London and on the South coast where informal 
work is relatively easy to get, can claim benefits while in informal work
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and that hence registered unemployment in such areas overstates the number 
of people looking for work.
The economic activity rate appears with a significant and positive 
effect (consistently with the argument set out above) in five of the seven 
equations for men (Table 2.9a). Rather unexpectedly the addition of this 
extra labour market variable serves to increase the magnitude (and the
significance) of the unemployment effects in the case of manual workers,
but at the same time to further weaken these effects in the case of
non-manuals. This seems to strengthen the conclusion that local labour 
market conditions matter for manual but not for non-manual men, although 
the nature of the interaction between unemployment and activity rates is 
not clear.
Turning to women, the activity rate has a consistently, and in the case 
of non-manuals, significantly negative effect (Table 2.9b). A possible 
explanation of this finding is that there is a supply side effect whereby 
more women wishing to work pushes down the average female wage. To 
investigate this we examined the determinants of the female economic
activity rate. Interestingly the estimated reduced form equation for the 
female activity rate suggests that female activity rates are higher when 
house prices are high and council tenancy rates are low (Table 2.10). This 
could be interpreted as a mortgage effect on labour supply: women may be 
more likely to go out to work if there is a mortgage to pay off.
Of more immediate concern, the introduction of the activity rate does 
nothing to improve the significance of the unemployment variables in the 
equations in women's wages. Therefore in Table 2.11 we leave out the 
unemployment terms altogether. The equations for non-manual female wages 
seem quite well determined in terms of house prices and activity rates, but 
those for manual women remain very poor with virtually no significant
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explanatory variables.
We experimented with a range of specifications, including those adding 
lagged house prices and lagged employment. None of those yielded any 
results of particular interest. We also examined the possibility of wage 
emulation effects. However, it turned out that the manual wage had at 
least as big an effect on non-manual wages as vice versa (Table 2.12). In 
Table 2.13 we carry out a sensitivity analysis where we examine the 
robustness of our results to the inclusion or omission of overtime 
payments. As overtime payments are counter-cyclical it might be argued 
that the observed unemployment effects might be somewhat spurious. We find 
that the effect of unemployment on manual male earnings is in fact improved 
by excluding overtime payments.
A puzzling feature of our results is that local unemployment rates 
appear to influence the earnings of manual men in manufacturing but not of 
those employed outside manufacturing. To understand why this might be we 
note first that ,,non-manufacturing" covers a diverse range of activities 
from mining at one extreme to services at the other. Some of these 
activities may have been covered by national bargaining over some or all of 
the period and others not.
We consider a number of hypotheses that have been suggested:
i) that changes in relative regional wages reflect primarily 
compositional changes in the structure of non-manufacturing employment by 
industry. In Table 2.14 we set out the proportion of non-manufacturing 
manual men in three very different sectors: agriculture, construction and 
mining. The figures show significant variation both across regions and 
over time.
ii) that the sensitivity of wages to unemployment may be different in 
different sectors: for example, construction workers may be more willing to
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move between localities and hence their wages will be less sensitive to 
local labour market conditions.
iii) that the sensitivity of wages to unemployment in particular 
sectors may have changed over time, in particular as a result of the 
breakdown of national bargaining.
The results of these investigations are set out in Table 2.15. The 
main results are:
a) that compositional effects are significant, in particular wages in 
mining are significantly higher than in other sectors.
b) that wages in mining are more sensitive to local unemployment rates, 
and wages in construction less sensitive to local unemployment rates than 
for the sector as a whole.
c) that wages have been more sensitive to unemployed since 1985 than 
previously.
Overall the results in Table 2.15 show that wages of manual men outside 
manufacturing have been responsive to unemployment at least since 1985.
Interpreting the significance of the 1985 dummy as indicating the 
breaking down of national pay bargaining (perhaps associated with a decline 
in union power) leads to the thought that this effect might be found for 
other groups of workers also. However we were unable to establish any such 
effect on wage determination of any other groups.
With regard to women's wages, our feeling is that the poor quality of 
the equations reflects compositional effects which we have had no success 
in measuring. Indeed even our basic disaggregation between manual and 
non-manual, and between manufacturing and non-manufacturing is not very 
helpful for women since about 70 per cent of women are in the 
non-manufacturing, non-manual category, and only 57 per cent of female 
workers (as against 94 per cent of male workers) are in full-time employment
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2.7. Curvature
Structural imbalances can be seen as a force raising wage pressure if 
the wage-unemployment relationship is non-linear. If, as we have so far 
assumed, the functional form is double logarithmic, then in each sector
log W£ - log woi- a log Ui (2.12)
Then, summing over regions, where is the proportion of workers in 
region i,
E oji log Wi - log wQ - a [ q  log U£ (where log wQ=Iai log woi)
= log wQ - a log u - a I c<i log (uj/u)
- log w0 - a log u + *a var (u^/u) (2.13)
where u — Ea^u^ is the aggregate unemployment rate. Equation (2.13) uses 
the approximation log u-^/u - (u^/u - 1 ) - £(uj_/u - 1)2 + ... 
and hence Eo^ log u^/u - var u^/u
For a given aggregate unemployment rate, the aggregate real wage will 
be higher the higher is the variance of unemployment across sectors. Thus 
for given levels of productivity (and hence for a given feasible real wage) 
aggregate unemployment will have to be higher if the variance is higher in 
order to secure the given real wage (see Note 2).
With ^a^logw^ taken as constant, total differentiation of (2.13) gives
1
0 = - a d log u + — a d  var (u^/u)
2
1
d log u = — d var (u^/u)
2
According to the Labour Force Survey, in 1987 unemployment rates of 
manual workers were around 13 per cent in the South East, South West and 
East Anglia, and around 20 per cent in the North, the North West, in
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Scotland and in Wales (see Minford and Stoney, 1991, p.117). If we take 
these two composite regions as of approximately equal size, the reduction 
in their average unemployment rate if unemployment could be equalised would 
be 2.25 per cent, that is from an average of 16.5 per cent to just over 
16.1 per cent. This would correspond to a net fall in unemployment of just 
over 20,000 men implying an increase in output of around £270m (assuming 
unemployed men are paid 83 per cent of average manual wages which were 
£12,300 p.a. in 1990) and savings to the exchequer^ of the order of £140m. 
These numbers are clearly significant, if not overwhelming. Clearly the 
effects of smaller reductions in the disparities would be less. A 
reduction in the unemployment rate differential of one percentage point 
(i.e. from 7 to 6 ) would imply a fall in aggregate male manual unemployment 
of 0.6 per cent, from 16.5 to 16.4 per cent, implying a net fall in 
aggregate unemployment of 5,000 men and exchequer savings of the order of 
£35m.
The double logarithmic form has however up to now been assumed rather 
than justified. In Table 2.16 we investigate two alternative assumptions. 
First, we ask whether wages might be responsive to the level, rather than 
the logarithm, of the unemployment rate. A comparison between these two 
formulations is shown in rows 1 and 2 of Table 2.16 which show the 
logarithmic form to be better specified. In row 3 the level and logarithm 
are both included, and while the logarithmic term remains highly 
significant, the level term is on the margin of significance, with a 
t-statistic of 1 .6 , though positively signed.
If one were to regard the level term as also significant, we may 
compute the effect of this change on the impact of disparities in 
unemployment on its average level as follows. Equations (2.12) and (2.13) 
become
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log wjl - log woi - ai log u± + a2Ui (2.12*)
log Wi - log wQ _ a^ log u + l/2a^var(u£/u) + a2u ( 2.131)
Then, totally differentiating (2.13') with Icr^log w^ taken as constant, 
we have
A reduction in the variance thus leads to a smaller fall in 
unemployment than before. Using the estimated parameter values, a^— 0.057, 
a2-0.0041, and an average value of u over the period of say 10 per cent (so 
u-1 0 ), the inclusion of the level term approximately doubles the size of 
the denominator of the above expression. This suggests a lower degree of 
curvature with correspondingly diminished effects of reducing the variance 
of unemployment on its sustainable average level.
We finally investigated the possibility that terms in the square or 
cube of the logarithm of unemployment might be relevant, as suggested by 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1990). The results, in row 4 of Table 2.16, show 
no such effects on relative regional wages.
2.8. Conclusion
The main conclusion from the econometric work on wages of men is that 
there is a very marked difference between the determinants of manual as 
against non-manual wages at the regional level. Manual wages for men are 
sensitive to regional labour market conditions. Differences in non-manual 
wages across regions appear attributable largely to differences in the 
cost-of-living and house prices.
2
du 1 a^u
d var(u^/u) 2 a^-a2u
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A possible explanation for this difference is that we have been 
relating wages of the different groups to the overall unemployment rates 
for men. Since unemployment rates of manual workers are much higher than 
for non-manuals it might be that variations in the aggregate unemployment 
rate better reflect movements in the manual than the non-manual labour 
market.
Up until 1982, unemployed people were classified by occupation and thus 
manual and non-manual unemployment rates could be calculated. Table 2.17 
shows, however, that over this period this makes no difference to our 
results.
A second possible explanation for this difference in behaviour is that 
the market for non-manual workers is essentially national in character (see 
also McCormick, 1991 and Minford and Stoney, 1991). Non-manual workers are 
willing to move between regions and in consequence if firms in a particular 
region are to attract workers they must be able to offer wages that fully 
compensate for differences in regional living costs and house prices. Much 
of the evidence on migration, eg. Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989), confirms 
that non-manual workers have a greater propensity to migrate. Also it is 
well-known that information on many types of non-manual work is advertised 
in national publications.
To investigate this hypothesis, we have made use of data collected on 
migration (Chapter 3) to contrast the influences on migration of non-manual 
as against manual workers. Again the analysis has to be confined to the 
period up to 1982 for reasons of data availability. The results, reported 
in Table 2.18, show migration rates of non-manual workers much more 
sensitive to unemployment differentials than is the case with manuals.
The wages of women, like those of non-manual men, seem influenced much 
more by living costs and particularly by house prices. While the economic
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activity rate is significant in some equations, this seems to be capturing 
differences in supply behaviour rather than in labour market conditions.
Our first conclusion is therefore that there is a regional problem, but 
it is confined to manual men. For other workers there is no evidence that 
regional labour market conditions have any effect on wages.
However, within this sector it appears that regional intervention could 
be effective. If, for example, we were able to switch the demand for
manual workers from a prosperous to a depressed region, in such a way that,
taking the sectors to be of equal size, wages in the prosperous sector fall 
by one per cent and in the depressed sector rise by one per cent, and if 
the unemployment rate of manual workers was 10 per cent in the prosperous 
sector and 20 per cent in the depressed sector, then unemployment would 
fall by 2 percentage points in the depressed sector and rise by one 
percentage point in the prosperous sector (given a long-term coefficient of 
0.1 in the wage equation). Put another way, for every 2 jobs created in 
depressed regions, one would need to destroy only one job in the prosperous 
regions to counterbalance the effect on overall wage pressure.
Insofar as both manual and non-manual workers are involved in most 
types of economic activity, increased employment of manual workers would 
entail increased employment of non-manuals also. However, this would take 
the form of reduced out-migration of non-manuals from the depressed regions 
rather than of changes in relative regional unemployment rates of 
non-manuals. If migration imposes social costs, e.g. in the form of
congestion in the prosperous regions, then the reduction of such costs will
be an additional benefit from any regional policy initiative.
Finally, we have to note that if regional policy actions raise wages 
and lower unemployment rates in the depressed regions the incentive for 
manual workers to migrate out of such regions will be reduced. But the
evidence from studies of migration (Chapter 3) is that the gross migration 
rates of manual workers are already very low, and, it appears, not very 
sensitive to unemployment rate differentials, and so reducing this 
incentive need not be a serious consideration at least in the medium term.
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patience in producing successive drafts of the paper. Views expressed 
in the paper are those of the authors, as is responsibility for any 
errors. The Centre for Economic Performance is financed by the 
Economic and Social Research Council.
Not all authors adopt the real wage approach. For example, Hyclak and 
Johnes (1990) and Blackaby and Manning (1987) estimate traditional 
Phillips Curve specifications, relating the rate of change of money 
wages to the unemployment rate and the rate of price inflation. 
However they do not justify the use of this functional form, and, in 
the case of Hyclak and Johnes the estimated coefficient of less than 
unity on price inflation suggests that the model is mis-specified.
We have not investigated the effect of expected as distinct from 
realised inflation. If money wages are set on the basis of expected 
inflation, an unexpected rise in inflation will reduce real wages and 
an unexpected fall will raise real wages. In our empirical work, our 
main concern is with relative wages and we do not have any data on 
inflation expectations by region.
In each case dispersion is measured as the coefficient of variation. 
Thus an increase in dispersion means an increase in the proportional 
differentials between regions, and not simply an increase in the
absolute differences.
The reason for looking at the male as well as the female unemployment 
rate in that our measure of unemployment is based on the claimant count 
and in the case of women the overlap between the claimant count and 
those actively seeking work is little over half (as against around 90 
per cent for men). Thus the claimant count unemployment rate for women 
may not be a reliable guide to the pressure of demand in the labour 
market. We also note that most women are employed in non-manual 
occupations, in many of which they will be in direct competition with 
men, whereas many men are employed in manual jobs which remain 
something of a male preserve.
We are very grateful to Charles Bean for discussions on this point.
It would clearly have been interesting to investigate more generally 
the effect of labour market conditions in one region on wages in 
another. Such investigations would need to be carried out on absolute 
rather than relative wage equations, and it turns out that the absolute 
equations are too poorly defined to allow further permutations of this 
type. It seems generally agreed that if there is a leading sector it 
would be the South East, however.
In their study, Hyclak and Johnes (1990), test for, and are unable to 
reject, the restriction of a common functional form across regions.
We have constructed the Gallant-Jorgensen statistic to test for common 
coefficients. This test fails, but in view of the fact that the freely 
estimated equations suffer from mis-specification it is not clear that 
anything can be inferred from this.
The exchequer savings are calculated on the assumption that benefit 
expenditures per unemployed person amount to £3,500 per year, while the 
average wage in work of manual men is 83 per cent of the average male
manual wage (£12,300) i.e. £10,200. Income tax and national insurance 
collected on this wage will amount to £3,250, making a total exchequer 
saving of just under £7,000 per year per person taken out of 
unemployment. (The assumption that the average earnings of unemployed 
manual worker is 83 per cent of the average manual wage is taken from 
the findings of the 1987 cohort study, see Erens and Hedges "Survey of 
Incomes In and Out of Work", SCPR, 1990, Table 307.)
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NOTE 1
Firm-level Wage Equations
In this note we very briefly examine some recent empirical work on 
firm-level wage determination, i.e. equations of type (2 .2 ) in section 4 of 
the paper. There exist numerous cross-section studies of wages in 
individual firms. Three recent examples are:
Blanchflower and Oswald (1989) using Workplace Industrial Relations 
Survey (WIRS) data
Gregory, Lobban and Thomson (1985) using Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI) data
Nickell and Wadhwani (1990) using EXSTAT/DATASTREAM panel data on 218 
firms over 11 years.
Nickell and Wadhwani consider two different types of wage-setting 
behaviour by firms. In the first, following Mortensen (1970) and, slightly 
more closely, Jackman et al (1984), firms have short-run monopsony power in 
the labour market and set wages primarily with regard to the impact on 
labour recruitment. In the second wages are set by collective bargaining 
between the firm and a union. Nickell and Wadhwani show that the same 
variables are relevant in both models although the interpretion of the 
coefficients is different. They stress that in both cases the relevant 
variables consist of both what they term inside factors (i.e. firm 
specific) and outside factors (i.e. local or national: they are unable to
distinguish these because this data set contains no information on 
location, and is in any case based on firms some of which have many plants 
in different regions). The firm specific variables they find most 
important are value productivity, union power (proxied by density and the 
mark-up), lagged employment, and liquidity variables such as the ratio of 
deposits to liabilities. The national outside variables are the national
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average wage, the unemployment rate and the proportion of long-term 
unemployed.
Nickell and Wadhwani go on to explore if it makes a difference whether 
bargaining occurs at the level of the industry or at the level of the firm. 
They investigate this relationship by the inclusion of interactive terms 
between the level of wage bargaining and the various insider factors. This 
has the same effect as allowing the coefficient on the insider factor to 
vary between types of firms. Our general equation (2.4) for the wage set 
by the firm can be represented, in somewhat simplified form, by
wf - c*0 + (^Q!1x1+<>!2x2) + (l“^)(71zl + 72z2  ^ + € (2.2')
where X is the weight given to insider factors. Then if 
X — Xq + X]^ D
where D is a dummy variable representing the level of wage bargaining, we 
have
wf - no + Xq (axxi+a2x 2 ) + (1-Xq)(7lzl+72z2>
+ X^ (o^Dx^ + a2Dx2 _ 7iDz^ — y2^ z.2) + £
Nickell and Wadhwani prefer to test for the effects of the level of wage
bargaining through the introduction of interactive terms rather than by
estimating different equations for the different types of firms. With
regard to unemployment, their central result is an elasticity of -.1 ,
implying that a rise in the unemployment rate from say 8 per cent to 
10 per cent (a 25 per cent increase) will reduce wages other things equal 
by 2.5 per cent. (Because the unemployment variable they use is national 
unemployment, the variation in it is time series rather than the 
cross-section. Since the time series variation in unemployment rates in
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all the regions in quite similar this result is consistent with either 
local or national unemployment rates influencing wages.)
Blanchflower and Oswald use the 1980 WIRS survey which covered 2000 
establishments. Because they have data for only one year they cannot of 
course test for the effect of national variables. However, they have data 
on the location of the establishments surveyed, so they are able to 
investigate the effects of regional variables, in particular of 
unemployment rates. (They in fact use the unemployment rate of the county 
in which the establishment is located.) The insider factors they 
investigate include the performance, size and age of firms and various 
factors to do with union recognition and the closed shop. Again they are 
content to run a single equation across all firms, rather than thinking 
that different factors determine how firms set wages in different parts of 
the country. Their central result on unemployment is an elasticity of -.08 
(for semi-skilled manuals) and -0.05 (for skilled manuals). These findings 
are clearly significant in statistical terms, and suggest that the
unemployment rate in a county effects the level of wages set in
establishments in that county. (Their main focus is on non-linearities in
the relationship between unemployment and wages, a topic to which we will 
return.)
Gregory, Lobban and Thomas (1985) use qualitative data from the CBI pay 
databank to gauge the strength of various influences on pay determination. 
The factors they consider can again be divided into the firm-specific (such 
as profits, strikes, product market conditions), local (such as ability to 
recruit or retain labour, local wage comparability) and national (in 
particular cost-of-living effects and national pay comparability). 
Unfortunately they do not discuss whether the influences on settlements
differ across regions.
The main conclusion of this note is that, given that investigations of 
wage-setting at the level of the individual firm have established a stable 
pattern of determinants of wage-setting, and there is no evidence that this 
pattern differs from one region to another, it follows that regional wage 
equations, being no more than statistical aggregates, must take the same 
form across regions. If the firm level data are consistent with equation
(2) at the beginning of this section, then equations, (3), (4) and (5) are 
obtained simply by aggregation over firms.
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NOTE 2
The Real Wage Function
The simplest characterisation of production technology allowing for 
differences in productivity across regions is a nested Cobb-Douglas 
production function:
Y± = A-^YCLi^Ki1-^) 1-7
where is the output of region i, region-specific productivity, 
employment in region i, capital stock in regon i and 0 and y lie between 
zero and one.
Then marginal productivity factor pricing implies that the wage rate 
and the rental rate on capital in region i (W^ and R^) are given by
Wi - 0(l-7 )Ai7(Li0Ki1-^) 1-7/Li
Rj. - (l-0)(l-7 )Ai7(Li(3Kil-0)l-7/Ki
so the wage-rental ratio
Wi/Ri = (0/1-0) Ki/Li
so
log = log (0/1 -0) + log R± + log (Ki/Li)
We may assume that outside the very short run capital is allocated
between regions such that the return is equalised, so Ri=R. If the
proportion of the workforce in each region i is ai (so that I c*i=l) ,
i
we have
I c*i log Wi = log (0/1-0) + log R + I q  log (Ki/Li) 
i
But I Oi log (Ki/Li) = log (K/L) + I log
i i
Ki/K
|Li/L
where K is the aggregate capital stock and L total employment in the 
economy as a whole.
If the capital-labour ratios in each region are approximately the same 
as those in the economy as a whole (as is implicit in the common production 
functions and similar factor price ratios, the expression (K^/K)/(L^/L) 
will be close to one. Hence we may approximate log (1+x) by x, so that
! - M  (EjM
but cxi-L^/L, and I (Kj[/K)=l, so to a first approximation 
Hence
E ai log Wi - log ((3/(1-0)) + log R + log (K/L)
Thus a regional policy initiative which shifts capital between regions 
with no first round effect on aggregate variables will, to a first 
approximation, have no effect on the feasible logarithmic sum of real 
wages.
-46- 
DATA APPENDIX
In the empirical investigations we focus on the determinants of average 
hourly earnings of full-time adult workers over the period 1974 to 1989. 
This is a reasonably long and up-to-date series which has the advantage of 
a considerable degree of consistency, both in terms of the method of 
compilation and in the geographical definition of the regions (where there 
were some quite significant changes associated with the local government 
reorganisation of April 1974).
The basic data source is the Department of Employment's New Earnings 
Survey (part E). It had been our intention to supplement this data with 
unpublished data from the New Earnings Survey held by the Department of 
Employment, but it proved impossible to reconcile some of the data from 
this sample with the published data, and this attempt had to be abandoned.
We focus on average hourly earnings as the best measure of wage rates 
and for this reason where possible we use a measure excluding overtime 
payments. However, for some of the less aggregated series this adjustment 
is not made, and therefore the average hourly earnings measure is inclusive 
of overtime. Unless otherwise specified we define wages as "average hourly 
earnings of full-time adults whose wages were not affected by absence over 
the sample, excluding overtime payments".
We consider a total of 14 regional level earnings variables - seven for 
males and seven for females - these were listed below.
(i) all employees;
(ii) manual employees;
(iii) non-manual employees;
(iv) manual employees in manufacturing;
(v) non-manual employees in manufacturing;
(vi) manual employees not in manufacturing;
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(vii) non-manual employees not in manufacturing.
Manufacturing relates to divisions 2 to 4 of the 1980 standard 
industrial classification or divisions III to XIX of the 1968 industrial 
classification. Non-manual occupations are defined as groups I to IX of 
the CODOT classification.
Our unemployment series are claimant based and relate to wholly 
unemployed excluding school leavers obtained from the Department of 
Employment Gazette. Contemporaneous figures are made consistent for 
definition changes over our sample period by adjusting using consistent 
aggregate figures obtained from the Department of Employment. We take a 
quarterly average of our adjusted figures. We note that the recording of 
unemployment by broad occupation and industrial groups was discontinued in 
1982. We are therefore able to disaggregate unemployment only into male 
and female unemployment rates.
With regard to the proportion of long-term unemployed we use only the 
ratio for men, because restrictions on benefit availability significantly 
reduce recorded long-term unemployment among women on the claimant count 
basis. Long-term unemployment is measured as the number of men unemployed 
for over 52 weeks and the proportion of long-term unemployed is this number 
divided by the unadjusted average of total male unemployed (average of 
January and July figures).
Employment levels refer to mid-year estimates of employees in 
employment and were obtained from Regional Trends (Employment).
Economic activity rates are obtained from published figures from 
Regional Trends (Employment) and are derived from Labour force Survey 
estimates.
The remaining variable is prices. We examine a number of separate
price indices:
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(i) The GDP deflator at factor cost (1985=100). This is the best 
measure of the price the employer receives for the output his workers 
produce, and thus of the firm's ability to pay. GDP deflator at factor 
cost is obtained from Table 2 of the Department of Employment Gazette.
(ii) Regional cost-of-living measures. Here it is useful to separate 
out house prices and non-housing prices. Regional house prices are based 
on a quarterly average, time series index for mix adjusted housing with 
level differences across regions captured by average dwelling prices for 
all Building Society borrowers in 1987. These figures were obtained from 
Regional Trends (Housing). We normalise regional house prices using the
housing Retail Price Index obtained from the Department of Employment
Gazette. September 1990, Table 6.4.
Figures for relative non-housing regional prices were obtained from the 
Regional Reward Survey and relate to retail prices based on consumers'
expenditure less housing.
Finally we examine the impact of housing tenure on wages. Data on the 
proportion of householders in the local authority rental sector and on 
owner occupancy rates were obtained from Regional Trends (Housing) and
figures were based on previous December estimates.
The data series are displayed in the form of charts in a data annex, 
available from the authors on request.
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TABLE 2.1
NES Basic Classification of Workers
Men Women
All men All women
Manual
women
Manual
men
Non-manualNon-manual
men
Manual 
men in
manufac tur ing
Non-manual 
women not in 
manufac tur ing
women m
Manual
manufacturing
Manual women 
not in
manufacturing
Manual men 
not in
manufacturing
Non-manual 
men not in 
manufacturing
Non-manual 
men in
manufacturing
Non-manual 
women not 
in
manufacturing
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TABLE 2.2
Relative regional male wage equations. 1975-1989 
Dependent variable (log w-^-log w)t
Explanatory (log 
variables
Wi-log w )t_ 1 (log u^—log u)t Sargan x2l GJ x 29 Long-run
elasticity
All employed 0.91 -0.020 3.7 10.5
CMCMo1
(1 0 .1 ) (1 .1 )
Non-manuals 0.63 -0.031 0.8 8.9 -0.08
(8.9) (1 .2 )
Non-manuals in 0.36 -0.056 3.6 5.8 -0.09
manuf ac tur ing (4.5) (2 .8 )
Non-manuals not 0.62 -0.030 0.0 7.7 -0.08
in manufacturing (8.9) (1.7)
Manuals 0.57 -0.054 3.7 8.4 -0.13
(9.3) (3.4)
Manuals in 0.40 -0.068 3.2 8.3 -0.11
manufac tur ing (6.3) (4.7)
Manuals not 0.67 -0.040 0.01 9.7 -0.12
in manufacturing (9.5) (2 .8 )
Notes:
Equations estimated by pooled cross-section time series across our ten 
regions and 15 year sample (150 observations), using region specific fixed 
effects which are suppressed from the Table.
Estimation by instrumental variable two stage least squares.
Instruments used were (log w^-log (log u^-log and (log u^-log
u)t - 2 •
The critical value for Sargan specification test statistic (one 
overidentifying restriction) at the 5% level of significance is 3.8. 
Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses. The critical value at the 5% level 
of significance is 1.6 (one-sided test).
The critical value for the Gallant-Jorgenson statistic (nine restrictions) 
at the 10% level of confidence is 14.7 (at 5%, 16.9).
The Gallant-Jorgensen (GJ) test statistic is constructed by comparing the 
difference in the criteria of the restricted (Cr) and unrestricted (Cu) 
equations, maintaining common instrument sets. Under the null hypothesis 
(Cr-Cu )/s2~X2r w^ere r denotes number of restrictions and s^ the estimated 
standard error of the unrestricted equation, 
u refers to male unemployment rates.
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TABLE 2.3
Relative regional female wage equations. 1975-1989
Dependent variable doe w^-loe
Explanatory
variables
(log Wi-log w)t_;L (log U£-log u)t Sargan x2l
All employed 0.54 0.044 0.5
(5.1) (1 .2 )
Non-manuals 0.34 0.034 0.6
(3.6) (1.4)
Non-manuals 0.67 -0.018 0.2
manufacturing (9.3) (0.7)
Non-manuals 0.32 0.031 0.6
not in manufacturing (3.8) (1.3)
Manuals 0.36 0.0021 0.1
(2.5) (0 .1)
Manuals in 0.37 -0.014 0.0
manufacturing (5.0) (0 .6)
Manuals not in 0.32 0.027 0.5
manufacturing (3.9) (1 .1)
Notes:
As for Table 2.2.
u refers to female unemployment rates.
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TABLE 2.4
Regional wage equations, men. 1975-1989
Dependent variable «.
(pooled sample size 150 observations)
Explanatory
variables
w i,t-l ui,t u t USE, t t Sargan * 2 3 
(s.e.)
All employed 0.55
(7.4)
-0.061
(2.7)
0.060
(2.5)
0.036
(2.3)
0.0097
(5.2)
3.31
(0 .0201)
Non-manuals 0.48
(6 .8 )
-0.071
(1.5)
0.071
(1 .6 )
0.041
(1.9)
0.013
(6.7)
35.4
(0.0258)
Non-manuals in 
manufac turing
0.45
(6.9)
-0.046
(2 .0 )
0.039
(1 .6 )
0.032
(2 .0 )
0.016
(7.9)
11.1
(0.0216)
Non-manuals not 
in manufacturing
0.43
(5.9)
-0.038
(1 .2 )
0.051
(1.5)
0.033
(1.5)
0.013
(6.7)
42.4
(0.0302)
Manuals 0.49
(6.7)
-0.063
(2.5)
0.065
(2.5)
0.025
(2 .0 )
0.0067
(5.9)
12.2
(0.0167)
Manuals in 
manufacturing
0.37
(5.0)
-0.068
(3.5)
0.073
(3.6)
0.032
(2 .6 )
0.0091
(6.7)
7.4
(0.0170)
Manuals not in 
manuf ac tur ing
0.54
(6.9)
-0.053
(2 .2 )
0.053
(2 .0 )
0.017
(1 .0 )
0.0059
(5.0)
10.3
(0.0219)
Notes:
Equations estimated by instrumental variable two-stage-least squares. 
Instruments used were w±f^ , uSE> uSEjt_2> ut_x , ut_2 , ui|t_lf u± t_ 2
and t. Hence three overidentifying restrictions. Critical values 
X23,0.05-7-8, x23i0.io-6.3. 
t denotes linear time trend.
Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses. The critical value of the 5 per 
cent level of significance is 1.6 (one-sided test).
ut refers to the average male unemployment rate across all regions except 
region i and the South East.
s.e. refers to the estimated standard error of each pooled equation.
All variables in logarithmic form.
TABLE 2.5a
Regional wage equations, men. 1975-1989
Dependent variable Wj_ *- 
(pooled sample size 150 observations)
Explanatory variables w t ut u i t uSE t Sargan X23
(I.e.)
All employed 0 .84 0 .,12 -0 .11 0 .0057 0 .1
(2 2 .2 ) (2 .2 ) (4. 9) (0 .■ 1 ) (0 .0158)
Non-manuals 0 .82 0 .,081 -0 .,061 -0 .000027 0 .2
(24..6 ) (1 ..8 ) (1 .■ 9) (0 .■ 0 ) (0 .0172)
Non-manuals in 0 .90 0 .12 -0 .084 -0 .028 7..0
manufacturing (25..9) (2 .5) (4. 1 ) (0 .7) (0 .0178)
Non-manuals not 0 .,80 0 .,051 -0 .,044 0 .019 1 .2
in manufacturing (2 2 .4) (1 .1 ) (1 .9) (0 .5) (0 .0198)
Manuals 0 .94 0 .080 -0 ,.098 0 ,.019 0 .7
(19,.5) (2 .5) (5,.2 ) (0 .8 ) (0 .0116)
Manuals in 0 .98 0 .10 -0 .12 0 ,.016 0 .6
manufacturing (2 2 .• 0 ) (3,.1 ) ('8 • 3) (0 ,• 6 ) (0 .0122)
Manuals not in 0 ,.87 0 ,.095 -0 .089 0 ,.029 0 ,.4
manufacturing (15 • 4) (2 .5) (5 .2 ) (0 ,.1 ) (0 ,.0148)
Notes:
ut denotes the average male unemployment rate across all regions excluding 
the region i and the South East.
s.e. denotes the estimated equation standard error.
Equations estimated by instrumental variable two-stage least squares. 
Instruments used were w t_lt u ^ , ut_2 , u i|t_1( u±} t_2 , usE,t-l and uSE,t-2 
(three over-identifying restrictions).
Sargan test statistic distributed as x23 under null hypothesis of no 
structural mis-specification. Critical value at 10% level of confidence.
X23, 0 .10= 6 -3 -
All variables in logarithmic form.
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TABLE 2.5b
Regional wage equations, men. 1975-1989
Dependent variable W£ ^ t 
(pooled sample size 150 observations)
Explanatory variables w t ut ui» t Sargan x22 
(s.e.)
All employed 0.89 0.12 -0.12 0.5
(33.1) (6 .1 ) (6 .0 ) (0.0164)
Non-manuals 0.84 0.078 -0.062 0.1
(39.1) (2 .6 ) (1.9) (0.0171)
Non-manuals in 0.93 0.085 -0.083 2.6
manufacturing (47.7) (3.9) (4.0) (0.0179)
Non-manuals not 0.81 0.069 -0.044 0.9
in manufacturing (35.4) (2.9) (1.9) (0.0197)
Manuals 0.95 0.098 -0.098 0.3
(31.8) (5.2) (5.2) (0.115)
Manuals in 1.0 0.12 -0.12 0.4
manufacturing (39.0) (7.8) (8.3) (0 .0 1 2 1)
Manuals not in 0.90 0.093 -0.089 0.1
manufacturing (25.6) (5.1) (5.2) (0.0148)
Notes:
Equations estimated by instrumental variable two-stage least squares^ u 
refers to male unemployment rates. Instruments used were w t_^, ut_^, u t_2 , 
ui t-l« u i t-2 (two over-identifying restrictions).
Sargan test statistic distributed as x22 unc e^r null hypothesis of no 
misspecification. Critical value at 10% level of confidence x22» 0.10=^-^-
Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses. Critical value at 5% level of
significance 1.6 (one-sided test)
s.e denotes estimated standard error of equation.
For all employed, manuals and non-manuals compositional effects were used 
to capture manual and manufacturing employment shares of which only the
former were found to be negative and significant.
All variables in logarithmic form.
u t refers to the average male unemployment excluding region i.
-55-
TABLE 2.6
Regional wage equations, men. 1975-1989
Dependent variable Wj^ t 
(pooled sample size 150 observations)
Own region unemployment effects 
Manuals Manuals in manufacturing
South East -0.10 (5.7) -0.080(4.9)
East Anglia -0.12 (6.8) -0.12 (6.7)
South West -0.14 (6.6) -0.12 (5.6)
West Midlands -0.15 (9.4) -0.14 (10.2)
East Midlands -0.14 (9.1) -0.12 (8.1)
Yorkshire and -0.12 (8.0) -0.11 (7.8)
Humberside
North West -0.13 (7.0) -0.098 (6.3)
North -0.16 (8.3) -0.12 (7.8)
Wales -0.17 (9.0) -0.14 (8.4)
Scotland -0.14 (7.8) -0.12 (7.2)
"t 0.98 (36.8) 1.0 (45.2)
“ t 0.13 (8.3) 0.12 (7.5)
Sargan x2ll 19.2 24.9
(X211.0.10~17-3)
Notes:
See Notes to Table 2.5b.
Equations estimated constraining for common national wage and unemployment 
effects but allowing for region specific own unemployment and fixed 
effects. _ _ _
Instruments used were ^t-l> u t-l» u t-2 * ui t-1 an(* ui t-2 (eleven 
over-identifying restrictions).
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TABLE 2.7
Regional male wage equations. 1975-1989
Sargan test statistic 
2
xzn
Range of own region 
unemployment effects
All employed 25.8 -0.15 WA 
(7.5)
-0.072 SE 
(3.2)
Non-manuals 21.9 -0.19 NO 
(3.9)
-0.078 SE 
(2.3)
Non-manuals in 
manufac tur ing
14.9 -0.14 WA 
(5.5)
-0.062 SE 
(2.4)
Non-manuals not 
in manufacturing
27.1 -0.086 NO 
(3.2)
0.00 SC 
(0.1)
Manuals 19.2 -0.17 WA 
(9.0)
-0.10 SE 
(5.7)
Manuals in 
manufacturing
24.9 -0.14 WA 
(8.4)
-0.08 SE 
(4.9)
Manuals not in 
manufacturing
19.0 -0.15 WA 
(7.6)
-0.080 SE 
(4.0)
See Notes to Table 2.6.
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TABLE 2.8a
Relative regional male wage equations. 1975-1989
Dependent variable w-^
Explanatory
variables w ii;-i u i R i
PHj
PH
n i H ™ i  
PH PH
W  Sargan x29 
(s.e.) Z
All employed 0 .59 - 0 . 030 0 . 16 0 ,.25 0. 069 0 . 23 0 .,49 1. 8
(5. 1 ) (1 .• 6) (2 .9) (0 .■ 7) (3,.1) (1 .6) (2 .7) (0 .00872)
Non-manuals 0 .32 - 0 . 0066 0 .,09 0 ,.82 0 ,.12 0 . 32 0. 28 0 . 05
(3..2 ) (0 .3) (0 .9) (2 .• 0 ) (3,• 5) (1 .• 8 ) (1 .3) (0 .0128)
Non-manuals in 0 . 13 -0 .020 0 .,15 1 .06 0 ,.069 -0 ,.06 0 .,43 2 .0
manuf ac tur ing (1 .4) (0 .■ 7) (1 .6 ) (2 ,.3) (2 .0 ) (0 .3) (1 .6 ) (0 ,.0154)
Non-manuals not 0 . 42 0 .015 0 . 12 0 ,.43 0 ,.099 0 ,.53 0 . 27 2 .1
in manufacturing (5..0 ) (0 .5) (1 .4) (1 .1 ) (3.■ 0 ) (2 .5) (1 .1 ) (0 .0142)
Manuals 0 . 44 -0 .051 0 . 068 -0 ,.086 0 ,.048 0 ,.17 0 . 47 3,.3
(4..7) (3 .0 ) (0 .8) (0 .3) (2 .2 ) (1 -4) (3..1) (0 .00864)
Manuals in 0 . 37 -0 ,.074 0 ,.084 -0 .26 0 .030 0 .11 0 .,42 1 .6
manufacturing (4..7) (3.- 5) (1 .1) (0 .9) (1 .3) (0 > 7) (2 .3) (0 .0107)
Manuals not in 0 .48 -0 .020 0 .039 0 .12 0 .071 0 .27 0. 44 1 .3
manuf ac tur ing (5,.9) (0 • 9) (0 • 6 ) (0 • 4) (2 • 7) (1 .8) (2 ,.3) (0 .0 1 1 0)
See over for Notes.
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TABLE 2.8b
Relative regional female wage equations. 1975-1989
Dependent variable
Explanatory
variables w i.,-1 ui
PHt
PH
PHt
PH
n i H ™ i
PH
n «
i
Sargan x ?  
(s.e.)
All employed 0 .,36 0 ,020 0 .,14 0 .078 0 .57 0.46 0 .,6
(4..0 ) (0 ,7) (0 .3) (2 .7) (2 • 5) (1.4) (0..0156)
Non-manuals -0 .,0078 0 ,0082 0 .62 0 .093 0 .70 0.50 0 .03
(0 .6 ) (0 ,4) (1 .2 ) (2 .8 ) (2 .7) (1 .8 ) (0 .0165)
Non-manuals in 0 .,47 -0,.037 0 .23 0 .11 0 .57 0.26 1 .2
manufac tur ing (5. 8 ) (1 .5) (0 .5) (3. 1 ) (2 .4) (0.9) (0 .0169)
Non-manuals not 0 .24 0 ,.029 0 .099 0 .067 0 .!56 0.31 o.:>
in manufacturing (2.• 6 ) (1 .2 ) (0 .2 ) (2 .1) (2 .3) (1 .0 ) (0 .0174)
Manuals 0 .27 0 ,.0094 0 .54 0 .023 0 .35 -0.26 0 .003
(1 .• 6 ) (0 .4) (1 .1) (0 .7) (1 • 4) (0 .6 ) (0 .0150)
Manuals in 0 .33 -0 .020 -0 .20 0 .,081 0 .30 -0.035 1 .0
manufacturing (3,.6 ) (0 .9) (0 .4) (2 .6) (1 • 4) (0 .1 ) (0 ,.0159)
Manuals not in 0 ,.27 0 .028 0 .49 0 .014 0 .10 0.20 0 ,.2
manuf ac tur ing (3 .0 ) (1 • 1 ) (1 .0 ) (0 .• 4) (0 .4) (0 .6 ) (0 .0184)
See over for Notes.
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Notes to Tables 2.8a and 2.8b
See Notes to Table 2.2.
Instruments used were R-i -l» Ri.,-2* (RH£/PH)_]_,
(PH^/PH)_^, (PH^/PH)_^ and (2 overidentifying restrictions)
All variables in logarithmic form except R^, and Further, all
regional variables are as differences from their national values.
The Sargan test statistic is calculated as
u'x' Z<Z'Z>-1 z'Xu
S^
where X is the matrix of explanatory variables, Z is the matrix of 
instruments, u is the residual vector and is the squared standard error 
of the equation. Under the null hypothesis of no misspecif ication the 
Sargan statistic is distributed as a chi-squared with degrees of freedom 
given by the number of overidentifying restrictions. The Sargan statistic 
generally tests for omitted variables and inappropriate choice of 
instruments. It is based on the null that Plim
Z*u -»0 as T-*o. If, as in our work, the lagged dependent variable is 
T
included as an explanatory, and instrumental variable, the Sargan statistic 
also tests for serial correlation, since, if serial correlation were to 
exist
Plimt-Lyt-1 -1u t*0 .
T
X22,0.05= 6 -0 > X21 ,0.05= 3 •8 •
Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses. Critical value at 5 per cent 
level of significance for one-sided test 1.6 and 1.3 at the 10 per cent 
level.
s.e. denotes the standard error of each pooled equation.
Equations estimated with regional fixed effects which are suppressed 
from the tables. The small sample dynamic fixed effects bias tends to bias 
the coefficients towards zero by a factor of 1/15 (Nickell, 1981).
For all employed, manual and non-manual equations a composition effect 
was used to capture industrial and occupation differences across regions. 
We do not quote such composition effects in our Tables.
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TABLE 2.9a
Relative regional male wage equations. 1975-1989
Dependent variable
Explanatory
variables w i,-l ui R i
act^ PHt
PH
All employed 0.40 -0.033 0.19 0.50 0.44
(2 .6 ) (1 .8 ) (3.2) (2 .0 ) (1 .1)
Non-manuals 0.30 -0.005 0.086 0.31 0.78
(3.1) (0 .2 ) (0 .8 ) (1 .0 ) (1 .6)
Non-manuals 0.081 -0.016 0.27 1.0 0.67
in manufacturing (0.9) (0.5) (2 .8) (3.1) (1.4)
Non-manuals not 0.42 0.014 0.096 -0.23 0.60
in manufacturing (5.0) (0.5) (1 .0 ) (0.7) (1 .2)
Manuals 0.13' -0.060 ) -0.011 0.96 -0.00092
(0.9) (3.4) 7 (0 .1) (3.3) (0.003)
Manuals in 0.33 -0.073 0.15 0.67 -0.49
manufacturing (4.5) (3.6) (2 .1) (2.9) (1 .6 )
Manuals not in 0.39 -0.015 0.085 0.42 0.026
manufacturing (4.4) (0.7) (1 .2 ) (1 .6 ) (0 .1 )
Explanatory PHt nH iPHi n H . Sargan Xn
Variables (continued) PH PH 11 l (s.e.)
All employed 0.038 0.11 0.53 1.4
(1.3) (0 .6 ) (2 .8 ) (0.00906)
Non-manuals 0.11 0.25 0.18 0.7
(3.0) (1.3) (0 .8 ) (0.0133)
Non-manuals 0.012 -0.17 0.18 2.3
in manufacturing (0.3) (0 .8 ) (0.7) (0.0147)
Non-manuals not 0.11 0.53 0.31 1.6
in manufacturing (2.9) (2.4) (1 .2 ) (0.0145)
Manuals 0.020 0.67 0.40 2.3
(0.9) (0.5) (2.5) (0.00899)
Manuals in -0.0076 0.042 0.27 3.6
manufacturing (0.3) (0.3) (1.4) (0.0104)
Manuals not in 0.060 0.25 0.35 3.3'
manufacturing (2 .2 ) (1.7) (1.9) (0.0106)
See over for Notes.
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Notes for Table 2.9a:
See Notes to Table 2.8.
Critical values X22,0.05“6 -0 * X22 ,0.10~4 •6 •
The estimated unemployed effect for manual employees in manufacturing 
is robust to introducing region specific time trends; truncating sample to 
cover the sub-period 1975-1985; to the exclusion of the South East or the 
East and/or West Midlands; robust to estimation by ordinary least squares 
and to using the lagged male unemployment rate.
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TABLE 2.9b
Relative regional female wage equations. 1975-1989
Dependent variable
Explanatory
variables w i,-l
Ui act£
PHj
PH
r u H ™ i  
PH PH
nH
1
Sargan 
(s.e.)
All Employed 0 .,27 -0 .014 -0 .60 0 ,.20 0 ,.13 0 .58 0 .15 2 .1
(3. 0 ) (0 .6 )_ (2 .3) (0 .• 5) (3. 3) (2 .7) (0 .5) (0 .,0146)
Non-manuals -0 .,012 -0 .0076 -0 .72 0 .48 0 ,.15 0 .79 0 .25 0 .8
(0 .9) (0:3) (2 .0 ) (0 .9) (3,.5) (3. 0 ) (0 .8 ) (0 ,.0166)
Non-manuals in 0 .49 -O'.040 -0 .,18 0 ,.28 0 ,.12 0 .57 0 .19 1 .7
manufacturing (5. 9) Ji-
(0 .7) (0 ,.6 ) (2 ,.7) (2 .3) (0 .6 ) (0 .0174)
Non-manuals not 0 .,10 0 .0038 -0 .83 0 ,.18 0 ,.15 0 .68 0 .,09 0 .2
in manufacturing (1 .0 ) (0 .1 ) (2 .8 ) (0 ,• 4) (3,.3) (2 .8) (0 .3) (0 .0171)
Manuals 0 .,27 0 .,010 0 .,056 0 ,.51 0 ,.020 0 .,33 -0 .22 0 .03
(1 .8 ) (0 .4> (0 .2 ) (1 .2 ) (0 ,.4) (1 .5) (0 .7) (0 .0145)
Manuals in 0 ,.33 -0 .,028 -0 .,32 -0 .13 0 .11 0 .32 -0 .,15 2 ,.2
manufac tur ing (3,.6 ) (1 .1) (1 .3) (0 • 3) (2 .5) (1 .4) (0 .5) (0 ,.0162)
Manuals not in 0 .27 0 .025 -0 .,10 0 .49 0 .023 0 .11 0 .16 0 ,.1
manufacturing (3..0 ) (0 .9) (0 .4) (1 .0 ) (0 • 5) (0 .• 4) (0 .5) (0 ,.0184)
Notes:
See Notes to Tables 2.8a and 2.8b.
Critical values X2l f0.05= 3 -8 X21, 0.10= 2 -7 -
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TABLE 2.10
Regional economic activity rate equations (reduced forms). 1975-1989
Dependent variable actj 
(150 observations)
Explanatory
variables
acti_i
PHt
PH
PHj
PH
n . H1 R 2
Males 0.69 20.6 1.3 -1.5 93.4
(10.3) (2.4) (1.7) (0 .2 )
Females 0.63 1.5 3.4 16.9 91.3
(1 0 .0 ) (0 .2 ) (3.5) (1.7)
Notes:
Estimation by pooled cross-section time series Ordinary Least Squares with 
regional specific fixed effects suppressed from Table.
t-statistics in parentheses. Critical value at 5 per cent level of 
significance 1.6 (one-sided test).
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TABLE 2.11
Relative regional female wage equations. 1975-1989
Dependent variable
Explanatory
variables w i,-l
act^
PHj
PH
PHj
PH
ntliPHi
PH
1
s .e .
All employed 0 .,24 -0..90 0 .16 0 .,17 0 .,67 o.:32 0 .0171
(2..3) (2..4) (0..3) (3..1) (2.■ 4) (0.9)
Non-manuals -0..011 -0,.72 0 ,.59 0 .16 0 .,77 0 .20 0 .,0176
(0.• B) (2 .1) (1..2) (3..5) (2.■ 9) (0 .6)
Non-manuals in 0 .51 -0 .20 0 ,.44 0 ,.13 0 .55 0 .031 0 .0177
manufac turing (6. 2) (0.• 7) (0. 9) (2,.7) (2.■ 0) (0 .1)
Non-manuals not 0 .09 -0 .87 0 .19 0 .15 0 .,66 0 .079 0 .,0171
in manufacturing (0..9) (3..1) (0,■ 4) (3..3) (2. 8) (0 .3)
Manuals 0 .26 0 .074 0 .48 0 ,.014 0 ,.34 -0 .20 0 .0153
(1.• 2) <0 .2) (1..1) (0,.2) (1 .• 3) (0 • 6)
Manuals in 0 ,.36 -0 .35 0 .042 0 .12 0 ,.31 -0 .30 0 ,.0161
manufacturing (4,• 0 ) (1 .4) (0 ,.1) (2 ,.8) (1 ..4) (1 .0 )
Manuals not in 0 .27 -0 .12 0 .37 0 .019 0 .088 0 .24 0 ,.0179
manufacturing (3,.2 ) (0 .4) (0 .8 ) (0 .4) (0 .4) (0 .7)
Notes:
See Notes to Tables 8a and 8b.
No overidentifying restrictions.
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TABLE 2.12
Relative regional male wage equations. 1975-1989 
(emulation effects)
Dependent variable Vj:
Explanatory
variables
w i,-l Manual wage Sargan x22 
(s.e.)
Non-manual 0.29 0.49 0.3
(3.1) (1 .2) (0.0124)
w i,-l Non-manual Sargan x22 
(s.e.)
Manual 0.25 0.24 2.5
(1.7) (1 .1) (0.00818)
w i-l Non-manuals Sargan x22
in manufacturing (s.e)
Manual 0.33 0.71 0.1
manufacturing (3.2) (1.3) (0.0144)
Notes:
See Notes to Tables 2.8a and 2.8b.
Critical values X22 ,0 .05= 6.0 X22 ,0.10=^ •^ •
u if acti, R if - 1 - pi!3-, included as explanatory variables
PH ^
but not reported in the above table.
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TABLE 2.13
Relative regional male wage equations 1975-1989
(Effects of overtime on wage equations) 
Dependent variable
Explanatory
variables w i,-l u i R i
act^
PHt
PH
Manuals including 0.46 -0.045 0.080 -0.091
overtime (4.8) (2.7) (0.9) (0.3)
0.18 -0.054 0.026 0.86 -0.015
(1.4) (3.2) (0.3) (3.4) (0.05)
Manuals excluding 0.44 -0.051 0.068 — -0.086
overtime (4.7) (3.0) (0 .8 ) (0.3)
0.13 -0.060 -0.011 0.96 -0.00092
(0.9) (3.4) (0 .1) (3.3) (0.003)
Explanatory PHi nV Hi p. Sargan x?
Variables (continued) PH PH 11 l (s.e.)
Manuals including 0.051 0.18 0.46 2.7
overtime (2.4) (1.5) (2.9) (0.00845)
0.028 0.095 0.44 4.2
(1.3) (0 .8 ) (2.9) (0.00831)
Manuals excluding 0.048 0.17 0.47 3.3
overtime (2 .2 ) (1.4) (3.1) (0.00864)
0.020 0.067 0.40 2.3
(0.9) (0.5) (2.5) (0.00899)
Notes :
See Notes to Tables 2.8a and 2.8b.
Critical values X^2 ,0 .05=^ •00, X^2,0.10=4 •6 •
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TABLE 2.14
Non-manufacturing manual men in particular industries by region 
Agricultural share of manual non-manufacturing male employment (NES)
SE EA SU WM EM YH NU NO UA SC GB
1974 3.0 16.7 4.9 2.2 4.8 4.0 0.9 1.8 1.8 6.2 3.8
1975 3.3 18.9 6.7 4.3 5.8 4.8 1.8 3.4 2.6 7.3 4.9
1976 3.1 17.8 6.9 4.6 6.8 4.4 1.6 3.7 3.1 8.1 4.9
1977 3.2 17.7 6.8 3.9 6.5 4.7 1.6 3.4 2.5 7.5 4.7
1978 3.0 18.9 6.4 4.1 7.1 4.9 1.7 3.5 2.7 7.2 4.8
1979 2.9 18.4 5.8 3.4 6.8 4.4 1.7 3.6 2.1 7.7 4.6
1980 3.0 12.6 6.1 4.1 6.3 4.4 1.7 3.4 2.2 6.5 4.4
1981 3.0 17.5 7.4 5.0 5.8 4.6 1.7 3.3 2.2 5.9 4.6
1982 3.0 16.2 7.6 4.3 6.0 4.7 1.9 3.2 2.0 6.1 4.5
1983 2.7 17.2 6.7 4.6 6.0 4.3 1.8 3.2 2.8 5.8 4.4
1984 2.9 15.6 7.4 4.4 6.0 4.3 2.1 3.6 2.7 5.6 4.5
1985 3.0 15.6 7.2 4.1 6.0 4.0 1.3 3.0 2.5 5.3 4.3
1986 3.3 14.5 7.3 4.2 5.9 4.9 1.8 3.9 3.3 5.7 4.6
1987 3.4 14.1 6.8 4.4 6.6 5.0 2.0 3.7 3.3 6.6 4.8
19 88 3.0 13.6 6.5 3.9 6.3 4.9 1.6 3.0 3.1 5.8 4.3
1989 2.9 13.1 6.0 4.2 6.4 4.9 1.4 3.0 2.4 5.8 4.2
Mini ng share of manual non-manufacturing male employment
SE EA SU WM EM YH NU NO WA SC GB
1974 0.7 0.0 4.4 9.5 22.2 16.4 2.9 19.2 17.6 6.2 7.6
1975 0.7 0.0 4.5 6.9 21.6 14.6 2.6 20.2 19.2 6.9 7.4
1976 0.7 0.0 3.6 6.7 20.3 16.0 2.1 17.1 17.4 6.2 6.9
1977 0.4 0.0 3.9 6.6 20.5 13.8 2.4 16.8 17.2 6.5 6.7
1978 0.4 0.0 2.7 4.8 18.2 14.1 2.0 16.4 16.1 6.8 6.2
1979 0.5 0.0 3.9 5.5 17.7 15.1 2.1 15.9 14.4 5.1 6.3
1980 0.5 0.0 ‘3.7 5.1 19.2 13.7 2.1 15.7 15.2 5.5 6.1
1981 0.5 0.0 4.0 6.0 23.0 14.2 2.3 16.3 15.7 6.5 6.8
1982 0.6 0.0 3.8 7.2 19.6 13.8 2.4 15.1 14.0 7.2 6.5
1983 0.3 0.0 0.0 5.2 17.9 13.1 2.0 13.3 13.3 3.5 5.2
1984 0.2 0.0 0.0 5.1 16.8 13.5 1.9 11.8 12.4 2.9 4.9
1985 0.2 0.0 0.0 5.1 15.7 13.8 1.9 10.3 11.4 2.2 4.6
1986 0.1 0.0 0.0 6.5 16.6 12.3 1.6 9.8 10.6 2.2 4.5
1987 0.0 0.0 0.1 5.6 14.4 9.3 1.5 8.0 8.1 1.2 3.6
1988 0.8 0.0 0.1 4.8 10.1 8.5 1.0 6.4 6.3 1.5 3.2
1989 0.6 0.0 0.1 3.3 9.1 7.2 0.9 5.9 5.3 0.9 2.6
Construction share of manual non-manufacturing male employment (NES)
SE EA SU WM EM YH NU NO WA SC GB
1974 20.0 24.8 24.2 24.7 20.5 23.0 25.1 29.8 27.2 30.3 23.9
1975 18.5 23.0 22.6 24.9 20.5 22.5 24.3 26.0 21.5 29.9 22.6
1976 18.3 21.6 22.2 22.3 18.6 20.1 23.5 27.0 24.3 29.6 21.9
1977 18.4 21.0 22.9 21.4 20.8 22.2 25.2 27.9 25.4 28.5 22.4
1978 18.7 21.2 23.8 21.8 18.8 22.7 23.7 28.1 24.7 30.0 22.4
1979 17.5 16.7 21.2 21.4 18.3 20.5 24.0 28.3 24.3 30.3 21.6
1980 18.2 17.0 20.2 21.6 18.7 22.5 25.0 27.3 23.5 30.8 22.0
1981 18.2 19.8 20.4 19.3 16.6 21.7 22.7 26.8 19.8 30.0 21.1
1982 17.7 19.0 18.9 17.6 17.4 19.3 22.7 25.8 22.0 28.5 20.4
1983 15.7 16.6 19.9 16.7 16.3 19.4 20.0 25.6 19.7 25.2 18.9
1984 14.6 16.7 19.8 17.1 16.7 19.4 19.1 26.4 18.8 25.3 18.5
1985 13.7 17.2 19.2 17.5 15.4 18.1 19.5 25.4 19.3 27.9 18.3
1986 13.4 14.3 17.5 18.8 14.3 17.4 18.8 24.6 20.0 25.4 17.5
1987 13,4 15.6 17.5 17.4 14.2 17.6 17,9 24.3 18.4 24,3 17.1
1988 13.0 16.5 18.6 17.4 15.4 18.6 18.5 27.1 20.5 24.5 17.6
1989 12.5 14.5 16.3 17.6 15.3 20.1 17.9 26.8 21.6 24.7 17.4
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TABLE 2.15
Relative regional male wage equations. 1975-1989 
Non-manufacturing manuals
Dependent variable
Explanatory variables
w i,-l ui u i * u^ * u-£ * mining^ Sargan
d1985 construct- mining^
ion£
1 0.27 -0.024 -0.033 0.61 -0.33 0.25 0.60 0.6
(3.1) (1-4) (3.2) (1.5) (1 .2 ) (2.9) (3.5) (0.00969)
2 0.29 -0.020 -0.033 0.61 — 0.24 0.54 0.4
(3.3) (1.3) (3.1) (1.5) (2 .8 ) (3.0) (0.00964)
3 0.36 -0.045 — 0.66 -0.28 0.31 0.63 0.2
(4.0) (3.0) (1 .6 ) (1 .0 ) (3.6) (3.5) (0 .0 100)
4 0.38 -0.041 — 0.67 — 0.29 0.58 0.1
(4.2) (3.0) (1 .6 ) (3.4) (3.1) (0 .0100)
5 0.57 -0.038 — 0.71 -0.17 — 0.73 0.6
(7.6) (2 .2 ) (1.5) (0.5) (3.6) (0.01013)
6 0.41 -0.012 -0.043 0.64 -0.25 — 0.67 0.04
(5.2) (0.7) (3.9) (1.4) (0 .8 ) (3.5) (0.0107)
Notes:
See Notes to Tables 2.8a and 2.8b.
Critical value for Sargan specification test statistic at 5fcflevel 
3.8.
Mining and construction refer to their respective NES employment shares 
within overall non-manufacturing manual employment. (See Table 2.14)
Average employment shares for GB over 1974-89 were 20.2% for construction, 
5.5% for mining and 4.5% for agricultural fishing and food.
diggs denotes a dummy variable for the years 1985-1989.
The inclusion of a compositional wage effect for agricultural employees was 
found to be insignificant.
House prices fail to enter with statistical significance into the above 
specification.
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TABLE 2.16
Relative regional male wage equations. 1975-1989. 
(curvature effects). Manual men in manufacturing
Dependent variable (In Wj-ln w)
Explanatory
variables
(In w^-ln w)_i ui In u^ (In U £)2 (In Ui)3 Sargan
(x2)
1 0.40 0.00033 0.2
(4.8) (0 .1 ) (X22 >
2 0.35 — -0.057 — — 0.7
(5.0) (3.5) (X22 )
3 0.30 0.0041 -0.077 — — 0.1
(3.5) (1 .6) (3.9) (X23>
4 0.34 _ -0.062 0.011 0.0021 6.8
(4.7) (2 .6 ) (0.3) (0 .0 2) (X24>
Notes:
See Notes to Tables 2.8a and 2.8b.
(lnw£-lnw)_2 , R-i and act^ included as explanatory variables but not 
reported in the above Table.
Critical values x^2>® * 05=6.0; »0•10=4.6 ;
X23,0.05-7.8; x23 >0 •10=6•3;
X24,0.05=9.5; X24 .0•10=7.8 .
-70-
TABLE 2.17
Relative regional male wage equations. 1975-1982
Dependent variable (log Wj_-log w)
Explanatory
Variables
(log w ^ l o g  w)_i unemployment rates (log u^-log u) 
all all 
males non-manuals manuals
Manuals in 0.10 -0.11
manufacturing (1 .2 ) (4.6)
0.13 -0.10 — _
(1.5) (4.3)
Manuals not in 0.11 — — 0.020
manufacturing (1 .0 ) (1 .0 )
0.12 0.0045 — _
(1 .1 ) (0 .2 )
Non-manuals in 0.27 — -0.013 —
manufacturing (2.7) (1.3)
0.22 -0.039 — —
(2 .2 ) (1 .2 )
Non-manuals not 0.043 — 0.0034 —
in manufacturing (0.4) (0.3)
0.047 -0.0012 — —
(0.4) (0.04)
Notes
See Notes to Tables 2.8a and 2.8b.
Occupation specific unemployment rates (men and women) constructed using 
manual/non-manual unemployment shares from the Department of Employment 
Gazette and manual/non-manual employment shares from the New Earnings 
Survey.
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TABLE 2.18
Inter-regional migration. Great Britain. 1975-1982
Dependent variable ln(M-y /L^) 
(720 observations)
Explanatory variables
u^ (manual) 0.032 (0 03) 0.036 (0 04)
u-: (non-manual) 5.03 (2 4) 5.0 (2 5)
R i -0.62 (2 4) -0.59 (2 4)
uj (manual) -0.20 (0 2) -0.22 (0 2)
u^ (non-manual) -2.3 (1 1) -2.1 (1 1)
Rj
0.44 (1 7) 0.41 (1 6)
v L/v * -0.11 (2 7)
V^/V (manual) -0.063 (1 4) *
Vj/V (non-manual) -0.039 (0 9) *
Vj/V * 0.048 (1 2)
Vj/V (manual) 0.035 (0 8) *
Vj/V (non-manual) 0.001 (0 02) *
J
cij -6.5 (2 1) -6.5 (2 1)
M/L 0.97 (9 5) 0.97 (9 6)
u -1.4 (1 1) -1.4 (1 2)
pHi/pHj
pHi/pH,
0.23 (2 0) 0.23 (2 1)
-0.33 (0 3) -0.29 (0 3)
w i/wj (manual) 
Wj/wj (non-manual)
-0.49 (1 2) -0.53 (1 4)
0.50
-0.13
(2
(0
1)
1)
0.51
-0.055
(2
(0
2)
06)
R 2 (%) 98.4 98.4
s.e. 0.098 0.098
Notes:
See Notes to Table 2.17.
M-jj is the number of people migrating from region i to region j and is 
constructed from the National Health Service Central Register. (Regional 
Trends, various)
C£j denotes the squared difference in the share of production employment 
between region i and j .
V denotes number of unfilled vacancies recorded in Jobcentres (Gazette. 
various)
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FIGURE 2.1
Wages and Employment in Two Regions
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FIGURE 2.3a
Regional dispersion of male average 
hourly earnings 1974-1989
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FIGURE 2.3b
Regional dispersion of male manual 
average hourly earnings ex. overtime
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FIGURE 2.3c
Regional dispersion of male 
unemployment rates 1974-1989
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FIGURE 2.3d
Regional dispersion of house prices 
1974-1989
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FIGURE 2.3e
Regional dispersion of retail prices 
(excluding housing) 1974-1989
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FIGURE 2.3f
Regional dispersion of male manual 
average hourly earnings
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FIGURE 2.4
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FIGURE 2.4
Relationship between relative regional 
unemployment and earnings : North W est
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CHAPTER 3
REGIONAL MIGRATION IN BRITAIN: AN ANALYSIS OF GROSS FLOWS USING NHS
CENTRAL REGISTER DATA
3.1. Introduction
Migration is one of the mechanisms which can play a part in resolving 
structural imbalances in the labour market. Unemployed workers in a 
depressed region can find work by migrating to a prosperous part of the 
country where jobs are more plentiful. But empirical investigations have 
cast doubt on the effectiveness of migration as an equilibrating force. 
While gross migration flows (Fig 3.1) are quite large (in the UK about 1.6 
per cent of people move between regions in any year) , net migration flows 
are very much smaller. The flow of migrants from region i to region j is 
offset by a flow in the opposite direction of similar magnitude (Fig 3.2).
Net migration, which is the relatively small difference between the 
much larger gross flows, generally operates in an equilibrating direction 
(from high unemployment to low unemployment regions). But migration flows 
show a marked cyclical pattern, tending to rise in times of prosperity and 
to fall in a recession. Since regional differences in unemployment rates 
tend to be highest in a recession, it appears that migration is least 
effective when it is most needed.
The standard economic model of migration, based on human capital
theory, is that people will migrate if the benefit measured in terms of the
present value of the increase in expected lifetime earnings exceeds the
cost of the move^. It is not easy on this approach to explain the 
magnitude of apparently perverse gross flows. More importantly, the human 
capital approach offers no explanation of the time series behaviour of 
aggregate migration, and in particular appears inconsistent with the
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observation that migration flows often fall when unemployment differentials 
widen.
In this chapter we start from a different theoretical framework, namely 
that of job-matching. The basic concept is the "hiring function" which 
states that the number of engagements, or hires, depends on the number of 
people seeking work and on the number of job vacancies. In this framework 
migration is seen simply as a special case of job-matching in which a 
job-seeker in region i is matched to a job in region j. Although people 
can live in one region and work in another (Chapter 4) , typically such job 
matches will involve the household migrating. It may be noted that, on
this approach, migration is viewed as the consequence of successful job
search rather than as a pre-condition for it. Given the existence of
newspapers and telephones, let alone more recent developments in 
information technology, it seems to us no longer appropriate to assume that 
people must physically relocate themselves in an area in order to be able 
to look for work there.
Our approach suggests that there will be a higher rate of out-migration
from regions of high unemployment, but for a reason quite different from
that stressed by the human capital theory. On the hiring function
approach, unemployed people are more likely to migrate because they are 
more active in job search. Our approach is thus consistent with the 
results of Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989a) who find that employed people 
are no more likely to migrate from areas of high than of low unemployment.
The hiring function approach also enables us to generate consistent 
explanations of gross and net migration. We set out the theory in Section
3.2, and offer an interpretation of the time series behaviour of aggregate 
migration.
The bulk of the Chapter is taken up with an attempt to model gross
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bilateral (i.e. region i to region j) migration flows. Our migration data 
derive from the National Health Service Central Register. This register 
records all transfers of patients between Family Practitioner Committees 
(ie GPs) and constitutes a comprehensive record of all migration movements 
within Britain. (The data are described more fully in Section 3.3)
There are obviously innumerable reasons why people may move from one 
region to another. We have therefore focussed in the empirical work on the 
causes (or at least the empirical correlates) of the time series variation 
in the migration rate from region i to region j over the fifteen years for 
which we have data, 1974-89, Our main findings are:
i) that unemployment and vacancy rates have significant and 
well-defined effects which are consistent with the theoretical framework.
ii) that housing market variables are by and large less significant 
than labour market variables, but relative house prices do have a 
significant impact in the expected direction.
iii) that relative wages appear to have a perverse effect implying a 
higher rate of migration from high wage to low wage regions. Possible 
explanations include compositional effects (high wage-earners are more 
likely to move) and reverse causality (other things equal a higher rate of 
in-migration depresses wages).
3.2. A Model of Migration based on the Hiring Function
We start from a very simple model in which only unemployed people look 
for work, in which there are no systematic differences in job 
characteristics between regions and distance is immaterial in job search. 
In the economy as a whole, there are U unemployed people and V job
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vacancies and the total number of engagements (job hirings) is given by the
hiring function
H - H(U,V) ,H2 > 0 (1)
(for recent discussions, see Blanchard and Diamond, 1989, or Jackman et al, 
1989, though the basic idea is due to Holt, 1970). The aggregate hiring 
function H is found to have constant returns to scale (Pissarides, 1986).
If we now imagine the economy divided into a number of regions, but 
retain the assumptions that location and distance are immaterial so that an 
unemployed person in a given region is equally likely to take up a vacancy 
in any part of the country, it will follow that the number of unemployed 
people in region i taking up vacancies in region j , M^j , is given by:
where is the number of unemployed people in region i and Vj the number
1
of vacancies in region j .
Making use of the notation v^ for the share of unemployment and the
Mfj - H.(Ui/U).(Vj/V) (2)
share of vacancies in region i respectively (ie D^”U^/U; v^=V^/V) we have
The total outmigration from region i is
out
j
(j*i)
The total in-migration to region i is
in
J J
(j*i) (j*i)
= H (1-u^ V£
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The net migration into region i is therefore 
in out
Mi - Mi - H (Vi-Gi) (3)
Finally, the total level of migration in the economy is given by 
in
M - jMi - H (1-2 ^ V i )  (4)
1
A comparison of equations (3) and (4) shows that while net migration is 
quite sensitive to small changes in relative shares of unemployment and 
vacancies across regions, gross migration is relatively invariant to such 
changes^. In fact, using British data over the period 1975-1984, the
variation in engagements is a thousand times the variation in (l~2u iv i) 
indicating that the variation over time in gross migration flows is, in the 
model, attributable almost entirely to variation in engagements and only 
very minimally to variation in sectoral imbalances^. As a check on the 
empirical validity of this approach, a regression of log M on log H and log 
( l - I u ^ )  over the period 1971-84 gives
log M = 0.40 log H + 5.2 log (1-Hu^v^) R^ =■= 0.724
(4.5) (1.5) Sargan - 0.2(*^,0.05-3.8)
By way of comparison, in Table 1 we briefly examine the correlates of
aggregate migration with a number of other possible explanatory variables 
by simple instrumental variables time series regressions. While with only
19 annual observations (1971-89), it is clearly not possibly to carry out
an exhaustive econometric analysis of this issue, the empirical results are 
quite striking. We first regress migration separately on our two hiring 
function variables, the engagement rate and the index of sectoral imbalance 
(l-Eu-jv^) . (Regrettably, data on total engagements are available only
until 1984.) We next examine the effect of two measures of the pressure of
demand in the labour market, unemployment and vacancies. It is noteworthy
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that vacancies offer a better explanation than unemployment and in a 
regression including both variables vacancies drive out unemployment (see 
Table 1.1). We then look at the hypothesis that migration is essentially a 
housing market phenomonen with people being more likely to move when 
mortgage rates are low than when they are high. Finally we examine some 
variables suggested by the human capital approach, the variances of 
relative unemployment rates, of relative wage rates and of relative house 
prices.
Clearly the engagement rate provides by far the best ’explanation1 of 
migration. In Fig. 3, we plot the two series to show how closely they have 
moved. However, most of the variables, taken by themselves are significant 
and of the expected sign. The best of these others appears to be the 
variance of relative house prices. However, in an equation including both 
variables, it turns out that only engagements matter, and house price
variance becomes wrongly signed and insignificant.
Our conclusions in this section are necessarily very broad-brush, but 
our empirical results appear to confirm our initial hypothesis that
migration can usefully be regarded as a special case of hiring, with
overall engagements in the labour market the dominant factor explaining 
aggregate migration.
3.3. An Analysis of the Inter-regional Migration
The time-series analysis of aggregate migration has been necessarily 
limited in its scope because we were working with only 19 observations. If 
we turn from aggregate to 'bilateral' (i.e. region i to region j) gross 
inter-regional migration flows, a much sharper picture can emerge. We
have, for the ten standard regions of Great Britain^, observations on the 
gross flow from each region to each of the other regions (90 observations)
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for 15 years (1975-1989), that is 1350 observations.
We first describe the migration data, then derive an estimation 
equation from our theoretical model, and finally comment on the empirical 
results.
3.3.1 Migration Data
The data on migration derive from the National Health Service Central 
Register (NHSCR) and are collated by the Office of Population Census and 
Surveys. These data are based on transfers of doctors' patients between 
Family Practitioner Committees (FPC's) in England and Wales and Area Health 
Boards (AHB's) in Scotland^. While obviously not as comprehensive as the 
population census, these data offer a continuous series of annual figures 
for regional movers, covering the vast majority of households.
The NHSCR data source obviously poses certain problems**. Firstly, our 
theoretical framework is based on migration as a job search phenomenon 
while our data, which is based on population and not simply on labour force 
movements, includes retirement moves (retirement to the South West say), 
those who move home but who remain in the same job, and other somewhat 
extraneous movements such as university student flows^. In this respect, it 
is worth noting that about one-third of both unemployed and employed 
migrants do so for non-job related reasons®.
Since there are clearly innumerable influences affecting migration 
flows other than simple measurable economic variables, we proceeded by 
assigning a fixed effect to each of the bilateral flows. The fixed effect 
will then absorb the effects of all variables which are constant over time, 
such as the distance between regions (for an analysis of the impact of 
distance on migration see Jackman and Savouri, 1991), differences in their 
climate or other features which affect retirement flows, differences in the 
number of higher education institutions across regions (for an analysis of
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student flows see Savouri, 1991a) and other location attributes which are 
constant (or at least relatively static) over time.
Thus our hypothesis is that variations in regional migration flows over 
time can be explained largely in terms of economic factors. Provided we 
can assume that the relationship between changes in the explanatory 
economic variables and migration flows are the same for each of the 
bilateral flows, we have for estimation purposes a total pooled sample of 
1,350 observations with 90 bilateral-flow fixed effects.
3.3.2 Analytical Framework
We turn now to the implications of the hiring function approach for 
bilateral regional migration flows. The basic equation is (2) on p.4:
Mij = H(Ui/U), (Vi/V) (2)
The flow of migrants from region i to region j is the product of total 
engagements in the economy, the share of unemployment in region i and the 
share of vacancies in region j .
This equation was derived from a very simple model, and given that we 
now have many more observations, it is possible to relax the simplifying 
assumptions in favour of a more general and realistic, though inevitably 
more complex, formulation.
Most importantly, in our simple model we had assumed distance 
immaterial in job search. In practice, of course, this is not the case. 
Most people are unwilling to move and would prefer to take a job close to 
home. In aggregate there are about one million migration moves in a year 
(of which some will not be job related) as against about 7 or 8 million job 
engagements. Thus, unemployed people from region i seeking work in region 
j will effectively be im competition mainly with job-seekers resident in 
region j rather than job-seekers in the whole country. Similarly, when we
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corae to vacancies we take into account the fact that the likelihood of 
job-seekers in region i seeking work outside the region will be primarily 
influenced by the availability of jobs in region i, rather than by 
vacancies in the nation as a whole.
Slightly more formally, we may allow for the discouraging effect of a 
distance on job search by a discount factor, 6 -fj where Sjj - 1 for i—j and 
S j j d  i^j . (As an example, in a gravity model one might have 
5£j=l/(l+d£j2 ) where d^j is the distance between the centre of region i and 
the centre of region j.) Returning to equation (2), we now have the 
proportion of people seeking work in region j who are resident in region i 
given by:
5 i-jU i U- /
-----------  - L'Uj for 6 -^j sman
Uj+I5iju i
i*j
Likewise, the proportion of vacancies effectively available to region i 
job-seekers which are located in region j is given by
{ijVj _ V i A , . .
- - 5ij J/Vj. for 5j[j small
Vi+E5 ijvj
Assuming distance in practice constitutes a substantial discouragement 
to job search, so the 6^j terms are small, we can rewrite (2 ) as:
Mil = (Ui/Ui)(ViA i)
(2 ')
= H(5ij)2 (ui/uj)(vj/vi)
where u^, v^ are the unemployment and vacancy rates.
Next, we allow for some effects of differences between regions. 
Job-seekers will obviously prefer to apply for jobs paying higher wages and 
thus potential migrants will tend to look for work in high wage rather than
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low wage regions. Thus a higher proportion of job-seekers applying for 
vacancies in high wage regions will be resident outside the region and one 
might therefore expect that a higher proportion of jobs in high wage 
regions will be filled by in-migrants rather than by local residents^. The 
relevant variable in this context is of course the real wage, which takes
into account differences between regions in both money wages and in the
cost-of-living.
Other economic factors that may affect migration flows are the 
composition of employment and housing tenure. Workers may clearly have a 
better chance of getting a job in a particular region if employment 
opportunities there are similar to the worker's existing work experience. 
We measure this by a 'comparability index', c^j, which is the square of the 
difference in the proportion of employees in manufacturing and construction 
industries between any two regions.
In the housing market, procedures for allocating local authority 
housing make it very difficult for local authority tenants to migrate 
between regions (Hughes and McCormick; 1981, 1985). We thus allow for the 
effect of the proportion of dwellings in a region which are local authority 
(or new town) tenancies.
Finally, we have up to now assumed the unemployed in region i (U^)
equal to the total number of job-seekers in region i. In a more general
framework we must allow (i) that not all the unemployed seek, or have much 
chance of finding, work and (ii) that there are also employed people 
seeking other jobs. On the first of these points, it is well-known that 
the long-term unemployed are less effective at job search and less 
attractive to potential employers than other job-seekers^-^. We thus
include the proportion of long-term unemployed in region i (R^) as a 
further explanatory variable.
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On the second point, suppose that the number of job-seekers in region i 
(S^) consists of the unemployed in that region (U^) plus some proportion 
(p) of employed workers in that region (E^). Then + ^E^.
Thus, the region i unemployment rate can be replaced by the proportion 
of job-seekers (employed and unemployed) in the labour force, s^ where
s± “ Sf/Lf U£ + y?(l—u^)
— <p+ (l-yj)u^
Similarly, in the destination region^ sj - ^+(l-^?)uj
so s^/sj - 1 + (1—v?) (uj_-Uj )/(y3+(l—v?)uj )=1+ (u^-u^)/C^+Uj ) (for small \p)
Or log ( S j / S j )  - ( U i - U j  )/(y?+Uj )
Thus, if we were to estimate (2') in log linear form
In = In H + ln(u^/uj) + ln(vj/v^) + constants
we may to a first approximation allow for employed job-searchers by
replacing the term in ln(u£/uj) by a term in (u^-uj) .
Finally, there is the problem of the level of overall engagements. Our
data series on total engagements stops in 1984, and rather than abandon the 
last five of our fifteen years of migration data, we have used total 
migration as a proxy for overall engagements. This procedure is supported 
by the theoretical analysis and empirical results of the previous section. 
It has the advantage of taking the broad time series movements in migration 
out of the bilateral flow equations, which can then focus on the 
determinants of region differentials in migration flows relative to the 
aggregate. (We do, however, in Table 3.3, present estimates using the 
aggregate engagement rate rather than the migration rate for the shorter 
time period for which it is available.)
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3.3.3 Results
Our dependent variable is the migration rate i.e. the
proportion of the labour force in region i migrating to region j . The 
independent variables are those suggested by the generalised hiring 
function approach described in Section 3.2. The estimates are based on 
pooled time-series cross-section regressions for ninety bilateral migration 
flows between each of the ten standard regions for the fifteen years 
1975-89.
The results are set out in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. While the equations 
appear satisfactory in terms of the t-statistics on individual explanatory 
variables, the Bresch-Godfrey test suggests the presence of first and third 
order autocorrelation. We are not greatly troubled by this for reasons we 
explain below. To summarise the main findings, the unemployment rate in 
the region of origin (u^) has a consistent and very well-defined positive 
effect while that in the region of destination (uj) has a negative and 
significant impact.
The effect of a high proportion of long-term unemployment (R) is to 
diminish out-migration (and encourage in-migration). This is consistent 
with the results of (e.g.) Jackman and Layard (1991) on the adverse effects 
of long-term unemployment on job search.
The vacancy shares (v^,Vj) enter with the signs suggested by the 
theory, and with coefficients very closely equal and opposite, supporting 
the theoretical specification.
The overall migration rate (M/L) is highly significant, with a 
coefficient which is slightly, though not greatly, less than the value of 
unity implied by the theoretical model.
Turning to wages and prices, we have good data on money wages (from the 
New Earnings Survey) but no data of comparable quality on the cost of
-93-
living by region. The best measures we have are data on regional house 
prices (from the Department of the Environment) and figures, excluding 
housing (from the Regional Reward Surveys). We examine the impact of each 
of these factors, but we should stress at the outset that we do not have an 
accurate way of measuring relative real wages across regions. It turns out 
that we find correct signs on the two price variables, with that on house 
prices highly significant, but the effect of money wages (w^/wj) is 
perverse and significant. We discuss possible interpretations of the 
perverse wage effect below.
In the second column of Table 3.2 we allow also for the effect of 
housing tenure, again relative to the national average (n^H/riH). It turns 
out that tenure in the region of origin has no significant impact on 
out-migration, but a high proportion of local authority property 
significantly discourages in-migration. The latter effect comes as no 
surprise, given that local authority waiting lists for housing give 
priority to local residents. But the finding that housing tenure in the 
region of origin has no effect on migration appears inconsistent with the 
results of Hughes and McCormick (1987; 1985) derived from Labour Force
Survey data on individuals. A possible explanation is that it is not 
housing tenure as such which affects migration, but that tenure is standing 
as a proxy for some unobserved individual characteristic (such as income, 
on which there is no data in the Labour Force Survey Data). If local 
authority housing is associated with low incomes, and if low income 
households are less likely to migrate than those with higher incomes, there 
will be a correlation in the data on individual households between tenure 
and migration. Across regions, however, average incomes are quite similar 
while tenure proportions differ substantially. Hence the spurious 
correlation between tenure and aggregate out-migration will not appear at
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the regional level.
We have considered a number of possible explanations for the perverse 
wage effect. One is that high wages may be correlated with high vacancy 
rates, and thus our vacancy rate variable, which is absent from most other 
studies, may be displacing a correctly signed real wage effect. We have 
tried omitting the vacancy rate from our equations, but the wage effect 
remains perverse.
It is also possible that wages and prices may be highly correlated, 
thus potentially lowering the coefficient on the money wage. To 
investigate this we have examined a number of measures of the real wage 
(giving different weights to house prices and to other prices). We have 
also tried a definition of the real wage giving various arbitrary weights 
to house prices while assuming other prices constant across regions. The 
upshot is that the data reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on the 
money wage should be equal and opposite to that on the price index, for all
procedures for calculating the price index.
A more likely possible explanation for the perverse wage effect is that 
of labour force composition. High average wages in a region may reflect 
not so much higher wages for given jobs as a higher proportion of people in 
high wage activities. If high wage people are more likely to migrate, we 
would expect to see a higher rate of out-migration from high wage regions. 
In Column 3 of Table 3.2, we examine whether a disaggregation between 
manual and non-manual groups assists in explaining migration flows.
The result is that differentials in manual wages across regions appear
to have no effect on migration, whilst the perverse effect remains with 
regard to non-manual wages. Not too much can be made of this result, 
however, as clearly compositional effects may be as important within the 
non-manual category as between manuals and non-manuals.
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Another possible explanation for the perverse wage effect is that it is 
capturing not so much a migration of workers as a migration of jobs. As 
wages rise in a region jobs move out and this may lead to an out-migration 
rather than an in-migration of workers. It turns out that in this respect 
there has been a difference between the South East and the other regions. 
In the South East wages have risen rapidly while employment has grown, but 
in the other regions there has been a clearly defined negative relationship 
between employment growth and relative wages.
Our estimated reduced form equation^- for employment growth is:
^  - 1.0 n - 0.22 w± R2 « 0.503
(11.3) (3.5) s.e. - 0.0207, Sargan Test - 1.0
x\, 0.05 - 3.8
where hi is employment growth in region i, h is employment growth in nine 
regions of Britain excluding the South East and Wi is the wage of full-time 
manual men in region i relative to the average wage in the nine regions 
excluding the South East.
In Table 3.3, we repeat the analysis of Table 3.2, but separating out 
relative wage effects for the South East from those for the other regions. 
We also incorporate an index of firm relocation from the South East (kindly 
made available by Jones, Lang and Wootton) but this turns out to be only on 
the margin of significance. Our findings are that the higher relative 
wages in the South East do appear to be associated with higher in-migration 
to the South East, though they have no significant effect on out-migration 
(unless we allow for a quadratic house price effect in column (3)). For 
migration flows between other regions, the perverse effect remains. This 
provides some support for the labour demand explanation. Where high 
relative wages are associated with employment growth (as in the South East)
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they are also associated with higher in-migration. Where high relative 
wages are associated with a decline in employment (as in the other regions) 
they are associated with a lower rate of in-migration. Finally, in column 
4 we record the results of our preferred specification using the engagement 
rate instead of the migration rate, and thus estimating over the shorter 
period 1975-84. The equation can be compared with column 3 of Table 3.4 as 
a check that substituting the migration rate for the engagement rate does 
not alter our findings.
Table 3.4 illustrates the stability of our results, by examining the 
estimates of our preferred specification (Table 3.3, column 3) for 
successively shorter time periods. Our interest in doing this arises from 
concern over the presence of autocorrelation in our estimated equations. 
Since we have no lagged dependent variable, our estimates are consistent, 
but their efficiency is reduced by the presence of autocorrelation. A loss 
of efficiency would be detected by instability between equations estimated 
for different sample periods. Table 3.4 shows that this is not a problem 
with our results.
Having estimated inter-regional migration utilising the complete set of 
bilateral flows (1350 observations) we now examine the overall flows for 
each region in the form of separate out and in migration equations (150 
observations each). The estimates of our preferred specifications are set 
out in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 respectively.
Starting with out migration flows we observe in Table 3.5 column (1) 
that the coefficient on overall migration is close to unity. Examining the 
estimates on labour market variables we note that own region unemployment 
encourages out migration while national unemployment and high regional 
vacancy shares both discourage regional moves. Turning to cost of living 
effects we see that high relative house prices encourage out migration but
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that relative non-housing cost of living differences are not statistically 
significant. Relative nominal earnings differences are found - as in the 
case of our bilateral equations - to be perversely signed. In columns (2) 
and (3) we introduce the relocation of firms from the South East variable 
and the house price quadratic. Both are significant, but neither has much 
impact on our key economic variables.
We now turn to in-migration. In Table 3.6 column (1), we note that the 
coefficient on the national migration rate is close to unity. Low 
unemployment and a high relative vacancy share encourage in-migration. 
Turning to cost of living differences we see that high relative house 
prices discourage in-migration.
Relative nominal earnings effects take on a perverse sign as they do 
with out-migration. Again, however, if we separate out the South East, as 
in column (2) , we find a positive wage effect for the South East in 
conjunction with a perverse effect in the other regions.
Finally, our preferred equation for net migration, where the net 
migration rate is measured as
-Miin_Mjout-
/
'M-
1 Li J .L.
is
m±net _ Fi - 3 . 2(u£-u) + 1 6 . 5  (v^v) - 0.561n (PHi/PH)
(3.4) (2.2) (5.3)
s.e. = 0.0842 R2 = 89.7
is where are regional fixed effects. It turns out that wage effects in
the net migration equation are neither well-defined nor stable over time.
We conclude therefore that the results of estimating overall in, out and
net migration equations for the regions are consistent with those obtained
from our bilateral flow analysis.
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3.4. Conclusions
In this chapter we have estimated both aggregate time-series and pooled 
cross section-time series bilateral flow migration equations using data 
drawn on gross population migration flows across the ten standard regions 
of Great Britain. Our conclusions are:
(i) that migration can be viewed as a hiring or job search phenomenon as 
witnessed by the strength of aggregate time series correlation between 
migration and job engagements;
(ii) that high unemployment in a region raises out-migration because the 
unemployed search more than the employed, and reduces in-migration because 
of the 'crowding-out' effects of the job search of locally resident 
unemployed people;
(iii) that long term unemployment in a region reduces out-migration by 
reducing the search effectiveness or attractiveness of the unemployed; but 
raises in-migration for the same reasons;
(iv) that a high level of job vacancies in a region reduces out-migration 
and encourages in-migration.
(v) that high relative house prices encourage out-migration and discourage 
in-migration.
(vi) that housing tenure at the destination region affects migration flows, 
because a large local authority housing sector reduces in-migration due to 
allocation policies favouring local residents;
These findings provide an immediate answer to the question we posed in 
the introduction to this chapter. Why do migration flows fall in a 
recession when regional unemployment differentials tend to widen? The 
answer is that overall engagements fall in a recession. Firms adjust to 
reduced demand by cutting back on recruitment and this reduces the job 
opportunities for the unemployed, including those which involve moving from
-99-
one region to another.
While this observation may not appear particularly profound it does 
seem to us that the capacity to explain why migration tends to fall when 
regional unemployment differentials are at their greatest may be one of the 
more important insights of the hiring function approach, and a result which 
most clearly distinguishes it from the human capital model.
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DATA SOURCES
Mj^ j : Inter Regional Movements .
Recorded internal population movements based on transfers of doctors'
patients. CSO, Regional Trends (see Population), various issues.
Figures pre-dating 1981 obtained from:
Office of Population Censuses and Surveys,
Migration Analysis Unit,
St Catherines House,
10 Kingsway,
London WC2B 6J P .
U: Total Unemployment excluding School Leavers, GB.
Department of Employment "X-ll" Series. This series derives from a
consistent definitional base for unemployment over our sample period.
Quarterly Average. Available on request to the:
Department of Employment,
Caxton House,
Tothill Street,
London SW1H 9NF.
U^: Regional Unemployment Stock.
Department of Employment Gazette. various issues. "Wholly Unemployed
Excluding School leavers". As a result of definitional problems due to
changes in benefit eligibility over our sample period, figures from
contemporaneous sources are not consistent over time. To overcome this
problem we use the Department of Employment's "X-ll" consistent
unemployment series to correct the regional unemployment levels.
Quarterly average.
R^: Proportion of Long Term Unemployment by Region.
This refers to the proportion of male unemployed over one year in the
unemployed pool. Department of Employment Gazette. various issues.
Average of January and July proportions.
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V^: Regional Vacancy Stocks.
Department of Employment Gazette. various issues. Total vacancies 
excluding both vacancies reported at Careers Offices and those based on 
the Community Programme. Monthly average, 
r: Mortgage interest rate.
Central Statistical Office, Financial Statistics. Monthly average, 
n ^ :  Tenure of Dwellings: Rentals from Local Authority or New Town.
CSO, Regional Trends (see Housing), various. December figures, 
n ^ : Employees in Employment by Region.
CSO, Regional Trends (see Employment) various. June figures. 
pH^: Regional House Prices.
Mix Adjusted Index of Dwelling prices, CSO, Regional Trends (see 
Housing) various issues. Quarterly average. Original source 
Department of the Environment. To obtain a time series for Regional 
House Prices we use 1987 Building Society valuations for dwelling 
prices, all borrowers. Regional Trends. 1989.
W^: Regional Earnings.
We use Average Hourly Earnings excluding overtime payments for Full 
Time Adult Males. April figures. Department of Employment, New 
Earnings Survey (Part E).
P: GDP deflator. CSO Economic Trends. various issues.
PH-l :Regional non-house prices based on consumers' expenditure less housing.
Regional Reward Survey figures, 
e: Engagements in the whole economy. Jackman et al (1989).
nj^:Proportion of employees in production, i.e. manufacturing and
construction industries. Department of Employment Gazette. various.
cij:<niP-njP )2
Relocation for the South East. Number of jobs relocated from Central 
London, 'The Decentralisation of Offices from Central London1, an annual 
special survey by Jones. Lang and Wootton. Table 2.
For full details of sources for our regional data set see Savouri (1991b).
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FOOTNOTES
* The Centre for Economic Performance is financed by the Economic and 
Social Research Council. Financial support is also acknowledged from 
the Esmee Fairbaim Charitable Trust.
We are extremely grateful to Jonathan Wadsworth who made available to 
us his Labour Force Survey data archives, and to R. Layard, A. Manning, 
C. Pissarides and A. Rodseth for very helpful comments, and to Jill 
Walters for expert typing of successive drafts of the paper.
1 Recent empirical migration work has included: Hughes and McCormick 
(1981, 1985) drawing on cross section household data from the 1973 and 
1974 General Household Surveys, Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989b) using 
data from the 1974 and 1984 Labour Force Surveys; Jackman, Layard and 
Savouri (1991) using regional net flows from the NHSCR; and Muellbauer 
and Murphy (1990) using gross flows from the NHSCR to and from the 
South East. Migration studies for Spain and Italy are to be found in 
Padoa-Schioppa (1991), and summarised in Savouri (1990).
2 The term (l-^uiv i) may be thought of as an index of mismatch, which is 
akin to the Nickell index of mismatch (1-£(u jV£)1/2) used in wage 
equations (Nickell, 1982) and see also Jackman and Roper (1987).
3 If M=H(l-^Giv i)
var (log M)= var(log H) + var (log (l-Ju^v^))
+ 2 covar (log H, log (l-£ u ^ ) ) .
On British data for 1971-84, var (log H) is 0.029 and var 
(log(l-^U£V^)) is 0.00003. (Given the very small variance of this 
latter term, the covariance can be ignored.)
4. We chose not to include migration flows to and from Northern Ireland in 
our regression analysis since they tend to be of a relatively small
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magnitude when broken down by region of origin and destination.
Further we are unable to disaggregate for the South East between
Greater London and the rest of the region due to data limitations over 
our sample period. (See Mitchell (1988) for an examination of
migration flows to and from Greater London).
5. A 10 per cent sample of re-registration was previously drawn as the 
basis for estimates of population movements, but from April 1984 this 
was changed to 100 per cent (CSO Regional Trends 1988, p.145).
6 A full critique of the NHSCR data can be found in Devis (1984).
7 See Regional Trends. 1989 and 1990, Tables 9.12 and 9.14 respectively 
for student flows across regions for 1987 and 1988.
8 See Hughes and McCormick (1990, p.11), who use Labour Force Survey
evidence.
9 This effect is partially offset by a reduced tendency for locally
resident job-seekers to seek work outside the region. But this type of 
effect would be expected to be proportionately very much smaller since 
migration flows are small relative to total engagements.
10 Using data drawn from four years of General Household Survey, Schmitt 
and Wadsworth (1992) find that the degree of job search of the 
unemployed declines with duration, such that a dummy capturing 
unemployment duration over twelve months enters negatively and strongly 
in their job search equations.
11 Estimated by stacked instrumental variable two stage least squares. 
Instruments used were w^ and where w^ denotes relative male
manual and w^* relative male hourly earnings. (One overidentifying 
restriction. )
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TABLE 3.1
Determinants of Aggregate Migration 1971-89 
Great Britain 
Dependent variable: log migration rate(m)
Explanatory Variables 
(all in logs)
Estimated Coefficient 
(t-statistic) R2 (%) Sargan (X2^)
^Engagement rate (e) 0.45 (6.0) 74.9 0.08
(1-ZGiVi) 8.4 (1.9) 11.6 2.1
Unemployment rate (u) -0.05 (1.5) 15.0 3.8
Vacancy rate (v) 0.25 (2.4) 36.2 0.9
Mortgage rate (r) -0.50 (2.5) 26.5 0.1
Variance of relative:
Unemployment rates (u^/u) 1.8 (3.5) 33.4 2.0
Wage rates (w^/w) 17.9 (3.5) 42.4 0.4
House prices (PH^/PH) 1.8 (3.6) 45.2 0.02
Sources: see Data Annex.
Notes:
* 1971-84 (for consistency we tested all the other equations over the 
1971-84 sub-period but this led to no difference of substance.)
Equations estimated using instrumental variables with one over identifying 
restriction X 2i, 0.05 = 3.8.
A multi-variate regression of_m on v and u generates estimates of 0.25(2.3) 
and -0.03(0.9) respectively (R2=35.9, Sargan (x^l) “ 0.5).
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TABLE 3.2
Inter-Regional Migration Equations 
Great Britain 1975-1989 
(1350 observations)
Dependent Variable In m^j
Explanatory Variables (1) (2 ) (3)
M/L 0 .88 (17. 9) 0 .87 (17.,8) 0 .87 (17,.8 )
u i 3..4 (8 .6 ) 3..4 (8 .• 6) 3.,3 (7,.9)
R i -0..31 (2 .3)
/
-0..34 (2 .5) -0.,40 (2 ,.9)
uj
-3..9 (9. 7) -3..8 (9. 7) -3..7 (8 ,■ 8 )
Rj
0 .37 (2 .7) 0 .,43 (3. 1 ) 0 .49 (3,.5)
V j / V -0,.054(2. 1 ) -0..053(2. 0 ) -0..055 (2 ,.2 )
V j / V 0 ,.045(1. 7) 0 .0 1 1 (0 .4) 0 .,0094 (0 ,.4)
cij
-3..5 (2 .7) -3..3 (2 .5) -3..2 (2 ,• 5)
PHi/PHj 0 .24 (6 .0 ) 0 ,.32 (6 ,.9) 0 ,.29 (6 • 7)
PHi/PHj 0 .84 (2 .0 ) 0 ,.70 (1 .• 7) 0 ,.52 (1 .2)
W i / w j  (all) 0 .58 (3..6 ) 0 .36 (2 ,.1 ) -
w i/wj(manuals) 0 .0045 (0 .0 2 )
w  ^ / w j (non-manuaIs) 0 .60 (3 .4)
fijH/nH -0 .57 (4,.6) -0 .51 (4 .3)
iiiH/nH -0 .097(0 ■ 8 ) -
R2(%) 97 .8 97 .8 97 .9
Notes:
For definitions of variables see data 
Equations estimated by using pooled,
sources. 
cross-section time series ordinary
least squares with a complete set of 90 bilateral fixed effects (Fj j ).
[F^ .j] “ 96.6, analysis of variance using fixed effects alone, 
t-statistics in parentheses. Critical value at one sided 5% level 1.6 and 
at 10% level 1.3.
All variables in logarithmic form except, u^, u j , R^, R j , c y  and iP*.
The Bresch-Godfrey Test for serial correlation suggests first and third 
order autocorrelation in the residuals across all quoted equations.
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TABLE 3.3
Inter-Regional Migration Equations 
Great Britain
(1350 observations)
Dependent Variable In mjj
Explanatory variables
(1 )
(1975-1989)
(2 ) (3)
(1975-1984)
(4)
M/L 0.84 (16.6) 0.87 (17.7) 0.81 (16.1)
E/L - - 0.53 (9.9)
ui 3.1 (7.9) 3.1 (8 .2 ) 3.2 (8.4) 4.1 (9.0)
R i -0.32 (2 .2 ) -0.33 (2.3) -0.35 (2.5) -0.68 (3.6)
u j
-3.5 (9.0) -3.5 (9.2) -3.5 (2.5) -2.4 (5.3)
R j
0.38 (2.7) 0.35 (2.5) 0.33 (2.3) -0.039(0.2)
V j / V -0.061 (2.4) -0.057 (2 .2 ) -0.054 (2 .1) -
V j / V 0.027 (1 .0 ) 0.058 (2.3) 0.061 (2.4) -
V i / V j - - - -0.063(2.7)
cij -3.1
(2.4) -3.1 (2.4) -1.5 (1 .1 ) -1.9 (1.0)
PHi/PHj 0.31 (7.3) 0.26 (6.4) 0.26 (6.4) 0.26 (2.5)
(PHi/PHj)2 - - 0.26 (4.9) 0.24 (1.0)
PHi/PHj 0.39 (0.9) 0.51 (1 .2 ) 0.51 (1 .2) 0.82 (1.3)
Wi/Wj 0.90 (4.7) 1.1 (5.6) 1.1 (5.7) 0.71 (3.3)
W i/WSE -1.2 (3.6) -1.2 (3.8) -0.72 (2 .1) -0.91 (1.3)
WSE/Wj -0.46 (1.4) -0.36 (1 .1) -0.88 (2 .6 ) 0.039(0.1)
rijH/nH -0.49 (4.1) - - -
Relocation
from the SE 0.046 (1 .6 ) - - -
R2 (%) 97.9 97 .8 97 .9 98.3
Notes:
See Notes to Table 2.
Earnings refer to average hourly earnings of full-time adult non-manual 
males.
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TABLE 3.4
Inter-Regional Migration Equations 
Great Britain
Dependent Variable In m^j
Explanatory
Variables 1975-89 1975-87 1975-84 1975-81
M/L
ui
uj
Rj
V i / V j
PHi/PHj 
(PHi/PHj)2 
PHi/PHj
Wi/Wj
w^/wSE 
wSE/wj 
R2 (%)
0.81(16.1)
3.2 (8.4)
-0.35 (2.5) 
-3.5 (9.1)
0.33 (2.3) 
-0.057(3.1) 
-1.5 (2.3)
0.26 (6.5) 
0.26 (4.9) 
0.51 (1.2)
1.1 (5.7)
-0.72 (2.1) 
-0.89 (2.6)
97.9
0.85(16.3)
3.0 (7.6)
-0.30 (1.9) 
-3.3 (8.3)
0.27 (1.7) 
-0.078(3.9) 
-2.1 (1.5)
0.087(1.3) 
0.26 (2.7) 
0.58 (1.2) 
0.84 (4.1) 
0.17 (0.3) 
-0.60 (1 .1 )
97.9
1.0 (14.3)
3.3 (8.0)
-0.32 (1.8) 
-3.3 (8.0)
0.32 (1.8) 
-0.063(2.9) 
-1.2 (0.7)
0.26 (2.9) 
0.14 (0 .6 ) 
-0.82 (1.3) 
0.71 (3.5) 
0.13 (0.2) 
-0.74 (1.1) 
98.5
1.1 (7.6
2.7 (3.7
-0.39 (1.3 
-2.4 (3.3
0.49 (1.6 
-0.084(2.7 
-1.1 (0.3
0.22 (1.9 
0.22 (0.8 
-0.21 (0.2 
0.65 (2.3 
0.74 (0.7
0.42 (0.4 
98.4
Notes:
See Notes to Table 2.
TABLE 3.5 
Regional Out-Migration Equations
Great Britain 1975-1989 
(150 Observations)
Dependent Variable In (M^/L-^)
Explanatory Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
M/L 0.96 (24.3) 0 .92 (2 2 .4) 0 .86 (19. 3) 0 .91 (24. 3)
u i 3.5 (8.7) 3..3 (8 .1) 3..5 (8 .8 ) 3..7 (8 .9)
^i -0.028 (1.3) -0 .030 (1 .• 5) -0 .019 (0 .9) -0 .046 (2 .2 )
u -3.5 (8 .2 ) -3,.8 (7.• 7) -3..6 (8 .4) -3..8 (8 .6 )
PHi/PH 0.14 (3.1) 0 ,.12 (2 .• 6) 0 .,23 (4. 0 ) 0 .19 (4. 2 )
(PHi/PH)2 0 ,.31 (3. 0 ) -
PHi/PH -0.16 (0.3) -0 .23 (0 ,• 5) -0 ,.061 (0 .1 ) 0 .38 (0 .8 )
w t/w 0.47 (3.3) 0 ,.42 (2 .• 9) 0 ,.38 (2 .7) -
relocation SE 0 ,.059 (2 .6) 0 ,.052 (2 .■ 4) -
R2 (%) 98. 6 98. 7 98. 8 98 .5
s . e 0 .0310 0 .03003 0 .0294 0 .0321
Notes: 
Equations estimated using region specific fixed effects (F^) by stacked
ordinary least squares.
R2 of fixed effects alone 91.1 (s.e=0.0795).
Asymptotic t-statistics in parenthesis. Critical value at 5% level of 
confidence for one sided test 1 .6 .
All variables in logarithmic form except u^ and u. 
s.e denotes estimated equation standard errors.
Earnings refer to average hourly earnings of full-time adult non-manual 
males.
Our estimates are found to be robust to truncating the sample to 1986.
The Bresch-Godfrey test for serial correlation in the residuals suggests 
first and second autocorrelation in the residual
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TABLE 3.6
Regional In-Migration Equations 
Great Britain 1975-1989
(150 Observations)
Dependent Variable In (Mj/Lj)
Explanatory Variables
(1 ) (2 ) (3)
M/L 0 .87 (1 1 .7) 0 .86 (9. 8 ) 0 .93 (13.6)
uj -0 .
49 (3..3) -0 .53 (3. 4) -0 .44 (3.0)
V j / V 0 .068 (1 .8 ) 0 ,.062 , (1 -6 ) 0 .090 (2.4)
PHj/PH -0 ,.30 (4..0 ) -0 ,.47 (3. 9) -0 .34 (4.6)
(PHj /PH)2 - -0 ,.42 (1 .6 )
PHj/PH -0 ,.86 (1 .• 0 ) -0 .97 (1 .1 ) -1 .3 (1.5)
W j / W -0 .49 (1 .8 ) -0 ,.68 (2 .3)
wSE/w - 2 ,.1 (1 .7)
R2 (%) 98 .0 98..1 98. 0
s . e 0 .0586 0 ,.0583 0 .0591
Notes:
Equations estimated using region specific fixed effects (Fj) by stacked 
ordinary least squares.
of equation estimated with fixed effects alone 93.4 (s.e. — 0.108).
See also Notes to Table 5.
Our estimates are found to be robust to truncating the sample to 1986.
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Figure 3.1
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Figure 3.3
Determinants of aggregate migration 
Great Britain 1971-1984
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Figure 3.3 ('cont.)
Determinants of regional migration 
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CHAPTER 4
REGIONAL MIGRATION VERSUS REGIONAL COMMUTING:
THE IDENTIFICATION OF HOUSING AND EMPLOYMENT FLOWS1
4.1. Introduction
A comparison of regional unemployment rates across Great 
Britain indicates a high degree of persistence? across the ten 
regions of Britain the simple correlation coefficient for 
regional unemployment rates between 1974 and 1987 was 0.92 
(Jackman et al. 1991) . One explanation for such persistence is 
the lack of geographical labour mobility or migration, which is 
in turn, often associated with housing market rigidities 
(McCormick, 1991) . A common view is that there cannot be a net 
movement of workers into a region of high labour demand because 
of housing supply inelasticities. In the local authority sector 
there is preferential allocation to local residents, while 
planning and land use controls hold back new housing development 
in the private sector.
But this view seems to neglect the possibilities that people 
can move their home from one region to another without changing 
their job while others may change their job without changing 
their home. In other words, if there are rigidities in the 
housing market, regional commuting may take on a more important 
role relative to migration as a means of alleviating regional 
inequalities. There is also, of course, the fact that some 
housing is occupied by retired, or non-working households, who 
can migrate without regard to labour market conditions.
Clearly in principle we may divide migrants into two 
categories, those who also change their job, and those who move
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home without changing their job. (Those who change job without 
moving home will not be classified as migrants.) This point was 
first discussed by Gordon (1975) and later developed by Molho 
(1982) . Both authors argued that one could distinguish the two 
types of migrants by reference to the distance of the move. It 
was, they suggested, to be expected that long-distance moves 
would consist of migrants who were also changing their jobs, whom 
they termed jobmovers2, while it would only be close to regional 
boundaries or along well-developed transport routes that people 
might move home across regions without changing their job. Most 
migration models assume people move for job reasons? according 
to Gordon (1975, p.161) the failure of such models to allow for 
migrants moving home but remaining in the same job had led them 
to under-predict flows between adjacent regions, since they 
failed to capture pure housing moves, and over-predict flows 
across non-contiguous regions.
A related problem with recorded migration flows is that they 
do not identify commuters, i.e those workers who fill vacancies 
outside their region of residence without changing their region 
of domicile. If we assume that these latent inter-regional 
migrants are largely between adjacent regions, then the effect 
of vacancies on migration flows will tend to be under-recorded 
for flows between adjacent regions. That is, some job-moves 
would not be accompanied by housing moves and hence would not be 
recorded as migration, while some housing moves, which would 
count as migration, would not accompanied by job-moves.
As evidence for the contrasting motives for short against 
longer distance moves, the General Household Survey for, 19763
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records that, when asked for the main reason for moving, only 4 
per cent of those moving under 5 miles and 18 per cent of those 
moving between 5 and 50 miles answered "Job-Study reasons" while 
of those moving 50 miles or more 53 per cent gave this answer, 
the respective shares who answered "Housing reasons" were 33, 19 
and 9 per cent (Table 4.1).
In attempting to overcome such identification problems, 
Molho (1982) argued that given an array of bilateral migration 
flows it was possible to identify certain cells as consisting 
exclusively of job-mover flows (i.e. the flows between non­
contiguous regions) and that the model should be estimated over 
these flows alone. Molho went on to argue that the same model 
could then be estimated over flows between contiguous regions, 
and that a comparison of the estimates would give some indication 
of the magnitude and determinants of housing flows.
It may be helpful to illustrate these issues by means of a 
simple diagram. Let Bfj. denote the net benefit from moving both 
job and home from region i to region j. Then if BE{. is the net 
benefit of a job move from i to j and B^. is the net benefit of 
a home move from i to j , then
B.. = Be.. + Bh... 
ij ij u
In Figure 4.1, we plot B5^ - and Bh.j so that, for any given 
household, the prospective net benefit of a move from its present 
region i to some other region j can be identified by a point on 
the figure. Clearly a point in the north-east quadrant (marked 
3 in the figure) indicates a move with both housing and 
employment benefits; the household will move home and change job. 
In the south-west quadrant, by contrast, both house and job moves
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have negative benefits, and the household will stay put. The 
interesting cases are the north-west and south-east quadrants, 
and it is here that distance can affect the decision rule.
If regions i and j are contiguous in many cases the 
household will be able to uncouple housing and employment 
decisions. Thus, a point in the north-west quadrant (positive 
for employment, negative for housing) will lead to job moves 
without housing moves, i.e. to commuting. In the south-east 
quadrant (positive for housing, negative for employment) 
households may move without changing job. Thus households in 
zones 3, 4 and 5 will be recorded as migrants whilst those in 
zones 1, 2 and 3 will be inter-regional job movers.
By contrast, if regions i and j are not contiguous, the 
migration decision is essentially a joint decision involving the 
net benefits of the housing move and job move taken together. 
The decision rule is thus move both house and job if the sum of 
the net benefits (B.j) is positive, that is if above the dashed 
line in Figure 1 (i.e. in zones 2, 3 and 4) .
If migration equations are estimated over non-contiguous 
regions, and the results applied to contiguous regions, it might 
therefore be expected that they would:
(i) over-predict labour market effects (because some people 
in zone (2) who the equation predicts to migrate i.e. move home, 
will not do so but will change job without moving, these are our 
latent migrants.)
(ii) under-predict housing market effects (because some 
people in zone (5) will move house across adjacent regions 
without changing jobs, these are our pure home movers.)
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We conclude therefore that while home mover flows will bias 
the observed flows across adjacent regions upwards; the failure 
to record commuters will bias observed flows downwards. We 
attempt therefore in what follows to isolate and identify such 
effects.
The effects of commuter and home-mover flows should result 
in regions of domicile and employment being different for a group 
of workers. In Figure 4.2 panel (a) we graph the share of 
workers domiciled in each region who commute to work across 
regional boundaries. In panel (b) we graph the proportion of 
jobs filled by workers who commute-in from surrounding regions4. 
Our figures suggest that just over 2 per cent of employees in 
England and Wales live and work in different regions. The 
overall figure conceals considerable regional differences while 
the regional figures themselves hide differences in the behaviour 
of men and women. Firstly, the figures for all commuters (panel 
(a)) range from under 1 per cent for the large market of the 
South East to 6 per cent for the East Midlands which has the West 
Midlands, East Anglia, the South East, the North West and 
Yorkshire & Humberside as immediate neighbours. Secondly, while 
almost 3 per cent of men domiciled in the North and 8 per cent 
of men domiciled in the East Midlands work outside of their 
domicile regions the comparable figures for women are just 1 and 
4 per cent respectively. The extent to which domicile and work 
regions differ suggests that inter-regional job movements, which 
do not involve home moves, or inter regional home moves which do 
not involve changes of work-place, may not be enormous but nor 
on this data is it negligible particularly in relation to net
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regional migration flows.
In this chapter we take a further look at these issues, 
making two innovations. First, our basic model of migration is 
based on a model of hiring which, as we have argued elsewhere
and non-contiguous moves not by partitioning the sample but by 
interacting contiguity with the relevant labour and housing 
market variables. This also allows the effects of contiguity to 
be more precisely identified - by the length of the common
boundary rather than by a simple zero-one dummy.
Section 4.2 outlines the basic hiring function model, 
section 4.3 presents the empirical results and section 4.4 
summarises the main conclusions.
4.2. A Model of Migration based on the Hiring Function
In Chapter 3 a model of inter regional migration was
developed which considered migration flows as components of an 
inter-regional hiring process. The hiring based approach to 
migration argues that, in essence, migration is simply a subset 
of hirings within the economy, namely those where a job-seeker 
in one region is matched to a vacancy in another. In support 
this hypothesis, we can point (Figure 4.3) to the close 
correlation of aggregate migration and total engagements 
(hirings) in the economy. (Unfortunately, we have data on 
engagements only until 1984 so the top half of Figure 4.3 plots 
aggregate migration and vacancies, as a proxy for hirings, over 
the whole period 1971-89, while the lower half plots migration
appears to best fit the facts of regional migration 
in Britain. Second we analyse the difference between contiguous
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and engagement from 1971 to 1984.)
The basic specification of the empirical model of bilateral 
(i.e. region i to region j) flows is
In m.j = In m + In F.. + In k^ . 
where mfj denotes the proportion of region i labour force 
migrating to region j (i.e. Mj./L. where M^ . represents total 
migrants and L. the labour force)? m denotes the aggregate 
migration rate; F*. denotes bilateral fixed effects, and k^ other 
factors.
Thus the hypothesis is that the bilateral migration flow 
between any two regions can be broken down into three components:
(i) the time series movement in aggregate migration which 
is dominated by the labour market variables which affect 
aggregate job hirings in the economy;
(ii) a fixed effect taking account of the distance between 
the two regions, climate and other . geographic or demographic 
features which do not change significantly over time; and
(iii) other variables, in particular variables measuring 
relative economic conditions, which cause the time series
t
movement of a particular bilateral flow to deviate from the 
national pattern.
The kij variables we are interested in are primarily labour 
market variables (unemployment, vacancies, wages and prices) , and 
housing market variables (house prices).
This equation was estimated in Chapter 3 using population 
flow data5 from the NHS Central Register across the standard 
planning regions of Great Britain for the period 1975 to 1989. 
The results were found to be consistent with the hiring model.
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Migration flows were from high unemployment to low unemployment 
and from low vacancy share to high vacancy share regions, with 
relative house prices also important in determining the direction 
of these flows.6 The base case result is summarised in Table
4.2 column 1, with the notation explained in the Note to the 
Table.7 This model however is, in the previous terminology, one 
of employment flows. As noted in Section 4.1 and summarised in 
Figure 4.1 the failure to allow for either pure housing flows and 
latent migrant flows across contiguous regions will lead to 
mispecifications. It is to this that we now turn.
4.3. Results
4.3.1 House Price Effects
In Figure 4.4 we graph relative regional house prices and 
note the increase in dispersion over the period 1982-1988.
In Table 4.2, column 1, the base case estimates of our 
preferred migration equation have relative regional house prices, 
pHj/pHj, significant, with an increase in relative house prices 
encouraging net out-migration from a region. This may in part 
be due to some pure housing moves (where householders move from 
high to low house price regions taking advantage of capital gains 
implicit in moving to a cheaper but comparable house while 
commuting back to their original work-place) . But it will also 
be explained by job moves where house price differentials may 
encourage job-seekers to swim against the tide and be more 
willing to move to areas of high unemployment (i.e. households 
in zone 4 of Figure 4.1).
It is of obvious interest to separate the house price
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effects on housing streams from those on employment streams. We 
attempt to do this by interacting relative regional house prices 
(pH./pHj) by the length of the common regional boundary (boundj.) 
and present the results in Table 4.2 column 2. Our estimates for 
the lengths of the regional boundaries, derived from measurements 
along the map of the regions in Regional Trends, are presented 
in Table 4.3. The interacted term is positive and significant 
suggesting that the response of migration to a relative increase 
in house prices within a region is greater for flows to and from 
its immediate neighbours than for flows to or from more distant 
regions, and that where this contiguity effect exists, it is 
proportional to the length of the common regional boundary.8 The 
interacted term suggests that the relative house price elasticity 
for regions with long common boundaries is about twice the house 
price elasticity for non-contiguous regions.
4.3.2 Labour Market Effects
We have now established that relative house price 
elasticities differ for flows between adjacent regions as against 
non-contiguous regions; and that this difference grew according 
to the length of the common regional boundary. We argued in 
Section 1 that the response to labour market differentials might, 
on the other hand, be smaller for flows between adjacent regions 
due to the exclusion of latent movers, i.e. those job seekers in 
adjacent regions who take up employment in adjoining regions 
without moving residence, by simply commuting to their new work­
places (the bias due to the omission of zone (2) in Figure 4.1). 
Again, as with housing market effects, this bias might be 
measured by the length of the common regional boundary.9 We
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test for these effects by interacting our labour market variables 
by the length of common regional boundary for adjoining regions. 
We find that only for relative vacancy levels is the interacted 
variable significant and we list our results for this case (also 
including the relative house price interaction) in Table 4.2, 
column 3. Our results suggest that a relative improvement in 
employment opportunities has a stronger effect on flows between 
non-contiguous regions than it does for contiguous regions, and 
that, in fact, on our estimates, it disappears altogether for 
regions with long common boundaries. This is consistent with our 
argument that job-seekers can take advantage of a relative 
improvement in employment opportunities in neighbouring regions 
without moving house, by simply commuting to their new work­
place, and that observed migration flows will not capture such 
inter-regional job filling.
We finish this section by examining the Molho (1982) 
partitioning procedure, and estimating our preferred migration 
equation over the sub-sample of flows between non-contiguous 
regions. Our results are presented in Table 4.4 column 2. By 
comparing column 1 (which replicates column 1 of Table 4.2, the 
base case) and 2 of Table 4.4 we find that this approach fails 
to identify differences in house price and vacancy elasticities 
between long and short distance flows (the estimates are within 
one standard deviation of one another). One explanation may be 
that, as noted above, using the simple dichotomy between 
contiguous and non-contiguous regions fails to capture the large 
inter-regional differences in common boundary lengths. We 
conclude that partitioning by non-contiguous regions alone is not
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sufficient to identify housing and employment flow elasticities, 
while using the length of common regional boundary as an 
interacted variable allows us to do so.
4.4. Conclusions
As with earlier work, we find that an analysis of bilateral 
migration flows which fails to distinguish flows across adjacent 
regions from those across non-contiguous regions gives biased 
estimates of relative house price and vacancy elasticities.
Our findings are that these results are consistent firstly 
with the presence in short distance flows of home movers who 
simply change address between neighbouring regions but without 
changing their work-place and secondly with the absence from 
migration figures of job-seekers who take up employment in 
neighbouring regions without changing address. We have argued 
that home movers may take advantage of regional house price 
premiums while not changing their work-place while job-movers may 
take up employment in a neighbouring region while choosing to 
commute rather than move home, and that these independent job and 
house moves are sufficiently important to effect estimates of 
migration equations. We find also that such effects are most 
precisely estimated by interacting employment and labour market 
variables with the length of the common regional boundary rather 
than by partitioning the sample into contiguous and non­
contiguous migration flows.
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FOOTNOTES
1. The Centre for Economic Performance is financed by the 
Economic and Social Research Council. Financial support is 
also acknowledged from the Esmee Fairbairn Charitable Trust.
2. There are two exceptions? firstly, retirement effects where 
households move home over long distance but where no 
employment effects are present and secondly long distance 
commuters. In our empirical work we will assume that 
retirement flows are adequately captured by regional fixed 
effects (in fact prime age adults-15 to 44 year olds-form 
60 per cent of total migration flows) and that long 
distance commuting forms a relatively small share of 
overall commuter flows.
3. Unfortunately this question has not been asked more 
recently.
4. 1981 figures for England and Wales are based on Population 
Census returns from the "Census 1981. Work-place and 
Transport to Work: England and Wales." No comparable data 
are available for Scotland.
5. While Gordon (1975) and Molho (1982) were able to analyse 
data on male migrants of working age we are restricted to 
using migration of all age cohorts and for both men and 
woman. See Jackman and Savouri (1991, Note 1) for an 
analysis of the NHS Central Register data.
6. While most models of migration have failed to include 
housing variables into their preferred specifications 
Jackman and Savouri (1991) allowed for a variety of housing 
variables of which only relative regional house prices were 
generally significant.
7. It will be noted that in the equation reported in Table 2 
column 1 the wage effects for the South East take a 
different sign from those for other migration flows. In 
Jackman and Savouri (1991) we show that wage differentials 
for the South East tend to be demand driven (high wages 
associated with excess demand for labour) whereas for the 
other regions relative wages tend to be cost driven and 
unrelated to relative labour demand.
8. If instead of the length of the common regional boundary we 
interact the relative house price term with a dummy 
variable taking the value one for contiguous and zero for 
non-contiguous regions, the interaction term is no longer 
significant (t=0.5).
9. With the relative vacancy variable it turns out that the 
simple zero-one dummy specification works nearly as well 
(t=1.9) as the length of the common boundary.
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DATA SOURCES
M..: Inter Regional Movements.
Recorded internal population movements based on transfers
of doctors' patients. CSO, Regional Trends (see
Population), various issues. Figures pre-dating 1981
obtained from:
Office of Population Censuses and Surveys,
Migration Analysis Unit,
St. Catherines House,
10 Kingsway,
London WC2B 6JP.
U: Total Unemployment excluding School Leavers, GB.
Department of Employment "X-ll" Series. This series derives
from a consistent definitional base for unemployment over
our sample period. Quarterly Average. Available on request
to the:
Department of Employment,
Caxton House,
Tothill Street,
London SW11 9NF.
U.: Regional Unemployment Stock.
Department of Employment Gazette. various issues. "Wholly 
Unemployed Excluding School leavers". As a result of 
definitional problems due to changes in benefit eligibility 
over our sample period, figures from contemporaneous sources 
are not consistent over time. To overcome this problem we 
use the Department of Employment's "X-ll" consistent 
unemployment series to correct the regional unemployment 
levels. Quarterly average.
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R .: Proportion of Long Term Unemployment by Region.
This refers to the proportion of male unemployed over one 
year in the unemployed pool. Department of Employment 
Gazette, various issues. Average of January and July 
proportions.
Vi: Regional Vacancy Stocks.
Department of Employment Gazette, various issues. Total 
vacancies excluding both vacancies reported at Careers 
Offices and those based on the Community Programme. Monthly 
average.
pH,-: Regional House Prices.
Mix Adjusted Index of Dwelling prices, CSO, Regional Trends 
(see Housing) various issues. Quarterly average. Original 
source Department of the Environment. To obtain a time 
series for Regional House Prices we use 1987 Building 
Society valuations for dwelling prices, all borrowers. 
Regional Trends. 1989.
Wj: Regional Earnings.
We use Average Hourly Earnings excluding overtime payments 
for Full Time Adult Males. April Figures. Department of 
Employment, New Earnings Survey (Part E) .
P: GDP deflator. CSO Economic Trends, various issues.
Pi: Regional non-house prices based on consumers1 expenditure
less housing. Regional Reward Survey figures.
e: Engagements in the whole economy. Jackman et al (1989).
For full details of sources for our regional data set see Savouri
(1991) .
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TABLE 4.1
Distance moved in last move bv main reason for moving
Main reason 
for move
Distance 
Under 5
of Last 
5-49
Move (Miles) 
50 or more
Housing Reasons 33 19 9
Environmental Reasons 9 12 6
Job-Study Reasons 4 18 53
Personal and 
Other Reasons 54 51 31
Source: General Household Survey, 1976, Table 5.50.
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TABLE 4.2
Inter-reaional migration 
Great Britain 1975-1989
(1350 observations) 
Dependent variable In m.j
Explanatory
variables (1) (2) (3)
ui 3.1 (8.2) 3.2 (8.2) 3.1 (8.1)
Ri -0.33 (2.3) -0.32 (2.3) -0.31 (2.2)
UJ -3.5 (9.2) -3.5 (9.2) -3.5 (9.1)
Rj 0.35 (2.5) 0.34 (2.4) 0. 33 (2.4)
In ( V v j) -0.057 (3.0) -0.054 (2.9) -0.072 (3.5)
In (Vj/V.) *boundij * * 0.018 (2.1)
cij -3.1 (2.4) -3.1 (2.4) -3.1 (2.4)
In m 0.87 (17.7) 0.87 (17.7) 0.87 (17.7)
In (p^/pH.) 0.26 (6.4) 0.24 (5.8) 0.24 (5.8)
In (pH^ /pHj*) *boundij * 0.045 (1.9) 0.052 (2.2)
In (pHf/pHj) 0.51 (1.2) 0.56 (1.3) 0.55 (2.2)
In (w,/w.) 1.1 (5.6) 1.1 (5.6) 1.0 (5.4)
In (W i / W SE> -1.2 (3.8) -1.3 (3.9) -1.2 (3.7)
In (w s e/ w j ) -0.36 (1.1) -0.38 (1.2) -0. 34 (1.0)
R2 (%) 97.8 97.8 97.9
Notes: See over.
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Notes to Table 2:
The equations were estimated using a complete set of 90 
bilateral fixed effects (F^ .) by stacked Ordinary Least Squares.
90 observations for each of the 15 years of our sample.
t-statistics in parentheses. Critical value for one sided 
test at 5 per cent level of significance 1.6 and at 10 per cent 
level 1.3.
m^ - denotes the migration rate from region i to region j , m 
the aggregate migration rate, u denotes unemployment rates, R 
denotes the proportion of male long term unemployed, V denotes 
total notified vacancies, w denotes average hourly earnings 
excluding overtime of full time adult non-manual men, pH denotes 
house prices (from the Department of the Environment) , pH denotes 
non-house prices (from the Regional Reward Survey) and c.. denotes 
the squared difference in the employment shares in production 
industries. Sources of the data are described in the data 
appendix.
bound, j is a measure of the length of common regional 
boundaries, set to zero for non-contiguous regions. The average 
value for non-zero bound-, is 3.5, and the range 0.7 (NW-NO? SW- 
WA) to 6.5 (EM-YH).
On average 60 per cent of NHS Central Register flows are 
between adjacent regions.
In Jackman and Savouri (1991) the estimates from the 
specification of column 1 were found to be stable across the 
truncated samples: 1975-87, 1975-85, 1975-83 and 1975-81.
Truncating the specification of column 3 above to cover the 
sample 1975-83, we obtain estimates of -0.075 (2.9) for V./V. and 
0.02 (1.8) for (Vj/Vj) *bound,j, while we obtain estimates of 0.21 
(1.9) for (pH./pH.) and 0.037 (0.6) for (pH,/pHj) *boundij-, the
respective figures for the sub-sample 1975-81, were, -0.11 (3.2), 
0.03 (2.0), 0.20 (1.6) and 0.046 (0.6).
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TABLE 4.3
Length of Common Regional Boundaries
Regions NO YH EM EA SE SW WM NW WA SC
North • • • 4.4 0 0 0 0 0 0.7 0 4.1
Yorkshire & 
Humberside 4.4 • • • 6.5 0 0 0 0 3.6 0 0
East Midlands 0 6.5 • • • 3.5 3.7 0 5.1 1.3 0 0
East Anglia 0 0 3.5 • • • 5.3 0 0 0 0 0
South East 0 0 3.7 5.3 . . . 6.2 1.0 0 0 0
South West 0 0 0 0 6.2 • • • 3.1 0 0.7 0
West Midlands 0 0 5.1 0 1.0 3.1 ---- 2.2 6.1 0
North West 0.7 3.6 1.3 0 0 0 2.2 • • • 1.4 0
Wales 0 0 0 0 0 0.7 6.1 1.4 • • • 0
Scotland 4.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Source: Regional Trends (1991 p.5)
Unit of measurement: map millimetres (scale 1mm = 3 2 miles)
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TABLE 4.4
Inter-regional migration 
Great Britain 1975-1989
Dependent variable In m^ .
Explanatory 13 50 obs 840 obs
variables (full sample) (non-contiguous)
ui 3.1 (8.2) 3.2 (5.9)
Ri 0.33 (2.3) -0.33 (1.5)
uj -3 . 5 (9.2) -4.0 (7.4)
Rj 0. 35 (2.5) 0.47 (2.2)
In
( V V J>
-0.057 (3.0) -0.070 (2.6)
CU -3.1 (2.4) -3.2 (1.6)
In m 0.87 (17.7) 0.81 (10.7)
In (pH^/pHj) 0.26 (6.4) 0.27 (5.0)
In (pHj/pHj) 0.51 (1.2) 0.91 (1.4)
In (Wi/Wj.) 1.1 (5.6) 1.2 (4.3)
In (w,-/wSE) -1.2 (3.8) -2.1 (4.4)
In (WSE/Wj) -0.36 (1.1) -0.27 (0.6)
R2 (%) 97.8 95.9
Notes: See Notes to Table 2.
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FIGURE 4.1 
Job moves and housing moves
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FIGURE 4.2
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FIGURE 4.3 
Regional migration GB 1971-1989
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FIGURE 4.4 
Regional house prices relative to UK
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CHAPTER 5
LABOUR MARKET POLICIES AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE OECD
5.1 Introduction
It is by now recognised that the appalling unemployment record of the 
1970s and 1980s can largely be attributed to supply-side shocks to the 
world economy. The effects of these shocks were then intensified and 
prolonged in a number of countries by social policies and institutional 
arrangements predicated on the assumption of continuous full employment. 
Recent papers in Economic Policy have documented the role of 
wage-bargaining arrangements (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988) and of 
unemployment benefits (Burda, 1988) in accounting for differences in 
unemployment rates across countries.
As unemployment rates have risen, and governments have come to realise 
the changed nature of the problem, new policies have been enacted to tackle 
unemployment. These policies are based on the perception that the causes 
of the high unemployment rates are from the supply side rather than the 
demand side, and that policies of indiscriminate demand expansion will 
quickly lead to a resurgence of inflation. Supply-side policies have 
ranged from reforms in taxation and social security to attempts to increase 
competition in product markets and to reduce the power of trade unions. In 
this paper, however, we focus on a sub-set of these policies having to do 
specifically with the functioning of the labour market. These policies are 
referred to as special employment measures or as labour market policies, we 
use the latter term throughout.
Our aim in this chapter is to examine the consequences on the labour 
market and on unemployment of expenditure on labour market policies.
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Because the variations in such policies are more marked across countries 
than over time with any particular country, the most useful comparisons and 
contrasts that can be made are across boundaries. Recently comparable data 
from several countries have become available, thanks largely to the efforts 
of the OECD and the Statistical Office of the European Communities.
In particular, following the classification of labour market policies 
recently published by the OECD, we focus on these major components of 
labour market policy:
(i) Employment services, such as the provision of information, 
guidance or financial support to assist the unemployed in finding 
jobs.
(ii) Labour market training.
(iii) Direction creation and employment subsidies.
Public expenditure on policies of this type has risen rapidly in recent 
years. Expenditure has increased as unemployment rates have risen. In
Figure 5.1 we plot average expenditure per unemployed person (normalised by 
per capita GDP) on these policies for the fourteen countries for which we 
have data against the average unemployment rate for those countries. While 
the time series data on spending on labour market policies is a bit rough
and ready (see below), Figure 5.1 shows a clear tendency for a sustained
rise in unemployment to be followed after a period of a few years by a
significant expansion in expenditure on labour market policies.
Ta put these figures in perspective, in 1988 spending on labour market 
policies amounted to as much as 0.7 per cent of GDP in six of the 
industrialised countries (Belgium, Finland, West Germany, Ireland, New 
Zealand and Sweden) and even in the United States such policies of active 
intervention in the labour market cost one fifth of one per cent of GDP 
(Table 5.1).
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No twithstanding the substantial outlays on these programmes, economic 
analysis and evaluation of their effects has been sparse. In the 1970s, 
the rapid rise in unemployment was accompanied in many countries by 
accelerating inflation. Restrictive fiscal and monetary policies were seen 
as essential for the control of inflation and this climate imposed severe 
financial constraints on labour market policies. Governments were 
searching for policies which could reduce unemployment without costing much 
money or adding to inflationary pressures. In operational terms, labour 
market policies thus had the objective of maximising employment gains per 
unit of expenditure (the "bang for the buck"). The underlying economic 
logic of this approach was never entirely clear, though it continues to 
provide the basis for most attempts to evaluate programmes.
By the late 1970s, however, attempts were being made to analyse labour 
market policies as methods of reducing the natural or equilibrium rate of 
unemployment (Baily and Tobin, 1977; and see also e.g. Jackman and Layard, 
1980; Johnson 1980). These approaches suffered from the problem that there 
was no generally accepted theory on what the natural rate of unemployment 
was, of how it should be modelled, or therefore of what types of labour 
market intervention might be effective in reducing it. The labour market 
was analysed in these studies in the conventional economic supply and 
demand framework, with unemployment generated by particular assumptions 
about supply behaviour or by the arbitrary imposition of wage or price 
rigidities.
More recent work has tried to allow for the fact that the labour market 
is unique among markets for its diversity of services traded and for the 
human dimension in both supply and demand decisions. Labour services 
cannot be branded and marketed in impersonal supermarket shelves. Despite 
this, many of the problems that befall this market can usefully be analysed
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with the conventional supply and demand framework. But many others cannot. 
The problems and policies that we wish to analyse here are very much of the 
latter kind. Instead of the conventional supply and demand framework, we 
therefore use one based on the co-existence of unemployment and vacant jobs 
and on the equilibrium relation that holds between them, known as the u/v 
curve or 'Beveridge curve1. The microeconomic theory underlying this curve 
is consistent with the diversity of workers and of jobs which characterises 
the labour market and which accounts for the existence of unemployment.
We will show that, in many countries, in recent years the Beveridge 
curve has tended to shift out to the right, suggesting that the labour 
market is operating less efficiently in matching unemployed people to the 
vacancies available. This loss of efficiency in the labour market has led 
to higher unemployment. Labour market policies can then be seen in terms 
of improving the efficiency of the labour market and hence reducing the 
equilibrium unemployment rate.
We first provide a short account of the types of policies currently in 
operation. Next, we provide a framework for identifying and analysing the 
shocks that affect labour markets. Finally, we show how labour-market 
institutions and policies affect the market's response to the shocks. Our 
analytic framework enables us to do just that and prepares the way for an 
evaluation of the experiences of the major OECD countries. Although in the 
particular area of our concern the data are still far from perfect, we make 
use of them to argue that well-targeted policies can ease the burdens of 
structural adjustment on employment. Our estimates suggest that the
effects of such policies on employment can be large relative to their 
budgetary costs.
5.2 Labour market policies
As noted in the introduction, the genesis of labour market policies was
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essentially pragmatic, an ad hoc response to a clearly perceived social 
problem of high unemployment rates for which conventional economic analysis 
could offer no immediate solution. The policies are defined as those which 
work upon the malfunctioning - in one respect or another - of the labour 
market itself, rather than on wider economic policies (macroeconomic, 
industrial or fiscal) which can have an impact on unemployment.
Systematic analysis of labour market policies has only recently been 
made possible at an international level as a result of the OECD initiative 
to gather data on a comparable basis from its member nations. These data, 
and the classification procedures adopted, were set out in the OECD 
Employment Outlook for September 1988 (Chapter- 3). Data for public 
expenditure on the main categories of labour market policies for 23 
countries are given in Table 5.1.
5.2.1 Employment services and administration
The first category, employment services and administration (ESA),
covers all public expenditure of employment exchanges relating to finding 
work for the unemployed. In most countries the government provides a
network of employment exchanges and employers are encouraged (in some 
countries required) to notify vacancies. There is, therefore, relatively 
little variation in this item across countries. Where there is variation 
it is in the extent of assistance provides to unemployed people in terms 
both of the amount of guidance (the length and frequency of interviews and 
so on) and of practical help with making job applications. In a number of 
countries a major element of labour market policy has involved a much more 
intensive role for the employment services in providing information,
guidance and assistance to long-term unemployed people. (Such programmes 
operate in many European countries: an example is the "Restart” programme 
recently launched in the UK).
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The rationale for employment exchanges in general is clearly one of 
bringing together information about job opportunities to enable the 
unemployed to search more efficiently. But it has never been clear how 
important empirically has been a lack of information in hindering job 
search, and it certainly seems unlikely that there has been a significant 
deterioration in information flows in recent years. It is not obvious that 
in quantitative terms there is much of a payoff from increasing the 
information available to the unemployed.
Policies involving more intensive counselling, and assistance in 
applying for jobs, for the long-term unemployed derive from the concern 
that long-term unemployed people have especial difficulties in getting back 
into work. Because they have to surmount additional obstacles in the form 
of an erosion of skills, a loss of self-confidence or employer prejudice 
they need additional advice and assistance if they are to have a good 
chance of finding a job.
The countries spending most on employment measues as a percentage of 
GDP are West Germany, Canada and Sweden. However, a better measure of the 
quality of service provided is the ratio of expenditure to the number of 
unemployed people, and this figure is given in Column (5) of Table 5.1. 
(In the case of Sweden one measure of unemployment takes into account both 
"open" and "hidden" unemployment, i.e. the number of people employed on 
various labour market policy schemes, which are discussed below.) The 
highest expenditure per unemployed person on employment services is in 
Sweden. Other countries that do well on this measure include Norway and 
Switzerland.
While the corporatist and social democratic economic policies of Sweden 
and the other Scandinavian countries may not appear to have much in common 
with the highly decentralised and non-interventionist approach to economic
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policy in Switzerland, in their approach to employment services the 
Scandinavians and the Swiss have much in common. In particular, employment 
services are organised around what may be termed the "employment 
principle” , with the key objective being to find work for the unemployed 
rather than the "benefit principle" where the objective is to provide 
financial support for people while unemployed and looking for work. In 
both the Swiss and the Swedish systems there is pressure on the unemployed, 
which can be coupled with denial of benefit, both to look for work and to 
take suitable job offers. In Sweden there is also extensive provision of 
training schemes and the like, to which we return below. (For further 
discussion of employment services in Switzerland see Danthine and Lambelet, 
1987, or, the OECD Annual Report on Switzerland for 1985-86).
5.2.2 Labour market training
The second heading, labour market training (LMT), is self-explanatory. 
This heading refers to training for people who have left school or other 
formal education, have in general had experience of employment, who have 
become unemployed and whose prospects of finding work are poor because of a 
decline in demand for the type of work they had been doing.
Such people face in the sharpest way the classic property rights 
problem of underprovision of training. Employers will be reluctant to 
train workers knowing that they can subsequently move off and work 
elsewhere and hence the employer cannot recoup the return on the investment 
in training. In many countries, employers' organisations within industries 
or sectors organise industry-wide training to which member firms are 
obliged to contribute. In others, government may already provide financial 
support towards the cost of courses and the like. While such policies are 
not specifically directed towards the unemployed, clearly employers are 
more likely to take on unemployed people who require some training more of
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the costs of such training is to be borne by others.
Even so there is no great incentive for an employer to take on an 
unemployed, untrained person, and there is a place for government support 
for training of unemployed people even in countries where in general the 
provision of training is adequate. Such government support can take the 
form either of paying unemployed people to attend courses (this payment 
would normally be at about the same rate as unemployment benefit plus some 
out-of-pocket expenses as in Sweden), or paying employers to provide
training to unemployed people they take on.
The variation in policy across countries in the provision of training
for the adult unemployed is enormous. Measured in terms of expenditure as
a proportion of GDP (column (2) of Table 5.1) Ireland, Denmark and Sweden 
do most in this respect, but measured in relation to the numbers of
unemployed people (column (6 )) Sweden is again far ahead. The Swedish 
policy of providing support for training for the adult unemployed was 
instituted at the end of the 1930s, and has not really been much changed by 
the onset of high unemployment rates in the rest of the world. It has 
perhaps shown its worth in helping the Swedish labour market to adjust to 
the shocks of the 1970s and 1980s, without the sharp rise in unemployment 
experienced elsewhere. (In Switzerland it will be noted that government 
spending on such activities is minimal but on the other hand employers' 
organisations are regarded as effective and very active in this area.)
5.2.3 Direct job creation and employment subsidies
The third type of policy, is direct job creation and employment 
subsidies (DJC/ES). This covers public works organised by local 
authorities or other agencies, the cost of which are borne by government 
provided unemployed people are taken on, and subsidies to employers in the 
private sector for hiring unemployed people. It also covers assistance to
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unemployed people to become self-employed or set up their own businesses. 
Examples of direct job creation schemes include the relief work scheme in 
Sweden, the Community Programme in the UK and the Community Employment
Programme in Australia. Subsidies to employers taking on, in particular, 
long-term unemployed people have been used in Australia, Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, West Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden. Exceptionally 
in the UK, the government has given subsidies to long-term unemployed
people themselves, for taking low-paid jobs, rather than subsidising
employers.
The rationale for job creation has always been less straightforward 
than the justification for employment services or support for training. 
One cannot, for example, invoke partial equilibrium arguments such as that 
subsidies can reduce relative labour costs (unless, one holds that
aggregate unemployment is the consequence of some arbitrary real wage
rigidity) . For a given level of aggregate demand in the economy it has to 
be asked whether job creation measures or employment subsidies can increase 
the total number of jobs. If the total number of jobs does not increase, 
the justification for shifting the work available from one line of activity 
to another, or from one individual to another, seems unclear. If the 
number of jobs does increase, it might be expected to affect pressure of 
demand in the labour market and thus jeopardise the objective of
controlling inflation.
There have however been some supply-side arguments for job creation
policies, particularly those linked to the long-term unemployed. For
example, if employers are reluctant to take on long-term unemployed people 
because they are thought to have lost work habits, skills or 
self-confidence as a result of being unemployed, work experience is the 
only way of reversing these problems and restoring the productive potential
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of long-term unemployed people. Similarly, if long-term unemployed workers 
have lost contact with the information network concerning new job 
vacancies, again additional assistance in the form of recruitment subsidies 
may be justified. In that sense, it is equivalent to training, even if no 
element of formal education is involved. Given the rigidity of pay 
structures it is very difficult for the long-term unemployed themselves to 
pay for such 'training', even if they had any money. There is also the 
argument that increasing the number of jobs, if it means employing more 
long-term unemployed people, will be less inflationary because the 
long-term unemployed have become to a large extent isolated from the active 
labour market and hence have a smaller effect on the balance of demand in 
that market.
5.2.4 Other programmes
It is worth mentioning that the OECD refers to two other categories 
which we exclude from our analysis. One is youth measures, which we 
exclude because it is so difficult to distinguish such measures from the 
regular and general support provided by governments for education and 
training for young people. In some countries, most notably West Germany, 
the school system develops into a system of vocational training and thus 
there is no need for seperate remedial sytems providing training for those 
who leave school and become unemployed. Arguably differences between 
countries in labour market spending or youth training are primarily a means 
of compensating for deficiencies in the formal education system rather than 
enhancing the efficiency of the labour market. Thus spending is highest in 
Ireland, Italy and the UK, and much lower in West Germany (OECD Employment 
Outlook. September 1988, ch.3, Table 3).
Because many training schemes involve some element of participation in 
work, and most jobs for young people involve some element of training, it
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is natural to include the two together. But from a labour market point of 
view there is an important difference, in that however adequate the 
education and training system it can still be difficult to place a young 
person in their first job, particularly given the emphasis many employers 
place on work experience. In Sweden local authorities act as employers of 
last resort for young people and employ them working alongside existing 
staff for periods of up to six months in order to provide them with some 
work experience. Expenditure on such activities clearly forms part of 
labour market policy rather than education. But because we cannot separate 
out these components, we exclude youth programmes for our measure of labour 
market policy.
The second is measures for the disabled. This again suffers from 
severe definitional problems. Programmes which in one country will be part 
of health service expenditure in another fall into the labour market policy 
category.
Our preferred measure of the intensity of labour market policies across 
countries therefore is restricted to spending on the three headings we have 
described, measured in relation to the number of people unemployed. This 
figure for 1988 is given in the final column of Table 5.1.
5.3 The analytical framework
We make use not of the conventional labour supply and demand framework, 
but rather of a model allowing the coexistence of unemployment and job 
vacancies. We ask first what determines in equilibrium the unemployment 
rate and the stock of job vacancies, and then discuss how these variables 
change in response to economic shocks and to policy changes.
We find it helpful to think of the determination of unemployment and 
vacancies in terms of two curves, the first being the Beveridge curve, or 
u/v curve, which we interpret as the condition of flow equilibrium in the
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labour market, and the second being the vacancy supply curve which traces 
out combinations of unemployment and vacancies consistent with optimising 
wage setting and employment behaviour on the part of firms and workers.
5.3.1 The Beveridge (UV) curve
The Beveridge curve is a relation between job vacancies and 
unemployment that traces points for which the flow into unemployment is 
equal to the flow out of it. Since when the flow into unemployment is 
equal to the flow out of it the stock of unemployment cannot be changing, 
the Beveridge curve traces points for which unemployment is stationary.
We first describe the logic underlying the Beveridge curve. The 
Beveridge curve is a meaningful relation for two reasons. First, frequent 
job changing and movement in and out of the labour force by workers, the 
birth and death of new firms, and job turnover in existing firms induced by 
structual change and other reasons, bring about a continuous and sizeable 
flow of workers and jobs into unemployment. Second, the many different 
requirements imposed by jobs on potential workers and the many different 
attributes of the available workers, some of which may not be immediately 
observable, imply that even if the number of jobs and workers match each 
other exactly, it is unlikely that those flowing into unemployment will 
instantly find a good job match. Thus vacant jobs and unemployed workers 
co-exist at all times and are engaged in a process of search and 
information processing that eventually leads to exit from unemployment.
Now given the processes that move workers in and out of unemployment, a 
higher rate of job vacancies must be associated with a lower rate of 
unemployment. With more vacant jobs in the market the unemployed workers 
engaged in search will find it easier to locate productive job matches. 
Thus, if the Beveridge curve is plotted in a diagram with the number of job 
vacancies (or the rate of job vacancies, using the labor force as a
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normal izing variable) on one axis and the level or rate of unemployment on 
the other, it will have negative slope (Figure 5.2). Points on the curve 
show combinations of vacancies and unemployment where the latter is not 
changing. Above the curve there are more jobs for given unemployment, so 
unemployment is falling, and below it jobs are fewer, so unemployment is 
rising.
5.3.2 The vacancy supply (VS) curve
The basic idea is that it will be profitable for firms to take on more 
workers, and thus to post vacancies, when the marginal (revenue) product of 
labour is high relative to the wage, and relative to the costs of 
recruiting additional workers. A high unemployment rate tends to depress 
wages, and to make it much easier to recruit workers, and hence encourages 
firms, other things equal, to expand employment by creating job vacancies.
The first component of this approach then is the relationship between 
wages and job vacancies. The number of jobs (i.e. employment plus unfilled 
vacancies) that come into the market depends on the relation between labour 
productivity and the real cost of labour, as in conventional labour-demand 
analysis. In a market where the allocation of workers to jobs takes place 
in a decentralized manner, after search, job application and job screening, 
it also depends on the cost of hiring and on the quality and quantity of 
the unemployed labour force. Thus, if we plot the number of jobs against 
the real wage rate, we should get a downward-sloping curve that shifts to 
the right when labour productivity increases and when there are more or 
better qualified unemployed workers; and shifts to the left when the cost 
of hiring or the non-wage costs of jobs increase.
There are some differences between this curve and the conventional 
demand for labour curve, which we shall utilize in our empirical work. The 
curve that we have described determines the number of jobs, i.e. employment
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and job vacancies. When there is turnover, jobs stay vacant for a 
non-trivial length of time, and the relation between employment and the 
number of jobs is not a simple mechanical one but depends on economic 
conditions. In Figure 5.3 we plot this curve in a diagram with job 
vacancies on one axis and real wages on the other, holding employment along 
the curve constant. Employment is still undetermined. We refer to this 
curve as the vacancies curve and denote it by VC.
At a given wage rate, if employment is higher, the marginal 
productivity of labour is less if there are diminishing returns in 
production, and so profit from the marginal job is also less. So at higher 
employment firms will want to open fewer vacancies at any given wage rate 
and so the vacancies curve in Figure 5.3 is further to the left. With a 
given labour force, higher employment implies lower unemployment, so the 
vacancies curve also shifts left because of the reduced availability of 
labour. With lower unemployment, and holding the quality of the labour 
force constant, there are fewer workers knocking on firms' gates for jobs. 
Firms are likely to find it more difficult to recruit and so may close up 
some jobs at given wages. This effect has attracted a lot of attention in 
the search literature but is not as important for the applications that we 
shall discuss in this paper.^ Nevertheless, in general we should expect 
higher employment (lower unemployment) to be associated with a vacancies 
curve further to the left than the one in Figure 5.3.
The curve VC then depicts the number of vacancies firms will create, 
given the level of employment, as a function of the wage. The next stage 
is to determine wages. We think of wages as the outcome of an explicit or 
implicit bargain between firms and workers. If there are more vacancies in 
the market, other things equal, workers are in a stronger position to 
bargain for higher wages. The firm concedes because with more competition
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from other firms for workers, it is running the risk of losing its 
workforce if it does not. The wage curve linking wages to vacancies, will 
shift to the right whenever there is an exogenous increase in wage 
'pressure', caused for example by an increase in union militancy. Other 
exogenous causes of wage pressure include unemployment benefits, which 
reduce the cost of unemployment to workers, and any other policy that 
reduces purchasing power for given gross wages, such as income and 
expenditure taxes. It shifts to the left whenever exogenous factors 
increase the bargaining power of firms relative to that of unions. 
Legislation designed to control the power of unions is a pertinent example.
The wage curve is related to a conventional supply of labour curve but 
it is fundamentally different from it because it depends as much on the 
workers' bargaining position as on the firms'. It is therefore influenced 
by both 'supply' and 'demand' conditions. Finally, the rate of 
unemployment is an important influence on wages in bargaining models; when 
unemployment is lower given the number of job vacancies, wages are higher 
because workers are in a stronger bargaining position vis-a-vis firms, 
thus, higher employment (lower unemployment) shifts the wage curve in 
Figure 5.3 to the right (again assuming a given labour force).
The intersection of the vacancies and wage curves gives the equilibrium 
wages rate and the equilibrium number of job vacancies in the market. This 
equilibrium, however, is for given employment, which still remains 
undetermined. In order to complete the picture of the labour market and 
determine employment we bring into the analysis the Beveridge curve.
5.3.3 Labour market equilibrium
Equilibrium vacancies and unemployment are given by a combination of 
the curves in Figures 5.2 and 5.3. We have already argued that different 
levels of unemployment are associated with different sets of curves in
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Figure 5.3. Higher unemployment shifts the vacancies curve up and to the 
right and the wage curve up and to the left. The higher unemployment 
therefore brings into the market a bigger number of jobs for two reasons; 
because wages are reduced and because more jobs open up for given wages. 
The effect of higher unemployment on wages is ambiguous in the diagrammatic 
analysis of Figure 5.3. The direct effect through the loss of workers' 
bargaining strength, however, is likely to dominate the indirect effect 
through the number of j o b s .2 The broken lines in Figure 5.3 are drawn in 
this light.
The intersection points in Figure 5.3, when unemployment is varied, 
trace an upward-sloping curve in Figure 5.2. We term this curve VS, for 
supply of job vacancies. The intersection of the Beveridge curve (labelled 
UV) with the VS curve gives the equilibrium rates of unemployment and job 
vacancies. With knowledge of the labour force, employment and the number 
of jobs can also be determined. Thus we have now determined all the 
unknowns and the analysis of the effects of exogenous change, including 
labour market policies, can begin.
5.4 Three types of change
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 are useful of analysing certain problems. Foremost 
among these is the question of the sources of change in unemployment, and 
by implication the sources of driving forces of the cycle.^ We consider 
the implications of three different types of change for the curves of 
Figure 5.3, which will form the background to our empirical evaluation of 
labour market policies in the 1970s and 1980s.
5.4.1 Aggregate activity shocks
Aggregate economic disturbances will typically in this framework be 
represented by (temporary or permanent) shifts of the vacancy supply (VS) 
curve in Figure 5.2.
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Aggregate demand shocks, including fiscal and monetary policy, change 
the demand for labour at given real wages. A fall in demand shifts the 
vacancies curve in Figure 5.3 to the left, and if the fall is severe enough 
to cause a rise in job separations, it also shifts the UV curve of Figure 
5.2 to the right. But the increase in job separations is unlikely to last 
for more than a short period after the impact of the shock and the drop in 
voluntary separations that accompany recessions is likely to counteract it 
to some extent. So the main change behind the fall in demand is the 
leftward shift of the vacancies curve.
Another type of aggregate shock would be a change in exogenous wage 
pressure variables, e.g. a rise in union militancy, or an increase in 
taxation. These types of shocks have their main impact on the wage curve 
in Figure 5.3, but again on the vacancy supply curve in Figure 5.2. 
Changes in unemployment benefits might be expected to effect both the WC 
and hence VS curves, through their effect on wage bargaining, and on the 
Beveridge curve through their effect on search intensity.
Thus the main impact of aggregate activity shocks is on the VS curve. 
A deflationary aggregate demand shock, for example, will shift the VC curve 
in Figure 5.2 to the right. Hence the VS curve in Figure 5.3 shifts to the 
right, implying a smaller supply of job vacancies at all levels of 
unemployment. From point A equilibrium moves down to point B (Figure 5.4). 
The path of the economy from A to B is likely to be a half loop below the 
UV curve, as vacancies fall on impact and unemployment begins rising in 
response to a reduced rate of job matchings.
If demand recovers without any other changes in the economy, 
equilibrium returns to A through a leftward shift of the VS curve and 
vacancies and unemployment trace the second half of an anticlockwise loop 
above the UV curve. Thus, demand shocks unaccompanied by structural change
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or by supply-side shocks trace anticlockwise loops around a more or less 
stationary UV curve. These loops were noted in the early literature on the 
Beveridge curve and discussed as one of the 'stylized facts' of business 
cycles
A permanent shock, say due to an increase in union power, will lead to 
a sustained higher unemployment rate coupled with a permanent reduction in 
vacancy rate.
5.A.2 Structural or mismatch shocks
Structural changes such as sectoral shifts in the demand for final 
output leads to shifts in the UV curve to the right. A structural change 
in demand leads to more job separations, as the sectors that experience the 
drop in demand shed more labour. In the steady state the higher 
separations will be matched by more separations rate either vacancies or 
unemployment or both need to be higher.
Rightward shifts in the UV curve are also caused by changes that reduce 
the matching effectiveness of workers and job vacancies. An increase in 
the geographical dispersion of vacancies and unemployment or in the 
compatibility of the skills of workers with the skill requirements of jobs 
are examples of increases in mismatch. Increases in mismatch lead to a 
fall in the matching rate at given vacancies and unemployment and so to 
shift out of the UV curve. A similar shift in the UV curve and for similar 
reasons is caused by a fall in the search intensity of workers or by an 
increase in the choosiness of either workers or firms. As with mismatch, 
either of the latter two changes reduces the rate at which unemployed 
workers are matched to vacant jobs at given vacancies and unemployment and 
so to a shift out of the UV curve. A similar shift in the UV curve and for 
similar reasons is caused by a fall in the search intensity of workers or 
by an increase in the choosiness of either workers or firms. As with
-156-
mismatch, either of the latter two changes reduces the rate at which 
unemployed workers are matched to vacant jobs at given vacancy and 
unemployment stocks.
A rightward shift in the UV curve causes an increase in the equilibrium 
rate of both vacancies and unemployment. Equilibrium in Figure 5.4 moves 
from point A to a point such as C, with the dynamic path traced by a 
stationary VS curve. Thus, even at this general level of analysis, an 
empirical distinction emerges between aggregate demand shocks on the one 
hand and structural (or mismatch or search effectiveness) shocks on the 
other. In vacancy-unemployment space demand shocks trace negatively-sloped 
anticlockwise loops, structural shocks give rise to positively-sloped 
(though probably flat) paths.^
5.4.3 Hysteresis
The foregoing contrast between demand shocks and structural shocks has 
attracted more attention in the United States than in Europe. A similar 
question that is of more interest in the European context is the question 
of 'hysteresis1; that is, mismatch, search effectiveness and other changes 
of a structural nature that accompany or follow a fall in demand and which 
persist longer than the demand shock.
The argument is that big changes in unemployment such as the ones 
observed in the 1970s and early 1980s in Europe themselves cause mismatch
problems and reductions in the search effectiveness of unemployed workers.
An important and much discussed mechanism that causes these problems is 
long-term unemployment. Big increases in unemployment lead to
proportionally even bigger increases in the duration of unemployment. If 
the long-term unemployed lose skills and the will to search for new job
openings, relocate etc., the degree of mismatch between vacancies and
unemployed workers increases and workers' search effectiveness falls.^
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Another factor that causes similar problems is internal adjustments in 
firms' production practices, which may become more frequent at times of 
depressed demand. If demand is buoyant firms are busy producing for sale. 
The high demand yields them sufficient profit and the incentive to engage 
in time and resource consuming reorganization of their internal practices 
is reduced. But if demand is slack and profits suffer the incentive to 
reduce costs by internal reorganization increases. Most frequently such 
adjustments involve redundancies of workers who are not easily employable 
elsewhere.^ Harold Wilson's July 1966 measures are a good example of this. 
Aggregate demand was reduced in order to give British industry the 
incentive to 'shake-out' unproductive labour.
Hysteresis through long-term unemployment, structural change or any 
other reason, shifts the UV curve to the right. But the shift now comes 
after a downward shift of the VS curve,. because the hysteresis comes after 
a fall in demand. Thus, the dynamic path in Figure 5.4 now starts from A 
and moves towards B, but it then turns outwards towards point D. If the 
demand fall that caused the shift in the VS curve in the first instance is 
temporary, the dynamic path then turns up but not towards its initial 
equilibrium point A. Hysteresis usually lasts longer than the demand 
shock. The path from B moves towards point C, on a UV curve that is 
further away from the origin than the original curve. If the shock is 
permanent and if the rise in unemployment is accompanied by hysteresis, the 
path that the economy follows in Figure 5.4 again starts at A and moves 
down towards point B, but before it settles at B turns towards point D.
5.4.4 Summary
Thus different kinds of shocks produce different dynamic paths in 
vacancy-employment space. Inspection of real—data diagrams may therefore 
give some idea of the type of shock that has caused a change in
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unemployment. More precise analysis will require better techniques. 
Given, however, the sharp differences between some of the paths in Figure 
5.4, we reasonably expect to be able to differentiate between at least 
three types of change: the closed anticlockwise loops of temporary
aggregate changes, A-B-A; the positively-sloped paths of exogenous 
structural or mismatch shocks, A-C; and the open loops of aggregate 
activity shocks with hysteresis, A-B-C or A-B-D. The distinction between a 
temporary demand shock and a longer-lasting one due, e.g. to changes in 
wages pressure, is more difficult to draw from a diagram, because of the 
similarity of the paths A-B-C and A-B-D. This distinction is also more 
difficult to analyse within our econometric framework than within a 
framework that estimates the wage equation as one of the structural 
equations, as for example in the work of Layard and Nickell (1987). In our 
work we concentrate primarily on policy measures that affect the process 
that matches workers to job vacancies.
5.5 A first look at the Beveridge diagrams
Figure 5.5 shows the weighted average unemployment and vacancy rates 
for the 'world' (that is for all the countries in our sample). Part (a) of 
the figure plots them against time and part (b) against each other, in a 
space similar to that of Figure 5.4. The plots against time reveal a 
similar cyclicality in both vacancies and unemployment with some trend. 
The trend is much stronger in unemployment than in vacancies. Much of the 
cyclicality in vacancies and unemployment, however, is due to the behaviour 
of the two series in the United States, which makes up about 40 per cent of 
the sample. If the United States observations are excluded (Figure 5.6), 
the cyclicality in both vacancies and unemployment is reduced and the 
upward trend in unemployment increased.
In terms of our previous analysis, the cyclicality in vacancies and
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unemployment is due to temporary shifts of the supply of vacancies curve in 
Figure 5.4; the trend fall in vacancies to longer-term rightward shifts of 
the same curve; and the trend rise in unemployment both to the longer-term 
shifts of the vacancy curve and to rightward shifts of the Beveridge curve. 
Referring back to Figures 5.2 and 5.3, we can then argue that the temporary 
shifts in the supply of vacancies curve are most likely due to changes in 
the demand for labour at given wages, as shown by shifts of the vacancy 
curve in Figure 5.3; and the longer-term shifts in the supply of vacancies 
curve to changes in wage pressure at given unemployment rates, as 
manifested by shifts in the wage curve.
A look at the Beveridge diagrams for the world, part (b) of Figure 5.5 
and part (b) of Figure 5.6 when the United States is excluded, suggests 
that all three types of shifts described in the preceding paragraph may 
have taken place. There are three discernible cycles in these diagrams. 
One that started in 1970 or earlier and terminated in 1973; one that 
started in 1973 and terminated in 1979; and one that started with the 
downturn of 1979 (1980 when the United States is excluded) and continued to 
the end of the sample. Each cycle is characterized by a reversible 
downward shift of the supply of vacancies curve, though when the United 
States is excluded the reversal in 1978 had hardly taken hold when the 1980 
downturn occurred. But in each cycle, the range of the fluctuation in 
vacancies is further down from the range in the previous cycle, indicating 
a longer-lasting downward shift of the supply of vacancies curve alongside 
the cyclical fluctuation.
An equally notable feature of the world Beveridge diagrams is that none 
of the three loops around the downward sloping UV curve returns to its 
starting point: 1979 is to the right of 1973 and 1989 is to the right of 
1979. Thus the Beveridge curve must have shifted to the right each time,
suggesting that there may have been some worsening in structural problems 
or in mismatch. In each case, however, the shift of the Beveridge curve 
came after a recession. Thus on average the rise in world unemployment 
appears to be closest to the third case that we discussed in the preceding 
section; that is, to the case of hysteresis following recession.
A look at the country diagrams shows that there are some interesting 
contrasts between the countries in the sample. Figure 5.7 gives the
Beveridge diagrams for all the countries in the sample (plus Switzerland 
and New Zealand) and in Table 5.2 we suggest a classification of countries 
according to the three cases discussed in the preceding section, with
reference to the cycle that began in 1979-80 or later. The letters under
each column refer to the paths in Figure 5.4.
The United States in the 1980s offers the best example of a country 
that has been subject to aggregate shocks but to no structural change or. 
search-related shocks. Its behaviour contrasts with that of the world 
average and with that of Germany and the United Kingdom, which appear to be 
typical cases of aggregate shock followed by persistence. France appears 
to fit best a description of negative and irreversible aggregate shocks. 
Pure outwards shifts of the Beveridge curve, unaccompanied by demand 
shocks, are rare and appear to have affected only two of the smaller 
countries in two short periods,
5.6 The role of labour market policies and other institutional factors
5.6.1 Labour market policies
The policies included under the general heading of labour market
policies are mainly meant to improve the employability of particular groups 
of unemployed workers.
Labour market policies can affect all three relationships that form our 
analytic framework. Employment subsidies can increase the supply of jobs
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at given wages, while employment services and training programmes can 
affect the rate at which unemployed workers find jobs at given number of 
vacancies. In this paper the policies that we consider affect mainly the 
job-finding rate at a given vacancy rate; that is, policies that either 
inadvertently affect the Beveridge curve or explicitly make it more 
favourable. We consider the channels through which they operate in turn.
The target groups are usually the long-term unemployed, though other 
'hard-to-place' groups (such as youths who left school early) are often 
also identified. The net effect of such policies (if successful) is to 
increase the rate at which unemployed workers find suitable jobs out of a 
given stock of available vacancies. Thus in terms of our analytic 
framework they increase the job-matching rate for given 
vacancy-unemployment stocks and so shift the Beveridge curve towards the 
origin. Their equilibrium effects are likely to be a reduction of both 
unemployment and vacancies.
Labour market policies of the kind considered under this heading is 
likely, however, to have some other influences on the vacancy-unemployment 
relation. If labour market policies improve the marginal rate of job 
matching, in addition to the average rate discussed above, they are likely 
to make the Beveridge curve flatter. A flatter Beveridge curve implies 
that a given improvement in job availability (increase in the number of job 
vacancies) decreases unemployment by more; so labour market policies in 
this case increase the employment benefits of a given programme of job 
creation.
Labour market policies may also speed up the recovery from a given 
shock to employment. We argued that adjustments to the equilibrium 
vacancy-unemployment relation take time and trace anti-clockwise loops 
around the Beveridge curve. An effective labour market policy may speed up
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the adjustment to the equilibrium relation by making it easier for 
displaced workers to find suitable jobs and removing other inertia in the 
operation of the jobs market.
Other institutional arrangements also affect the functioning of the 
labour market:
5.6.2 Unemployment insurance
The effects of unemployment insurance on unemployment is a much debated 
issue.® In the . job-search literature the mechanism that attracted most 
attention is the effect of unemployment insurance on the choosiness of 
unemployed workers. The alleged effect is that unemployment benefits 
reduce the cost of unemployment and so enable the unemployed worker to 
increase his reservation wage or reduce his search intensity. The effect 
of either of these is to reduce the rate at which unemployed workers meet 
suitable job vacancies and so shift the Beveridge curve outwards.
But another important channel through which unemployment insurance 
affects unemployment is wage determination. Higher unemployment benefits 
increase the bargaining strength of workers or of their representatives, 
and so increases the wage rate at given labour-market tightness. This 
mechanism shifts the wage curve of Figure 5.3 up and so it shifts the 
supply of vacancies curve of Figure 5.2 to the right.
Both mechanisms of the preceding two paragraphs increase equilibrium 
unemployment, though one increases and the other decreases equilibrium 
vacancies. Since the mechanism that works through the wage rate increases 
unemployment by reducing the number of job vacancies, in a regression of 
unemployment with vacancies as one of the right-hand side variables we are 
not likely to be able to identify it. But the choosiness effect can be 
picked up because it operates at given vacancies and unemployment.
Another effect of unemployment insurance on job search, which is often
-163-
neglected in theoretical discussions because it requires some kind of 
hard-to-model market failure, might actually lead to a reduction of 
equilibrium unemployment at given vacancies. The argument is that 
unemployed workers who might be constrained by the lack of savings, cut off 
from labour-market contacts and generally feeling excluded from the 
networks that bring together jobs and workers, may feel more part of the 
market when a comprehensive unemployment insurance system is in place to 
cater for them. In other words, the unemployment insurance system becomes 
part of the formal labour-market networks and those who are part of it feel 
more attachment to the labour market than those who are left out of it.
If the latter argument is correct, those receiving unemployment benefit 
may be closer to labour-market contacts than those who do not, and so 
countries with elaborate insurance systems may experience a higher rate of 
job matching than countries with less complete coverage.9
Thus the actual level of unemployment benefit may or may not influence 
the Beveridge curve adversely (even ignoring the last favourable mechanism, 
the evidence from job-search studies is far from conclusive). But a second 
aspect of the unemployment insurance system, the length of time that 
unemployed workers can claim benefit, is likely to influence the curve 
adversely. The choosiness argument applies for as long as benefits are
available. The longer an unemployed worker expects to qualify for benefit 
the more choosey he is likely to be. When benefits are expected to run 
out, reservation wages decline progressively during search, increasing the 
probability of finding a job.10 The attachment argument also leads to the 
conclusion that when benefits are expected to run out the worker is more 
likely to move into employment more quickly. When the expectation is that 
benefits will soon run out, workers are likely to intensify their job 
search activity to avoid the risk of losing their labour market links.
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Thus, given the level of benefit, longer qualification should shift the 
Beveridge curve out from the origin.
5.6.3 Corporatism
Corporatism has been debated widely in terms of its influence on the 
wage determination process.H The argument is that wages in corporatist 
economies respond faster to a rise in unemployment or to external shocks 
that are expected to cause a rise in unemployment than they do in 
non-corporatist economies. So the increase in unemployment following a
negative shock is likely to be less and last for a shorter period of time
in corporatist than in non-corporatist economies.
The argument so far does not involve the Beveridge curve. Unemployment 
in corporatist economies rises by less because wages fall faster when there 
is a negative shock. In terms of Figures 5.2 and 5.3 this argument implies 
that corporatist economies have a flatter wage curve, so the vacancy curve 
in Figure 5.2 does not shift much in response to negative shocks. But 
other features of corporatism are likely to imply a Beveridge curve closer 
to the origin than in non-corporatist economies.
Firstly, we have argued that a rise in unemployment, regardless of 
source, may cause hysteresis through long-term unemployment or other 
reasons. Corporatist economies are likely to respond fast to this threat 
and contain the factors that are likely to cause hysteresis. Thus
non-corporatist economies are more likely to experience the shifting UV 
curve that brings about the open loops A-B-C of Figure 5.4, than 
corporatist economies are. Corporatist economies are more likely to 
experience the closed loops A-B-A, and the grouping of countries in table
5.2 confirms this. The Beveridge curve of a corporatist economy is 
consequently likely to be on average closer to the origin than the
Beveridge curve of a non-corporatist one.
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Secondly, a corporatist economy is likely to be more egalitarian in its 
wage choices than a non-corporatist one. The wages commanded by a given 
individual in different industries or different locations are therefore 
likely to be closer to each other in the corporatist economies than in the 
non-corporatist ones. Since the returns to search are less when wages are 
more uniform across locations, unemployed workers in corporatist economies 
are not as likely to hold out for a good wage offer as are unemployed 
workers in non-corporatist economies. With less search taking place, the 
Beveridge curve in corporatist economies is again likely to be closer to 
the origin than in non-corporatist ones.
Finally, corporatism is as much a state of mind and an implicit 
commitment to help each other in the labour market as an explicit 
institutional arrangement for wage determination. Labour market policies 
are likely to be more frequently reviewed, better targeted and command more 
support from unions and employer groups than in non-corporatist economies. 
Thus they are also likely to be more successful. The scarcity of good data 
and inherent difficulties in quantifying the intensity and success of 
policies make it difficult to construct a policy variable that will fully 
capture the many different aspects of labour market policies. Corporatism 
may capture some of these unobserved features of policies. Corporatist 
economies are likely to have Beveridge curves closer to the origin than 
non-corporatist economies are, because the unobserved aspects of their 
labour market policies are likely to be more successful in reducing 
unemployment at given vacancy rates than in non-corporatist economies.
Thus, in summary, labour-market policies targeted to the long- term 
unemployed and the hard-to-place and corporatism are likely to shift the 
Beveridge curve inwards; the duration of unemployment benefits is likely to 
shift it outwards; and the level and coverage of unemployment benefit is
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like ly to have small and ambiguous effects though on balance it is expected 
to shift the Beveridge curve outwards.
5.7 Results of the empirical analysis
5.7.1 Methodology
We test the effects of the various labour-market policies discussed in 
the preceding section by estimating regressions for Beveridge curves for 
the fourteen countries in our sample. The argument underlying our 
estimation is that the unemployment-vacancy relationship in each country is 
subject to two types of shocks, common world shocks and country-specific 
shocks. World shocks may include some policy changes that are common to 
all countries, but generally we do not believe that these are important or 
that they can easily be quantified. Our analysis of policy effects 
concentrates on country-specific aspects, and with one exception only it 
derives all effects by comparing country experiences. In order to avoid 
having to model the common world shocks that affect each country's 
unemployment-vacancy relationship, we estimate our regressions by following 
a two-step procedure. In step 1 we regress the logarithm of unemployment 
and the logarithm of vacancies on nineteen zero-one dummy variables, for 
the nineteen years in our sample. Thus, each dummy takes value 1 in one 
year only and zero elsewhere. The coefficients on the dummies identify the 
world shocks (the graph of these coefficients looks very similar to part 
(a) of Figure 5.5, as can be seen in Appendix Figure 5.1, Part (b)). We 
then take the residual from these regressions, which now reflects only 
country-specific influences, and in step 2 we regress the unemployment 
residual on the vacancy residual and on a set of four other variables: 
policy variables, country fixed effects (that is, a different intercept for 
each country), one-year lag of the dependent variable, and country-specific 
time trends.
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5.7.2 Individual country estimates of the Beveridge curve
Table 5.3 gives the unconstrained estimates of the vacancy-unemployment 
relation for each country when the policy variables are excluded. The 
fixed effects identify the position of the Beveridge curve for each country 
when we control for the other variables and they show a plausible pattern. 
The vacancy-unemployment relation slopes down in all countries except 
Austria and the Netherlands (where the coefficients are poorly determined), 
and it also exhibits lagged adjustments in virtually all countries. We 
refer to the coefficient on vacancies as the slope coefficient and to the 
coefficient on lagged unemployment as the persistence coefficient. The 
country-specific time trends are significant in some countries and 
generally they are correlated with the fixed effects. We include them in 
all regressions that follow but do not report them or discuss them further.
5.7.3 Effects of labour market policies
In column (1) of Table 5.4 we replace the country fixed effects by the 
policy variables. Thus these regressions investigate whether policy 
differences between countries can explain the differences in the location 
of the Beveridge curve. The results of this investigation confirm that 
policy variables can play this role. The Gallant-Jorgenson test for the 
replacement of the country constants by a common constant and policy 
variables is below its critical 5 percent value, indicating that policy 
variables explain the differences in the country intercepts. We discount 
the idea that this substitution might be spuriously due to the fixed 
effects being badly determined, by observing that the Gallant Jorgenson 
test for the replacement of the country fixed effects by a common intercept 
convincingly rejects this hypothesis. As expected, labour market policies 
and corporatism shift the Beveridge curve inwards and the duration of 
unemployment benefits shift it outwards. The replacement ratio also shifts
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the Beveridge curve outwards but in the unconstrained regressions of column 
1 its effect is not well defined. Generally, we found that the coefficient 
estimated for the replacement ratio was the least well determined of the 
policy coefficients that we estimated, often changing magnitude and 
significance with small changes in the specification of the equations.12
Our labour market policy variables are firstly the 1985 level of 
expenditure per unemployed worker as a country dummy (that is, it takes a 
single value for each country) and secondly two other zero-one dummy 
variables for policy changes within countries. The two dummy variables are 
the only policy dummies that capture some within-country variation in 
policy. Policy dummy 1 changes from zero to one when a new labour market 
policy is introduced in the country in question. Policy dummy 2 changes 
from zero to one when a second labour market policy is introduced in a 
country, where appropriate (see Main Labour Market Programmes 1970-88). 
Thus these two dummies capture the effects of new policies. In contrast, 
the variable 'labour market policy' captures the effects of broad 
differences in the extent of labour market intervention in different 
countries.
The variable 'labour market policy' takes values ranging from 2.7 (for 
the United States) to 25 (for Sweden), with a mean value of 8.13 Thus on 
average it implies, for example, (using the unconstrained estimates in 
column 1) that the United States Beveridge curve is to the right of the 
'world' curve by about 13.8 per cent of world unemployment, whereas 
Sweden's curve is to the left of the world curve by about 44 percent.
The first dummy for policy change takes value 1 for ten countries 
(Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom) and the second policy dummy takes 
value 1 for four of these countries (Australia, Denmark, France, United
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Kingdom) . The second policy change appears to have been more effective on 
average than the first, where they both occurred. The countries with one
policy change have, after the change, a Beveridge curve 7.8 percent to the
left of where is was before, whereas the four countries with two new 
policies have a curve that is now about 23 percent to the left of the 
original position. These dummy variables are a little crude, but for most 
countries they are the only data available. However, for five countries 
(the Nordic countries and the UK) we are able to construct time series data 
on expenditure on labour market policies. We re-estimated the regression 
in Table 5.4 column (1) using this data. In four of these five countries 
there is a clear and statistically significant effect of labour market 
policies on unemployment at given vacancies.
The experience of labour market policies may explain in part the 
difference between the world vacancy-unemployment relation in 1979 and the 
same relation in 1989. Both years were peaks of cycles, but the 1989 point 
is proportionally closer to the 1979 point than the 1979 point is to 1974. 
New labour market policies in the 1980s pushed the 1989 point to the left,
thus avoiding the open loops around the UV curve that characterised the
1970s.
The duration of benefits ranges from 0.5 years (in Canada, Japan and 
the US) to indefinite, which we specify as 4 years for the purposes of the 
regressions (in Australia, Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Netherlands 
and the UK) . The Beveridge curve of the latter group of countries is a 
full 56 percent of unemployment to the right of the Beveridge curve of the 
former group of countries. The replacement ratio has a smaller effect, as 
expected. The smallest value it takes is for the UK, at 0.36, and the 
highest for Denmark, at 0.9. The observation for Denmark, however, is an 
outlier: most countries are concentrated around 0.6. But even the big
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difference between the ratios for the UK and Denmark can explain a 
difference in the location of the Beveridge curve that is about 15 percent 
of unemployment.
Finally, corporatism measured by the Calmfors-Driffill index of
centralisation of wage bargaining, ranges from 0 (for Canada) to 15 (for 
Austria), with a mean value of 8.1. Given the similar magnitude of 
variation of this variable and our measure of labour market policies, it is 
clear from the estimated coefficients that corporatism is quantitatively 
more important than the pure cross-sectional variations in labour-market 
policies. But as we argued in the preceding section, corporatism in this 
context is perhaps best thought of as a proxy for unobserved features of 
labour market policies. At a corporatist value of 15, the Austrian 
Beveridge curve is about 41 percent to the left of the average and the
Canadian curve about 49 percent to the right of it.
In columns (2)-(4) of Table 5.4 we test whether labour market policy 
has any other effect on the vacancy-unemployment relationship, besides its 
influence on the location of the curve. The results reported in column (2) 
examine the role of labour market policies in the determination of the 
response of unemployment to vacancies. Labour-market policies make the 
vacancy-unemployment relationship flatter, so a small increase in vacancies 
is more effective in reducing unemployment than otherwise. The interactive 
effect is very strong, so slopes across countries appear to differ 
substantially. The restriction that when controlling for labour market 
policies slopes are statistically similar is accepted, so the specification 
in column (2 ) is a more parsimonious version of the unrestricted 
specification in column (1 ).
The results reported in column (3) show that countries with labour
market policies recover more quickly from recessions: persistence is
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negative ly related to labour market policies. The negative effect of 
labour market policies on persistence appears robust, and the restrictions 
on the persistence coefficients needed to test for this effect are not 
satisfied (see the Gallant-Jorgenson test at the bottom row of the table). 
Column (4) imposes restrictions on both the slope and the persistence 
coefficients of the Beveridge curves. Although the results are similar to 
the results of the previous two columns, the combined intersections are not 
accepted at the 5 per cent level (but on the margin of acceptance at the 1 
per cent level).
5.8 Conclusions
We have followed an approach based on the vacancy-unemployment 
relationship (the Beveridge curve) to evaluate the sources of change in 
unemployment in fourteen OECD countries and the role played by labour 
market policies in containing the rise in unemployment. Our conclusions 
are:
1. Both in the 1970s and 1980s, the increases in unemployment 
originated in falls in the demand for labour. In most countries the 
initial rise in unemployment persisted because of changes on the supply 
side that reduced the job effectiveness of the unemployed.
2. Labour market policies intensified in the 1980s. This 
substantially reduced unemployment, on average, from what it could have 
been, had the 1970s experience been repeated.
3. Labour market policies, such as training programmes, help to the 
unemployed in their job search, explicit placement programmes for 
hard-to-place groups etc., help to shift the vacancy-unemployment relation 
towards the origin and they also make it flatter. Thus, at given 
vacancies, countries that pursue these policies have less unemployment, and 
when they experience an increase in their vacancies their unemployment
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falls by more (in proportional terms) than in other countries. Labour 
market policies also speed up the adjustment to equilibrium, by reducing 
the influence that past unemployment has on future unemployment.
4. Our estimates permit a rough assessment of the cost-effectiveness 
of labour market policies. Using 1985 levels of expenditure as a measure 
of labour market policy we have estimated in Section 5.6 that at given 
vacancies the unemployment rate in Sweden is for example, reduced by about 
2 percentage points relative to that of the United States. To achieve 
this, Sweden spends about 1 percent of GDP more than the United States on 
labour market policies (see Table 5.1). Table 5.6 presents the same 
comparison for other countries.
5. Unemployment benefits increase unemployment at given level of 
vacancies. But the effect of the level of benefits is small when compared 
with the effect of the maximum duration of benefits. Countries where 
benefits run out after say six or twelve months experience a more 
favourable vacancy-unemployment relation than countries that pay benefits 
indefinitely.
6 . Corporatism shifts the vacancy-unemployment relationship inwards, 
giving rise to less unemployment at given vacancies. We interpret this 
effect of corporatism as arising from the fact that corporatist countries 
are more likely to reach consensus on the appropriate labour market 
policies and work for the success of the policies.
FOOTNOTES
Financial Support from the Department of Employment and the Economic 
and Social Research Council is gratefully acknowledged.
See for example Diamond (1982) , Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1984). 
The reason for the importance of this effect in search models is that 
it is an 'externality* that implies that the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment is inefficient. Our discussion in this paper does not 
touch on efficiency issues. Some of these issues are discussed in an 
empirical context in Pissarides (1986).
Formal models always confirm this, giving a positive relation between 
wages and the rate of unemployment. See Pissarides (1990, chapter 1) 
for formal demonstration in a framework similar to the one described 
here and Blanchflower and Oswald (1990) for a variety of arguments and 
empirical evidence in the context of union models.
For an analysis of this problem in a framework very similar to the one 
in this paper see Jackman, Layard and Pissarides (1989), Pissarides 
(1986) and Blanchard and Diamond (1989). The early uses of this 
apparatus - needless to say not in its present-day refined state - were 
partly to provide justification for various measures of the excess 
demand for labour used in wage inflation (Phillips curve) studies, as 
in the classic papers by Dow and Dicks-Mireaux (1958) and Lipsey 
(I960), and partly to classify unemployment into various types, as in 
the study by Thirlwall (1969) . Our work is more closely related to the 
latter type of analysis, though rather than use the apparatus to 
classify unemployment into various types, which we do not believe to be 
either meaningful or useful, we use it to classify the causes of change 
of unemployment into different types. The short papers by Gujarati 
(1972) and Taylor (1972) also used Beveridge curves to study some of
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the causes of change in unemployment in the 1960s.
4 See for example Phelps (1968) and Hansen (1970).
5 On this question see Abraham and Katz (1986) and Blanchard and Diamond
(1989).
6 See in particular Layard and Nickell (1987) for the argument in the 
British context, and Jackman and Layard (1991) for time-series evidence 
that long term unemployment reduces the search effectiveness of 
workers.
7 See Davis (1987) for evidence on this and related issues.
8 See Atkinson and Micklewright (1990) for a survey.
9 Some theory for the apparent perverse effect of unemployment insurance
on the job finding rate was provided by Mortensen (1977), though the
mechanism that he emphasized is related to entitlement of benefit and
not to market failure. Evidence that those receiving benefit are 
closer to job-matching networks than those who are not was presented by 
Wadsworth (1991) by using the British Labour Force Survey.
10 See for example Shavell and Weiss (1979).
11 See for example Calmfors and Driffill (1988) and the originators of the
economic debate, Bruno and Sachs (1985).
12 Because of data limitations the replacement ratios that we use in the
regressions have no time variation, so the coefficient estimated is for
country differences only.
13 The regressions are based on 1985 data, as we only have data for this
year for benefit durations, corporatism and the replacement rate. More 
recent data for expenditure on labour market policies for 1988 is given 
in Table 5.1.
TABLE 5,1
Public Expenditure on Labour Market Programmes: 1988
ESA
(1)
%
LMT
(2 )
of GDP 
DJC/ES 
(3)
Total
(4)
Per unemployed person 
Unemployment ESA LMT 
Rate (5) (6 )
as % of 
DJC/ES 
(7)
output per person 
Total 
(8 )
Australia 0.1 0.05 0.06 0.21 7.2 1.3 0.6 0.8 2.7
Austria 0.11 0.07 0.03 0.21 3.5 3.0 1.9 0.8 5.8
Belgium 0.18 0.14 0.68 1.00 10.2 1.6 1.2 6.0 8.8
Canada 0.2 0.2 0.02 0.42 7.7 2.4 2.4 0.2 5.0
Denmark 0.11 0.51 0.03 0.65 8.6 1.2 5.4 0.3 6.9
Finland 0.09 0.27 0.41 0.77 4.5 1.9 5.7 8.7 16.3
France 0.13 0.28 0.04 0.45 10.1 1.2 2.5 0.4 4.0
Germany 0.23 0.32 0.22 0.77 6.2 3.5 4.8 3.3 11.6
Greece 0.07 0.12 0.2 0.39 7.6 0.9 1.5 2.4 4.7
Ireland 0.15 0.52 0.3 0.97 16.7 0.7 2.6 1.5 4.8
Italy 0.08 0.03 0 0.11 10.6 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.9
Japan 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.19 2.5 1.2 1.2 5.1 7.4
Luxemburg 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.14 1.6 3.1 1.2 4.3 8.6
Netherlands 0.09 0.21 0.06 0.36 9.5 0.9 2.0 0.6 3.4
New Zealand 0.08 0.5 0.21 0.79 6 1.3 7.8 3.3 12.4
Norway 0.11 0.07 0.02 0.20 3.2 3.3 2.1 0.6 6.0
Portugal 0.11 0.26 0.13 0.50 5.6 1.9 4.4 2.2 8.4
Spain 0.09 0.12 0.4 0.61 19.1 0.4 0.5 1.7 2.6
Sweden 0.2 0.51 0.2 0.91 1.6 6.1 15.7 6.1 28.0
Switzerland 0.07 0.01 0 0.08 2.1 3.3 0.5 0.0 3.7
Turkey 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.09 15.9 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5
United Kingdom 0.14 0.14 0.2 0.48 9 1.4 1.4 2.0 4.9
United States 0.06 0.11 0.01 0.18 5.4 1.1 1.9 0.2 3.2
Notes: ESA - Employment Services and Administration
LMT - Labour Market Training
DJC/ES - Direct Job Creation and Employment Subsidies 
Figures in France and Luxembourg are for 1987 
Sources: Public expenditure on labour market programmes: OECD Employment Outlook. July 1989, pp.205-207. 
Unemployment: OECD Economic Outlook. No.45, June 1989, Tables R17 and R18.
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TABLE 5.2 
Three types of change in the 1980s
Demand-side 
shock 
(A-B-A)
Supply-side
change
(A-C)
Demand-side shock 
Supply-side persistence 
(A-B-C) or (A-B-D)
Austria 80-86 Austria 86-88 Australia
Denmark Norway 85-88 Belgium
Finland Canada
France Germany
Netherlands Japan
Norway 80-85 United Kingdom
Sweden 
United States
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TABLE 5.3 
Sample 1971-1988 
Dependent Variable (u£-bt)
Fixed _ _ Gallant
Country Effect [v£-dt] [ b t Trend Sargan* Jorgenson** SE***
Australia 0 .,18 -0 .,12 0 .43 0 .00046 2 .6 1 .3 0 .090
(2 .3) (0 .8 ) (2 .2 ) (0 .09)
Austria -0 .,32 0 .,42 0 .,64 0 .,023 3..5 0 .,7 0 .,113
(1 .2 ) (0 .5) (4. 0 ) (1 .2 )
Belgium 0 .,35 -0 .24 0 .21 0 .04 1 .,4 0 .08 0 .,058
(3,.3) (3..9) (1 .0 ) (3. 7)
Canada 0 .,54 -0 .,31 -0 .074 -0 .035 3..0 0 .,004 0 .,037
(5,■ 6 ) (4..5) (0 .4) (5. 6 )
Denmark -0 .31 -0 .,19 0 .,53 -0 .0011 9.,4 1 1 .,6 0 .,20
(0 .■ 9) (1 .5) (2 .7) (0.09)
Finland -0 .,092 -0 .43 0 .35 -0 .,0051 4,.5 0 .,7 0 .11
(2 .3) (4. 0 ) (2 .7) (0 .9)
France 0 .13 -0 .23 0 ,40 0 .,0027 0 ,.07 0 .,04 0 .054
(2 .4) (3..5) (2 .• 9) (0 .■ 7)
Germany 0 .32 -0 .29 0 .59 0 .,020 4..8 6 .9 0 .148
(1 .6) (1 .■ 5) (3. 5) (1 .6 )
Japan -0 .48 -0 .35 0 .30 -0 .0097 6 .7 0 .3 0 .056
(1 .8 ) (1 .3) (0 .• 7) (1 .4)
Netherlands 0 .17 0 ,.007 0 ,.68 0 .0044 3 .1 0 .02 0 .,100
(2 ,.1 ) (0 ,.06) (5,■ 2 ) (0 .4)
Norway -0 ,.78 -0 ,.74 0 ,.41 -0 .006 6 .4 9,.5 0 .169
(2 ,.0 ) (1 .• 5) (1 .4) (0 .4)
Sweden -1 .06 -1 ,.3 -0 .0001 -0 .022 1 ,.0 0 ,.7 0 .142
(4..7) (3,• 8 ) (0 .04) (2 ,.1)
United Kingdom 0 ,.68 -0 .51 0 .65 0 ,.018 9 .2 2 .5 0 .086
(2 .8 ) (1 .• 9) (5,.1 ) (3..0 )
United States 0 ,.43 -0 .20 0 .30 -0 .035 5 .5 1 .5 0 .079
(2 .4) (2 .0 ) (1 • 5) (2 ,.6 )
Notes:
Estimation by 2SLS. _
Instruments used were (v£-dt)_^, GDP_^ (lagged real 
GDP) and M_i (lagged real imports).
Trend (1985) = 0.
Asymptotic t-statistics in parenthesis. Critical value at 5% level -1.
8 and at 10% level 1.3 [£(18-4)]-
* Sargan specification test statistic. Critical value for mis-
specification at 5% level 6.0 [x^2 two overidentifying restrictions].
** Gallant Jorgensen test for 1st order serial correlation. Critical value 
at 5% level 3.8 [x 1 ]•
*** Standard error of equation.
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Notes (cont.):
To eliminate world ’shocks' from national unemployment and vacancy rates we 
estimated:
u it ** ^t + ei , t ^  “ 38.7%
^it " + nift R2 - 12.7%
where b t and dt are time dummies for years 1970-1988 (see Appendix Table 2
and Appendix Figure 1) we then used the residuals from these equations for
estimator purposes.
All variables in logarithmic form.
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TABLE 5.4
Sample 1971-1988 
Dependent Variable (u^-bt)
Country
Fixed
Effect [vi-dt] Cui~b tl-i
Accommodate 
Trend Stance
Gallant** 
Sargan* Jorgenson SE
Denmark 1.1 -0.39 0.057 0.09 -0.12 0.9 0.0 0.24
(1 .6 ) (2.3) (0 .2 ) (2 .2 ) (2.4)
Finland 0.59 -0.46 0.37 -0.03 -0.019 1.3 1.0 0.137
(1 .6 ) (3.8) (2.3) (2 .0 ) (1.9)
Norway -0.27 -0.49 0.61 -0.007 -0.01 8.2 9.9 0.156
(0.5) (1.3) (2 .0 ) (0.5) (0.7)
Sweden -0.32 -0.87 0.0019 -0.04 -0.017 3.5 0.5 0.087
(1 .0 ) (4.0) (0 .0 1) (3.6) (2 .0 )
United 0.77 -0.49 0.82 0.032 -0.041 5.3 0.8 0.080
Kingdom (5.1) (3.7) (5.9) (3.9) (2.3)
Notes:
Estimation by 2SLS: _
Instruments used were (v i-ht)_i, AS_^, GDP_^ and
Asymptotic t-statistics in parenthesis. Critical value at 5% level 1.8 
and at 10% level 1.3.
* Sargan specification test statistic. Critical value for mis- 
specification at 5% 6.0. [x^2l•
** Gallant-Jorgenson Test for first order serial correlation. Critical 
value at 5% level 3.8.
Accommodate Stance:
For Nordic countries based on figures from Calmfors and Nymoen (1990). 
'Ratio (in per cent) between the work force in programmes and the sum of 
the work force in programmes and in open unemployment for 1985-1988 
we spliced on labour market spending per unemployed person per unit of 
GDP. '
For United Kingdom figures based on equivalent ratio for the Community 
Programme (see Appendix Figure 5.6).
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TABLE 5.5 
Policy Influences on the UV Curve
Intercept 0.12 -0.04 -0.36 -0.28
(0.5) (0 .2) (2.5) (2 .6 )
Labour Market Policy (LMP) -0.026 -0.026 -0.014 -0.016
(2.7) (4.2) (2 .2 ) (4.1)
Policy dummy 1 -0.078 -0.042 -0.043 -0.035
(2 .2 ) (1.3) (1 .2 ) (1 .2 )
Policy dummy 2 -0.15 -0.10 -0.11 -0.073
(2.9) (2 .2) (2 .1 ) (1.9)
Benefit duration 0.16 0.14 0.22 0.14
(3.5) (4.4) (5.8) (6 .0 )
Replacement ratio 0.28 0.31 0.67 0.48
(0.7) (1 .1 ) (3.0) (2 .8)
Corporatism -0.060 -0.036 -0.080 -0.038
(2.4) (3.0) (4.8) (5.1)
log vacancy rate * 0.094 * 0.10
(1.3) (2.3)
log vacancy rate interacted -0.032 -0.029
with LMP (3.3) (4.3)
log lagged unemployment rate * * 0.77 0.81
(12.5) (20.4)
log lagged unemployment rate -0.027 -0.017
interacted with LMP (4.2) (4.1)
time trends * * * *
Gallant-J orgensen
Test of restrictions 10.2 14.8 16.8 43.3
(Critical at 5% level value) (14.1) (2 1 .1) (2 1 .1) (36.4)
Notes:
Estimation by 2SLS on pooled country equation.
Standard error of unrestricted pooled equation 0.113. Asterisk denotes 
that country specific estimates allowed for.
Instruments used were (v-dt)_^, GDP_^ and M_^.
Asymptotic t-statistics in parenthesis. Critical value at 5% level of 
significance 1 .6 . [t«>].
Results largely robust to (i) quadratic trends (ii) extension of estimation 
to period 1968-1989 and (iii) use of original OECD vacancy data.
GJ test for replacement of country fixed effects by single constant 79.1 
critical value at 10% level of confidence 22.4. [\'^13l*
Using implied step function (see Appendix Figure 5.5). We obtained:
LMPSTEP CORP DUR RHO GJ test of restrictions on country constants
(critical value at 5% level of significance x^g) 
-0.013 -0.093 0.14 -0.085 12.7
(1.9) (2.6) (1.5) (0.08) (16.9)
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TABLE 5.6
Cost-Effectiveness of Labour Market Policies
Budgetary Cost Unemployment Effect
Australia 0.35 3.20
Austria 0.23 0.97
Belgium 1.13 4.10
Canada 0.49 1.20
Denmark 0.60 4.60
Finland 0.76 . 2.86
France 0.44 3.98
Germany 0.58 2.26
Japan 0.16 0.41
Netherlands 0.35 1.79
Norway 0.44 1.39
Sweden 1.17 2.44
United Kingdom 0.45 2.15
United States 0.2 0.50
Notes:
The Budgetary cost is expenditure on labour-market policies in 
1985, expressed as a percentage of GDP. The unemployment effect 
is calculated as 100ug5[exp{0.026LMP + 0.078PD1+ 0.115PD2}-1] 
where ug5 is each country's unemployment rate in 1985.
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Figure 5.1
World unemployment rate and world labour market policies
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Figure 5.2 
Equilibrium unemployment and vacancies
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Figure 5.4
Three types of shock in the Beveridge curve
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Figure 5.6
World unemployment and vacancy rates 
excluding the United States
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Figure 5.7 (cont.)
National unemployment-vacancy relationships
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Figure 5.7 (cont.)
National unemployment-vacancv relationships
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APPENDIX A
Main Labour Market Programmes 1970-1988 
OECD Employment Outlook September 1987
Australia:
1983 Community Employment Programme "to provide the disadvantaged 
unemployed with temporary work in special schemes".
1985 Jobstart "to enhance the employment prospects of LTU"
Austria:
1985 Training contracts ("Action 8000" Programme) to provide training 
for LTU by training subsidies.
Belgium:
1982: Troisieme circuit de travail (Third Sector Employment) funding of 
special employment initiatives for chose unemployed for over two 
years.
Denmark:
1979 EIFL Programme "to restore motivation and self-confidence" and 
special training courses.
1983 Job Offer Scheme.
Finland:
1984 Wage subsidies to aid LTU.
Germany:
1983 Integration Assistance Subsidy, wage subsidies to LTU.
France:
1975 Contract Emploi-formation. Special training contracts with 
employers.
1983 Operation Long term unemployed involving 'appraisal' interviews. 
Netherlands:
1984 "Plough back scheme" and voluntary work by LTU.
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Sweden:
1984 Wage subsidy for LTU.
United Kingdom:
1983 Community Programme and Enterprise Allowance Scheme 
1987 Restart Programme.
APPENDIX B . DATA
Unemp1ovment OECD Economic Outlook. No.45, June 1989. Table R17
'Standardised', Unemployment Notes, except in Denmark and Austria, 
for which we use R18, 'National definitions' and for the UK 
for which we use Department of Employment 'Xll' Unemployment Series, 
which is adjusted for the various changes in the definition of 
unemployment in the UK.
Adjustment for breaks in standardised series
For Belgium adjust 1970-1982 by 11.7x12.1/12.9x12.6
For Germany adjust 1970-1983 by 7.1/8.0
For Sweden adjust 1970-1986 by 2.2/2.7
For Switzerland scaled by a factor of 3 to conform to Labour Force Survey 
figures.
For Italy scale by 10.6/11.8 (1987 ratio of LFS to standardised figures).
Vacancies: OECD Main Economic Indicators : Historical Statistics and
Main Economic Indicators. May 1989.
For UK use corrected figures from Jackman, Layard and Pissarides (1989)
For Germany use Franz (1990) corrected vacancy figures
For US and Canada indexes available. To create series of vacancy levels 
we use Abraham (1983) adjustments.
We scale remaining countries by a factor of 1.7 except Sweden for which 
reporting of vacancies is compulsory.
Labour force : OECD Main Economic Indicators : Historical Statistics 
and Economic Outlook. No.45, June 1989, Tables 37 and 38.
Labour Market Programmes : OECD Employment Outlook. July 1989 and 
Employment Outlook. September 1987.
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In constructing Labour Market Programmes per unemployed person for Sweden 
we measure unemployment to include those on labour market programmes 
in addition to those in "open" unemployment. This reduces the figure 
for Sweden for expenditure on Labour Market Policy by a half.
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APPENDIX TABLE 5.1 
'World* Unemployment and Vacancy Rates
World Rates %
Year Unemployment Rate Vacancy Rate
1968 2.53 3.32
1969 2.34 3.85
1970 2.90 3.37
1971 3.41 2.89
1972 3.42 3.16
1973 2.99 4.02
1974 3.37 3.27
1975 5.14 2.20
1976 5.09 2.34
1977 4.97 2.63
1978 4.75 3.12
1979 4.60 3.33
1980 5.15 2.84
1981 6.00 2.43
1982 7.41 1.81
1983 7.88 1.84
1984 7.20 2.37
1985 7.04 2.51
1986 6.89 2.58
1987 6.43 2.88
1988 5.79 3.08
1989 5.47 3.12
Notes:
Computed as weighted averages of national vacancy and unemployment rates 
over our 14 country OECD data set.
Weights used were relative 'Labour Force' shares averaged over 1968-1989. 
Simple correlation coefficient between World Unemployment rate and World 
Vacancy rate -0.81.
APPENDIX TABLE 5.2 
Capturing World Unemployment and Vacancy ’Shocks*
Year Unemplovment 'Shocks' Vacancy
1970 1.7 1.8
1971 2.0 1.5
1972 2.2 1.5
1973 2.0 2.0
1974 2.2 1.8
1975 3.4 1.0
1976 3.6 1.0
1977 3.9 0.9
1978 4.2 1.0
1979 4.1 1.1
1980 4.1 1.0
1981 5.0 0.7
1982 6.2 0.5
1983 7.0 0.5
1984 6.7 0.6
1985 6.4 0.9
1986 6.0 1.0
1987 5.9 1.0
1988 5.6 1.1
Notes:
Figures obtained by taking the exponential of the estimates of time dummies 
obtained from a pooled 14 country time series regression over the period 
1970-88 explaining country (log) unemployment and vacancy rates using year 
time dummies. The estimates obtained for the time dummies from the later 
procedures are in fact unweighted averages across countries of the 
logarithms of unemployment and vacancy rates respectively.
Estimation by Ordinary Least Squares.
R.2 for unemployment 38.7%.
R.2 for vacancies 12.7%.
14 Countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom and 
United States.
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APPENDIX FIGURE 5.3 
(see Table 1)
Public E xpenditure on 
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APPENDIX FIGURE 5.3 (cont.)
Public E xpenditu re  on Direct Job 
Creation + E m p lo y m en t Subsidies: 1988
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APPENDIX FIGURE 5.4 
Labour market spending per unemployed person at % of GDP 1985-L989
(Employment Outlook July 1989)
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APPENDIX FIGURE 5.4 (cont.)
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APPENDIX FIGURE 5 5 
(See Main Labour Market Programmes and APPENDIX FIGURE 2)
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APPENDIX FIGURE 5.5 (cont.)
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APPENDIX FIGURE 5.6 
Accommodate stance of labour market policies
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APPENDIX FIGURE 5.6 (cont.) 
Accommodate stance of labour market policies
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